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INTRODUCTION
IN banking, change is a permanent condition.' The pressure for change
is coming from many directions: from the banking industry, which
has been pushed by external competition and internal financial problems
to seek new products and markets,2 from scholars who support the trend
toward deregulation of industry,3 and even from the bank regulators
themselves.4 In response to these forces, large portions of traditional
bank regulation, including the twin pillars of geographic5 and product
restrictions,6 are crumbling rapidly.7
1. The revolution in the structure, business and regulation of the banking industry
has been extensively documented during the past few years, see, e.g., K. Cooper & D.
Fraser, Banking Deregulation and the New Competition in Financial Services (1984), but
is most dramatically illustrated by the changed services offered by banks to their custom-
ers. A bank customer today, unlike her counterpart a decade ago, can obtain discount
brokerage and other securities investment services from her bank, can earn a market rate
of interest on her bank balance and can withdraw cash from an automated teller machine
at a different address or even in a different state from her bank branch. The process of
innovation in the banking business has required complex reinterpretation of existing
banking statutes and regulation; the effects of innovation have been obvious.
2. See, e.g., Hayes, Investment Banking: Commercial Banks' Inroads, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 50 (May 1984) (banks offer new securities services); Sudo,
Bank Groups in Crucial States to Renew Push on Insurance, Am. Banker, Nov. 18, 1987,
at 1, col. 2 (banking groups lobby for new insurance powers); see also infra notes 99-137
and accompanying text (discussing profitability crisis in banking industry).
3. See, e.g., Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 Va. L. Rev. 301 (1987) (calling for further deregulation of bank-
ing). For a justification of the trend toward economic deregulation, see generally S.
Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982).
4. See, e.g., Trigaux, Corrigan Endorses Proxmire-Garn Bill, Am. Banker, Dec. 11,
1987, at 3, col. 2 (President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank favors new securities
powers for banking organizations). Despite philosophical differences among the three
federal bank regulators-the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and the Comptroller of the Currency-there appears to be a consensus as to the
need for further deregulation. According to one regulator, "[tioday, it is neither fashion-
able nor practical to speak out against deregulation." Taylor, Deregulation and Prudent
Supervision, 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 253, 253 (1987).
5. Federal laws such as the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982), and the Douglas
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982), and various
state laws restrict the ability of banking organizations to open branches or acquire addi-
tional banks outside of a single state. For a description of these restrictions, as well as
recent innovations, see Cohen, Interstate Banking: Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. L.A.L.
Rev. 965 (1985).
6. Federal regulation limits entry into the business and ownership of banks, see, e.g.,
Bank Holding Company Act § 3(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982) (acquisitions of banks
require prior regulatory approval); Glass-Steagall Act § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982) (for-
bidding affiliations between banks and securities firms), and restricts permissible activities
and investments of banking organizations, see, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act
§ 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987) (nonbanking activities and investments
of bank holding companies must be "so closely related to banking or managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto"); Glass-Steagall Act § 16, 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 Seventh (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (banks may not underwrite corporate securities).
State laws traditionally have contained similar restrictions. For a discussion of the re-
strictions on bank powers, see generally Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical
Perspective, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 676 (1983).
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Most recent commentary about bank regulation either documents the
changes or proposes further regulatory dismantling. In contrast, this Ar-
ticle offers a different perspective on the progress of deregulation of bank-
ing by examining the new strategies of regulation that are emerging to
take the place of the old regulatory controls.
Initially, the notion of a new regulation would seem to run counter to
the goal of deregulation of banking. Yet this new regulation is essential
to the continued progress and success of the deregulatory process. Un-
like the deregulation of many industries, deregulation of banking has not
meant that banks simply are unshackled from regulatory controls. The
fundamental aim of traditional bank regulation, protection of the safety
and soundness of the banking system,' remains an important concern of
7. The deregulatory process in banking, as in other regulated industries, gained mo-
mentum in the 1980s. In banking, deregulation has taken place principally through rein-
terpretation and restructuring of the day-to-day supervisory regulation of banks rather
than through legislative enactment. The bank regulators are committed to the continua-
tion of this deregulatory process. See, eg., Forrestal, Deregulation: Too Much or Not
Enough?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 4, 8 (Jan.-Feb. 1987) (President of the
Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank expressed doubts that "increasing regulation could return
us to the more or less placid financial system of the early 1960s"); cf. Langevoort, Statu-
tory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal
Banking Regulation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 672 (1987) (judicial construction as a means of
modernizing outmoded banking statutes). Of course, assaults on bank regulation have
not been uniformly successful. In recent years, Congress repeatedly has considered yet
has failed to enact legislation repealing the Glass-Steagall Act's fifty-year-old ban on bank
securities activities. See Garsson, Proxmire: Securities Bill Dead, Am. Banker, Oct. 21,
1988, at 1, col. 2. Periodic banking crises, such as large bank failures, have slowed the
process of deregulation and occasionally have even lead to some "re-regulation." In a
1983 survey, the overwhelming majority of bankers, regulators and legislators surveyed
predicted the total repeal of the Bank Holding Company Act's interstate banking and
product restrictions by 1986 at the latest. See Dezember, Bankers' Views on Regulatory
Changes, 7 Issues in Bank Reg. 3, 4-5 (Autumn 1983). In 1989, most of these restrictions
were still firmly in place.
8. For the leading statement of the argument that the operations of banks are so
critical to the economic system as to justify special regulation to ensure their safety and
soundness, see Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, 1982 Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Ann. Rep. 2. Corrigan identified three unique functions performed by banks: offering
liquid transaction accounts (demand deposits), providing a back-up source of credit for
the economy when other sources of funds are unavailable, and serving as a transmission
belt for monetary policy. See id. at 7. The goal of bank regulation is to reduce the risk of
interruption of these unique services. Such an interruption obviously would occur if the
entire banking and financial system collapsed. In addition, some individual failures may
have such serious effects on other banks as to pose a risk to the banking system. These
possible spillover effects provide a justification for regulation that seeks to reduce risk in
individual banks, as well as for the deposit insurance system. The aim of this regulation
is not to rescue every bank that runs into trouble, but to minimize the likelihood of those
failures that pose systemic risks. For a fuller explanation and defense of. regulatory policy
with respect to bank failure, see Garten, Banking On the Market: Relying On Depositors
to Control Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 129, 160-63 (1986). The effects of individual
bank failure on the financial system have been hotly debated. Nevertheless, even critics
of bank regulation have recognized the need for some regulatory intervention, such as
deposit insurance, to reduce the adverse effects of bank failure. See infra note 11 and
accompanying text.
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regulators and deregulators alike.9 Although critics differ as to the best
approach to guaranteeing soundness, as illustrated by the continuing de-
bate over government bailouts of failing banks,'" they generally agree
that, under any new regulatory scheme, the bank regulators must still
monitor bank safety to prevent risk to the banking system as a whole. 1
Thus, deregulation of banking has forced the bank regulators to develop
new strategies for monitoring bank safety as their traditional regulatory
tools are taken away. 12
This Article analyzes the shift in regulatory strategy that has accompa-
nied deregulation of banking. As a way of contrasting the old and new
strategies of bank regulation, this Article proposes an analogy to familiar
concepts of corporate governance. Traditional bank regulation viewed
bank safety from the point of view of a depositor or other debtholder.
This regulation was characterized by restrictions on the types of activities
in which banks could engage, policies that encouraged asset growth 3
and protection of depositors in the event of failure. The strategy of this
regulation was to ensure banks a stable rate of return from traditional
9. Proponents of deregulation share this goal of reducing bank risk, but argue that
some aspects of bank regulation do not work to maintain a healthy banking industry.
See, e.g., Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 3, at 322-38 (criticizing product and
geographic restrictions).
10. Compare Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the
Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 215, 223-33 (1988) (arguing for
less government intervention) with Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on
the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 241, 241-51 (1988) (arguing for contin-
ued regulatory role).
11. See, e.g., Shumway, The Compatability of Deregulation and Increased Supervision,
6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 247 (1987) (deregulation will require increased regulatory super-
vision of banks). Most proponents of deregulation favor retention of deposit insurance
protection of small depositors and central bank lending to provide liquidity to banks.
See, e.g., Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 3, at 312-18; Isaac, The Role of De-
posit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 195, 195-
215 (1984). If these regulatory devices survive deregulation, then, as a practical matter,
the regulators will be required to monitor and control bank risk in order to prevent deple-
tion of the insurance fund as a result of massive bank failure. See infra notes 371-74 and
accompanying text.
12. Observers of bank regulation often have drawn a distinction between formal regu-
lation of banks by statute, rulemaking and adjudication and less formal supervision by
regulatory examination and oversight. See Shumway, supra note 11, at 248; see also K.C.
Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 4.04, at 249-50 (1958). This distinction between
regulation and supervision is not always clear-cut. For example, bank regulators always
have played a role in interpreting formal statutes and rules in the process of deciding
specific applications by banks for new activities or acquisitions and often have imposed
their own conditions on approval, thereby creating an informal set of rules that could be
applied to other banks. Cf Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 39 (1984) (describing this regulatory "conditioning power").
Although bank deregulation will mean fewer formal statutes and rules and more reliance
on informal supervisory techniques, this Article focuses less on the form of future bank
regulation than on the regulatory strategy it reflects.
13. A bank's assets consist primarily of loans, but may also include United States
government securities and other securities eligible for purchase by a bank under applica-
ble banking law, Eurodollar placements and deposits in other banks.
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and safe banking businesses, while maintaining a cushion of protection
for depositors in the event of unforeseen losses. Like typical debtholders,
the bank regulators were averse to excessive risk-taking by banks, prefer-
ring a steady rate of return to aggressive profit-seeking.
Recently, many of the static controls that characterized traditional
bank regulation have proved counterproductive, actually weakening
rather than strengthening the financial position of many banks. As these
controls are being dismantled, a new regulatory strategy is developing
that views bank safety from the point of view of an equityholder. This
"new" regulation actually encourages banks to engage in additional risk-
taking to improve profitability and to diversify activities as a hedge
against risk. Like typical equity investors, the regulators increasingly are
concerned with improving the quality of bank management, especially
management's ability to adapt to market changes and to prevent fraud
and conflicts of interest. In addition, the bank regulators have increased
their reliance on the market for bank stocks both to confirm their assess-
ments of banks and to assist them in monitoring bank condition.
This shift in regulatory strategy from a debtholder's to an equi-
tyholder's viewpoint is neither as complete nor as formal as this sum-
mary suggests. 14 Nevertheless, this categorization is useful for two
reasons. First, it permits some sense to be made of the seemingly random
and unplanned changes that are occurring in bank regulation.15 Second,
it provides a means of identifying the problems that already have
emerged for the bank regulators in their new roles as managers of dereg-
ulation. In part, these growing pains are the inevitable result of adjust-
ment to a changing banking and regulatory environment. In addition,
they may be symptomatic of a deeper problem with the new regulatory
strategy.
Part I of this Article analyzes the rise and fall of traditional bank regu-
lation, and, in particular, the relationship between regulation and profit-
ability in the banking industry. To the extent that traditional bank
regulation helped to sustain the profitability of the banking business after
the banking crisis of the 1930s, such regulation was highly successful.
Traditional regulation began to fail only when banks could no longer
operate profitably within its confines. The need to find new profit sources
14. Likewise, the divergence of interest between equityholders and debtholders in re-
ality is not as pronounced as corporate governance models would suggest. See infra notes
224-25 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the classic model provides a useful way of
illustrating the differences in approach between what this Article calls the old and the
new bank regulation.
15. The current confusion surrounding the progress of bank deregulation is illus-
trated by a congressional committee's decision to institute a comprehensive investigation
of the present state of the bank regulatory framework in order to determine why "suppos-
edly elemental matters-such as... the meaning of 'bank'... should be the subject of
intense debate." See House Comm. on Government Operations, Confusion in the Legal
Framework of the American Financial System and Services Industry, H.R. Rep. No. 692,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
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has been the most significant force behind deregulation of the banking
industry.
Part II develops the characterization of these changes in regulatory
approach as a shift from the strategy of the debtholder to that of the
equityholder. This change in perspective is evident in the new regulatory
approach toward bank risk-taking and diversification, leverage and cor-
porate governance. More generally, this shift in regulatory strategy has
meant a significant change in techniques of risk control at banking insti-
tutions. Rather than relying on regulatory "debt covenants" that pre-
vented many opportunities for risk-taking, the new regulatory approach
must depend on more active management of the novel and often complex
risks facing banks.
Part III examines some problems that have emerged from this new
regulatory strategy. To the extent that this strategy relies on active risk
management, it raises the question of who bears primary responsibility to
control risk-taking at banking institutions-the bank's regulators, its
management or its shareholders. Although the regulators' new approach
may view bank safety from the perspective of an equityholder, the regula-
tors' preferences with respect to bank risk-taking may not necessarily be
those of the bank's management or its shareholders. Moreover, attempts
to implement the regulators' risk preferences through regulatory incen-
tives and penalties imposed upon bank management and shareholders
may have some unintended consequences for the banking system. This
Part analyzes three examples of recent regulation that illustrate this
weakness in the new regulatory approach.
Finally, Part IV considers the future of the new regulatory strategy. If
the bank regulators are to play the primary role in controlling risk in the
new deregulated banking industry of the future, the regulators must find
more effective ways to bring pressure to bear on bank management to
control its risk-taking. This in turn will require greatly improved tech-
niques of monitoring and disciplining management performance.
I. THE METAMORPHOSIS OF REGULATION
To recent observers, the bank regulatory system presents something of
a paradox. The complexity and detail of bank regulation make banking
one of the most intensively and comprehensively regulated industries. 6
Moreover, bank regulation has been successful in achieving its primary
16. This Article does not attempt to review in detail all of the statutes and rules
applicable to banks, but does develop broad themes that characterize regulatory strategy,
providing specific examples where necessary. For a comprehensive analysis of the tech-
niques of traditional bank regulation, as well as regulation of other financial in-
termediaries, see Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 Yale L.J. 1 (1976).
Professor Clark divided traditional bank regulation into four categories: anticompetitive
regulation (such as restrictions on entry into the banking business and ceilings on interest
payable on bank deposits); portfolio regulation (such as restrictions on permissible bank
activities and investments); insider misconduct regulation; and reactive regulation (such
as deposit insurance). See id. at 26-101.
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goal of maintaining the stability of the banking system. 17 Yet, today,
bank regulation appears both ineffective and outmoded. Banks have
taken advantage of numerous loopholes in the regulatory framework to
enter previously forbidden businesses.' 8 Market forces ranging from vol-
atile interest rates to international competition in financial services have
made anticompetitive bank regulation not only useless to halt innovation
but actually counterproductive. 9 Finally, the number of bank failures is
increasing each year.2"
In a sense, both these views of bank regulation are correct. Certainly,
many of the traditional tenets of bank regulation, such as limits on the
interest payable on deposits,2 ' restrictions on the ability of banks to offer
certain products and services22 and strict anti-branching rules,23 recently
have hindered banks in competing for and retaining customers, and occa-
sionally have even contributed to serious financial problems at individual
banks.2" Moreover, these restrictions apparently run counter to the pref-
17. Although bank failures have occurred, public confidence in the banking system
has been successfully maintained, and in fact is at its highest level in years. See Rosen-
stein, Confidence Rises in US Banking System, Am. Banker, Jan. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 2
(confidence in banking system remained high following stock market crash of October
1987).
18. The most dramatic recent example was the "nonbank bank" phenomenon, as
banks and nonbanks took advantage of a loophole in the definition of "bank" in the Bank
Holding Company Act to set up deposit-taking entities that escaped the Act's restrictions
on the ability of banks to expand across state lines or to affiliate with nonbanking entities.
See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361
(1986) (construing Bank Holding Company Act not to cover nonbank banks). Congress
closed this loophole by enacting the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-86, Title I, § 101(a), 101 Stat. 552, 554 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)). Many
observers have concluded that recent reforms of bank regulation have been loophole-
driven. See, e.g., Heimann, Market-Driven Deregulation of Financial Services, Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 36, 38 (Dec. 1984) (deregulatory process described by
former Comptroller of the Currency as "crawling through the loophole").
19. A frequently cited example of this phenomenon was the regulation that limited
the interest rates that banks were permitted to pay on time deposits. These restrictions
originally were intended to protect banks by ensuring that the rates that banks paid de-
positors on their liabilities would not exceed the rates that they could earn on their loans
and other assets. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Eventually, however,
rising interest rates and the growing sophistication of corporate and individual savers
caused banks actually to lose deposits to rival financial institutions such as brokerage
money market mutual funds that could offer higher rates of interest. The bank regulators
and ultimately Congress responded by deregulating the rates of interest payable on time
deposits. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title II, § 204, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503
(1982)). See generally Horvitz & Zock, The Implications of the Deregulation Act for the
Competitive Position of Depository Institutions, 6 Issues in Bank Reg. 8 (Autumn 1982)
(reviewing history and effects of DIDMCA).
20. See Rehm, FDIC Believes Tide Has Turned After Record Number of Failures,
Am. Banker, Jan. 5, 1989, at 1, col. 2. In 1988, 200 banks failed, a post-Depression
record; another 21 were kept open only through regulatory assistance. See id.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See supra note 6.
23. See supra note 5.
24. For example, strict anti-branching restrictions in Illinois have been blamed for
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erences of most banks, which are actively seeking to compete in new
markets,25 as well as the desires of their customers.26
If traditional regulation is economically unsound, anticompetitive and
ineffective in preventing innovation, what is surprising is not that deregu-
lation is occurring, but that it took so long to occur. Some observers
have explained the longevity of traditional regulation as a form of special
interest regulation intended to benefit bank competitors, such as the in-
vestment banking industry,27 or, alternatively, as evidence of the persis-
tence of a highly paternalistic view of banks and their depositors that
seeks to shelter them from the consequences of their own risk-taking.28
Yet neither of these views explains why traditional regulation was not
resisted long before now by the banking industry itself, as well as by bank
customers. Until relatively recently, there was very little pressure from
any source to make banking more competitive.29
A better explanation for the survival of traditional bank regulation
may be that, until recently, such regulation was successful in maintaining
the profitability of the banking industry. Two factors may account for its
success. First, by removing any temptation for banks to venture into
potentially risky activities and markets, the substance of traditional regu-
lation returned banks to a banking business characterized by stable prof-
restricting the ability of Continental Illinois to expand its core deposit base, instead forc-
ing it to fund its loan growth through expensive and highly volatile wholesale deposits.
See Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 235-36
(1984) [hereinafter Continental Hearings] (statement of C.T. Conover, Comptroller of the
Currency).
25. See, e.g., Rivoir, Banks Take Aim at Money Market Funds, 6 Issues in Bank Reg.
23 (Autumn 1982) (describing bank deposit innovations); see infra notes 120-23 and ac-
companying text.
26. It is generally assumed that consumer demand is a significant force behind the
efforts of banks to diversify their product lines. Undoubtedly, many customers favor
"one-stop shopping" for financial products. Yet surveys have indicated that the largest
consumers of financial services may not be concerned with obtaining all their financial
services from a single supplier. See Bennett, Consumer Demand for Product Deregula-
tion, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 28 (May 1984); see also Sudo, Service
Counts Most with Corporate Customers, Am. Banker, Aug. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (survey
finds quality of service more important than variety of service in banking relationships).
27. This explanation has been offered for the Glass-Steagall Act. See Macey, Special
Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33
Emory L.J. 1, 15-21 (1984); see also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 57 (suggesting Glass-
Steagall Act should be analyzed as interest group legislation). But cf Langevoort, supra
note 7, at 693 (no historical evidence of this purpose for the Glass-Steagall Act).
28. See, eg., Clark, supra note 16, at 25-26 (protection of public suppliers of capital
from the results of their own risk-taking as motive for regulation of financial
intermediaries).
29. See Leavitt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, 90 Banking L.J. 632, 647
(1973). Significantly, the banking industry made no serious effort to avoid the regulatory
restrictions, although, as demonstrated by recent innovations, evasion would not have
been difficult. See Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J.
Corp. L. 481, 517-18 (1988) (noting infrequency of legal challenges to bank regulation);
see also infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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its. Second, the form of traditional regulation, consisting of easily
administered prophylactic rules, greatly facilitated the regulators' task of
monitoring risk levels at individual banks. The result was a banking in-
dustry with high earnings and a low failure rate.
The crisis in traditional bank regulation has come about because the
traditional banking business is no longer profitable for many banks. As a
result, the primary goal of the bank regulators, to maintain a stable and
profitable banking system, can no longer be achieved through the tradi-
tional controls. Much of the recent deregulatory effort, as well as certain
new regulatory initiatives, are designed to find new sources of profitabil-
ity for the banking industry as a whole.
A. Traditional Bank Regulation
Analyses of the vast body of statutes and rules that make up tradi-
tional bank regulation generally have made three observations.3" First,
much of traditional bank regulation had its origins in the banking crisis
of the early 1930s.3 1 Second, bank regulation has tended to rely heavily
on prophylactic rules that bar banks from particular activities or invest-
ments rather than simply to regulate the conduct of those activities.32
Finally, the principal result of traditional bank regulation has been to
confine banks to certain narrowly circumscribed areas of operation that
are considered the core business of banking, namely, taking deposits and
making loans.33
These generalizations about traditional bank regulation are true up to
30. This Part's attempt to summarize fifty years of bank regulation, as well as its
impact on the banking industry, is of necessity very generalized. For a more detailed
description of specific regulations, see Clark, supra note 16, at 26-101.
31. For a description of the crisis and related events of the early 1930s that led to
comprehensive regulation of the banking and securities industries, see M. Friedman & A.
Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960, at 299-419 (1963).
32. Regulation of banking also has taken place through the regulators' informal day-
to-day supervisory powers over the banking industry, including examinations, monitoring
and approval of applications. See supra note 12. Nevertheless, the prophylactic rules
provided a check on the discretion of the bank regulators to permit diversification by
banks. Moreover, although many of the rules discussed in this Part are statutory, the
regulators often formulated their own prophylactic rules in supervising banks. See infra
note 43 and accompanying text (regulators set interest rate ceilings for time deposits).
33. There is no real historical reason for considering the loan/deposit business to be
the central business of banking. For many periods in banking history prior to the 1930s,
banks engaged in a variety of activities. See Symons, supra note 6, at 684-714 (reviewing
historical development of bank powers). The source of this traditional, narrow view of
banking may have been the economic theory of banking known as the "real-bills" doc-
trine, which viewed banks chiefly as suppliers of short-term business credit to meet the
requirements of trade. For a discussion of the impact of this theory in the United States,
see L. Mints, A History of Banking Theory in Great Britain and the United States 9-12
(1945). The "real-bills" doctrine profoundly influenced the drafters of the major banking
legislation of the 1930s and probably has informed the popular view of the business of
commercial banks. For a history and analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the
banking legislation of the 1930s, see Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment
Banking: A History, 88 Banking L.J. 483 (1971).
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a point. Although not all bank regulation dates from the Depression,34
perhaps the best known provisions of banking legislation, the divorce of
banking from the securities business (known as the Glass-Steagall Act)
and the federal deposit insurance system, were part of the comprehensive
banking legislation adopted in 1933. 35 Moreover, these two provisions
exemplify the form and function of much of traditional bank regulation.
For example, the Glass-Steagall Act generally barred banks from engag-
ing in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securi-
ties, either directly or through affiliates. 36 This statutory bar reflected a
decision to impose direct regulatory controls on the assets and invest-
ments of banks, removing from bank management the discretion to allo-
cate resources among business opportunities. Similar direct controls
were imposed on the ability of banks to become affiliated with nonbank-
ing companies, 37 to engage in general commercial or financial activities38
or to invest in additional banks across state lines.39
In addition to regulating the types of assets that banks could acquire,
traditional bank regulation sought to protect bank assets for the benefit
of the bank's most significant creditors, its depositors. The most obvious
protection is provided by the deposit insurance scheme, which reim-
burses depositors in failed banks up to $100,000. 4° The deposit insurance
system does more than simply to provide a guarantee for small deposits.
34. For example, the nonbanking activities of bank holding companies and their non-
bank affiliates were not restricted until the adoption of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). After 1933, bank affiliates were subject to some federal regula-
tion, including a requirement to report nonbanking activities to the Federal Reserve
Board. These reports revealed that banks were affiliated with retail clothing corpora-
tions, packing companies, newspapers, lumber yards, steamship companies and even
churches. See Note, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation and the Contemplated Modifi-
cations, 8 St. John's L. Rev. 434, 436 (1934).
35. See Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Although the Banking Act of 1933 was passed during the first
hundred days of President Roosevelt's first term, it has never been considered to be New
Deal legislation. The separation of commercial and investment banking was not a new
idea, but had been proposed several years earlier by Senator Glass. For a description of
the origins and purposes of the separation provisions by a key advisor to Senator Glass,
see H.P. Willis & J. Chapman, The Banking Situation 84-102 (1934). Moreover, the Act
was almost vetoed by President Roosevelt, who disapproved of the federal deposit insur-
ance provisions. See R. Moley, The First New Deal 320 (1966).
36. The basic provision is codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982 &
Supp. V 1987). In addition, banks are barred from affiliating with organizations "en-
gaged principally" in securities activities, id. § 377, or from having management inter-
locks with such firms, id. § 78, and organizations engaged in securities activities may not
engage in deposit-taking, id. § 378.
37. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
38. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982 & Supp. V 1987)
(setting forth permissible activities of national banks); Bank Holding Company Act
§ 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987) (activities of nonbank affiliates of bank
holding companies must be "closely related to banking").
39. See Bank Holding Company Act § 3(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
40. See id. § 1813(m)(1).
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also assumes the assets of
failed banks and liquidates them for the benefit of unsecured creditors,
including uninsured depositors and the insurance fund itself.41 In addi-
tion, whenever feasible, the bank regulators will arrange for the acquisi-
tion of a failed bank's assets and liabilities by a healthy bank, thereby
preserving the investments of the failed bank's creditors.42
Other traditional regulation was designed to protect a bank's assets
while it is a going concern. For example, ceilings on the rates of interest
payable on bank deposits43 were intended to ensure a positive spread be-
tween the rates that banks could earn on their assets and the rates that
they paid on their liabilities. This cushion not only would protect banks
from interest rate risk that could lead to failure,' but would remove the
temptation for banks to make high yielding, high risk loans in order to
meet their funding costs.45 In addition, banks have been subject to peri-
odic on-site regulatory examinations that are intended to identify banks
with financial difficulties.46 Bank examinations traditionally have fo-
cused on evaluating loan quality as a way of ensuring that the value of
the bank's assets will not fall below its liabilities.47
Critics of bank regulation have viewed this emphasis on the regulation
and protection of bank assets as a reaction, or perhaps an overreaction,
41. See id. § 1821(c)-(f).
42. If the failed bank has insufficient assets to cover its liabilities, the regulators will
provide some amount of financial assistance to permit the acquiring bank to assume the
failed bank's liabilities. The regulators will attempt to arrange such an assumption when-
ever the amount of required federal assistance is less than the cost of paying off the in-
sured depositors out of the insurance fund. See J. Sinkey, Problem and Failed
Institutions in the Commercial Banking Industry 36-37 (1979). In addition, in certain
cases, the regulators may provide direct financial assistance to failing banks to keep them
open. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (1982). This also has the effect of preserving the invest-
ments of the bank's creditors.
43. The Banking Act of 1933 gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to set the
maximum rates of interest payable on time deposits. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
§ l1(b), 48 Stat. 162, 182. The Act also prohibited banks from paying any interest on
demand deposits. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § l1(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181 (amending
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 19, 38 Stat. 251, 270 (1913)) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 371a (1982)).
44. Because bank assets (primarily loans) tend to reprice more slowly than bank lia-
bilities (deposits), banks are particularly vulnerable during periods of rising interest rates.
See Kessell & Clark, A Study of Expectational Errors in the Money and Capital Markets,
1921-70, 19 J. L. & Econ. 1, 13 (1976). For example, a bank may sell 90-day.certificates
of deposit paying 9 percent interest and use the proceeds to fund six-month loans paying
10 percent interest. If, 90 days later, the bank must offer 11 percent on its new certificates
of deposit, the bank's cost of funding will exceed what it is earning on its income-produc-
ing assets.
45. See M. Friedman & A. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 443 (describing this motive for
interest rate ceilings).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 325 (1982) (examination of Federal Reserve member banks by
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); id. § 481 (examination of national
banks by Comptroller of the Currency); id. § 1820(b) (examination of insured nonmem-
ber state banks by FDIC).
47. See Dince, Deregulation and the Examiner: A Commentary and an Interview, 7
Issues in Bank Reg. 3, 4 (Summer 1983).
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to a crisis. 8 During the early 1930s, the banking system proved to be
vulnerable.49 The Glass-Steagall Act and similar regulation were
designed to protect the banking industry by shielding banks from what
were viewed as excessively risky activities, such as investment banking. 0
Yet, as so many critics of the Glass-Steagall Act have pointed out,51 this
response may have been miscalculated. First, as a historical matter,
whether the banking industry's problems in the 1930s, or any other time,
were caused by participation in investment banking activities is debata-
ble.52 Second, it is not so clear that investment banking itself is such a
risky activity, either when compared with banking or, more important,
48. See, e.g., Jacobs, Regulation of Deposit-Type Financial Institutions, in Institute for
Contemporary Studies, Regulating Business: The Search for an Optimum 17, 18 (1978)
(bank regulatory system a response to "aberrant conditions"); Whitesell & Kelly, Is the
Glass-Steagall Act Obsolete?, 87 Banking L.J. 387, 387 (1970) (Glass-Steagall Act
"[c]onceived in a mood of anger and mistrust"); see also Englert, Bank Supervision in
Historical Perspective, 34 Bus. Law. 1659, 1659 (1979) ("[w]henever the economy is un-
settled or out of joint, the bank supervisory structure ... comes under attack").
49. From 1930 through 1932, over 5,000 commercial banks failed; in January 1933
alone, there were 241 failures. See Golembe Associates, Inc., Commercial Banking and
the Glass-Steagall Act 51 (1982).
50. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 137, 144 (1984) (Glass-Steagall Act "responded to the opinion, widely expressed
at the time, that much of the financial difficulty experienced by banks could be traced to
their involvement in investment-banking activities"). Whether the danger associated
with banks' involvement in securities activities was the risk of loss on a speculative securi-
ties portfolio, the opportunity for conflicts of interest or the loss of public confidence in
the integrity of banks has been debated without resolution. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst.
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-34 (1971) (setting forth various possible hazards).
51. For a sampling of recent criticism of the Glass-Steagall Act, see Saba, FDIC Reg-
ulation of State Nonmember Insured Banks' Securities Activities: A Model for the Repeal
of Glass-Steagall?, 23 Harv. J. Legis. 211 (1984); Clark & Saunders, Judicial Interpreta-
tion of Glass-Steagall: The Need for Legislative Action, 97 Banking L.J. 721 (1980);
Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 Banking L.J. 631 (1980); Plotkin,
What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today's Financial World?, 95 Banking L.J.
404 (1978). This criticism has led to efforts, as yet unsuccessful, to repeal most of the
Act's ban on bank securities activities. See supra note 7.
52. Prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, most banks conducted their securi-
ties activities through separately capitalized affiliates. For a description of the typical
affiliate arrangement, see Note, Security Affiliates of National Banks: The Legal Aspects,
33 Colum. L. Rev. 324 (1933). One advantage of this separate capitalization that was
noted at the time was that it ensured the affiliate its own supply of funds in the event that
the bank was unwilling or unable to advance more money. See Wilkinson, Bank Security
Companies, 119 Bankers Mag. 927 (1929). Moreover, although many of the most notori-
ous securities affiliates occasionally may have caused the bankruptcy of their customers,
they generally managed to protect themselves from losses. A vivid description of the
abuses of the securities affiliates is contained in the record of the investigation into stock
market practices by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in the spring of 1933,
generally known as the Pecora hearings after the Committee's chief counsel. In one case,
a clerk interested in buying United States government bonds was persuaded by a bank
securities affiliate to invest in Viennese, German, Greek, Peruvian, Chilean, Rhenish,
Hungarian and Irish bonds; when he complained about their decline in value, his broker
replied, "Why don't you let me sell you some stock?" See F. Pecora, Wall Street Under
Oath 85-86 (1939).
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when conducted in conjunction with a traditional lending business.53 Fi-
nally, barring banks from engaging in investment banking does not pre-
vent banks from taking excessive risks in permissible activities such as
lending, as is demonstrated by numerous bank failures.54
Nevertheless, to conclude that traditional bank regulation represented
an often misguided attempt to eliminate risk from the banking business
provides an incomplete picture of the actual purposes and accomplish-
ments of regulation." Obviously, too much risk avoidance can be
counterproductive if banks are relegated to activities from which they
cannot earn sufficient profits to cover their liabilities. This, however, was
not true of the business of banking, at least until quite recently. In con-
trast to other financial businesses such as investment banking, commer-
cial banking under the regime of traditional regulation was characterized
for decades by stable and consistently high earnings. 6 Thus, traditional
bank regulation did not simply force banks to reduce risk, but actually
facilitated the banking industry's return to profitability. In addition,
traditional regulation enabled the regulators to monitor risky behavior at
53. Portfolio theory suggests that the risk associated with an investment portfolio
should be determined not by looking at the riskiness of each investment by itself, but by
measuring the degree of correlation between the fluctuations in returns on those invest-
ments. If the returns on two investments are positively correlated, they will tend to pro-
duce revenues and losses at the same time. If their returns are negatively correlated, poor
returns at any given time on one investment should be offset by high returns on the other
investment, reducing the variability of earnings of the portfolio as a whole. See Note, The
Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio
Theory Approach, 88 Yale L.J. 1238, 1240 (1979). It has been argued that underwriting
and commercial banking returns are negatively correlated. See, e.g., Note, Restrictions on
Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More Permissive Regulation,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 720, 729 (1984). But see infra notes 298-323 and accompanying text
(criticizing application of portfolio theory to bank diversification).
54. See supra note 20. Some critics argue that protective regulation such as deposit
insurance actually has encouraged banks to take excessive risks in their existing busi-
nesses, since the costs of failure are borne by the government. See E. Kane, The Gather-
ing Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance 14-15 (1985) (applying moral hazard argument in
deposit insurance context).
55. Prevention of risk is not the only explanation that has been given for traditional
bank regulation. Fear of concentration of economic power also was a motive for the
limits on geographic and product expansion contained in the Bank Holding Company
Act. See Glassman & Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies and Concentration of Banking
and Financial Resources, in The Bank Holding Company Movement to 1978: A Com-
pendium 209, 210 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1978). Neverthe-
less, regardless of motive, the real accomplishment of traditional bank regulation was to
restore the profitability of the banking industry. Moreover, the demise of traditional reg-
ulation has had less to do with any flaws in these expressed or implied motives for regula-
tion than with the diminishing profits of the banking industry operating under regulatory
constraints. See infra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
56. For example, between 1960 and 1984, the commercial banking industry's com-
pound earnings growth rate was 9.1 percent, well above the inflation rate for that period,
while returns on assets remained remarkably stable. In contrast, during the same period,
earnings in the thrift, securities and insurance industries were extremely volatile. See
Koch, The Emerging Financial Services Industry: Challenge and Innovation, Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 25, 27 (April 1984).
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individual banking institutions.5 7 These two accomplishments provide
not only a motive for the form and content of traditional bank regulation,
but an explanation of its longevity.
1. Regulation and Profitability
In view of recent publicity about bank failures and lending problems,58
it is difficult to remember that, for the past fifty years, the core banking
businesses of deposit-taking and lending generally have been very profita-
ble. Moreover, this profitability did not result from either aggressive
risk-taking or constant innovation on the part of bank management.5 9
Rather, bank profitability can be attributed to two developments in the
market for bank products: the tremendous influx into the banking sys-
tem of inexpensive deposits and the ready availability of low-risk, mar-
ketable assets in which those deposits could be invested.
In part, the declining market for securities following the stock market
crash and subsequent regulation of the securities industry was responsi-
ble for the growth of the bank product market. Following economic re-
covery, savings, particularly those of individuals, flowed back into the
securities markets at a slower rate than they flowed into the commercial
banks.60 Moreover, the increased demand for commercial loans enabled
the banks to deploy their new funds profitably. Although rapid loan
growth can lead to problems for banks in periods of economic contrac-
tion, banks also were able to acquire large quantities of low risk assets
such as treasury obligations6" and government guaranteed mortgages.62
In addition, ceilings on the rates of interest payable on deposits enabled
banks to be concerned less with the return on their investments than with
57. See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 20.
59. Studies of the rates and variability of returns in commercial banking relative to
other industries confirm that the post-1930s banking business managed to be both profita-
ble and not very risky. A study of the average annual rates of return in banking and
manufacturing between 1960 and 1970 found that the banking industry experienced both
consistently high rates of return and relatively little variation in rates of return compared
with other sectors of the economy, suggesting that the profitability of banking was not
due to aggressive risk-taking by banks. See Rhoades, A Comparative Investigation of Risk
and Rates of Return in Commercial Banking and Manufacturing Industries, 25 Antitrust
Bull. 589, 593-609 (1980). The high rates of return in the banking industry were attrib-
uted to market power rather than industry innovation. See id. at 609-14.
60. Prior to 1929, individual investors provided the bulk of capital to the securities
markets, which markets shrank after the Depression. For a description of the new issues
market before and after 1929, see J. Auerbach & S. Hayes, Investment Banking and Dili-
gence: What Price Deregulation? 8-107 (1986).
61. Significantly, the Glass-Steagall Act's ban on the purchase of securities by banks
for their own account exempted certain government obligations. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 Sev-
enth (1982 & Supp. V 1987). As of the end of 1947, treasury securities made up 60
percent of the total loans and investments of commercial banks. See Mitchell, Exogenous
Forces in the Development of Our Banking System, 32 L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 3 (Winter
1967).
62. See Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J. L. & Econ. 129, 136 (1967).
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maintaining safe and liquid portfolios.63
Thus, a combination of economic conditions and bank regulation ena-
bled the banking business to return to profitability. This very profitabil-
ity raises a question as to why coercive regulation was needed at all to
keep banks in the banking business. In part, the explanation may have
been a distrust of the banks on the part of the legislature:' bank man-
agement may have been thought either too venal or too incompetent to
recognize the advantages of the commercial banking business over more
speculative alternatives." Whether this assessment of bank management
had any basis in fact is unclear. For example, even before the Glass-
Steagall Act was passed, many large banks were voluntarily abandoning
the securities business.66 Moreover, after passage of the Act, a number of
prominent banks, including J.P. Morgan & Co., chose to remain in com-
mercial banking rather than in the investment banking business.67
In fact, there are indications that, in the case of the Glass-Steagall Act,
the banks derived certain benefits from making their business decision to
leave the securities business a matter of legislative directive. Many banks
had made substantial investments in their securities affiliates, having set
up extensive branch networks staffed by numerous employees to facilitate
securities distribution.68 When the decline in volume of new securities
63. In general, interest-bearing deposits tended to be a less significant source of funds
for banks than non-interest-bearing transaction accounts. As of the end of 1947, 73 per-
cent of deposits at commercial banks were demand deposits; over 90 percent of time
deposits were low interest passbook savings accounts. See Mitchell, supra note 61, at 3.
In contrast, by 1970, demand deposits represented only 52 percent of total deposits; by
1980, this percentage had declined to 38 percent. See Golembe Associates, Inc., supra
note 49, at 13.
64. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (paternalistic motive for bank
regulation).
65. To the extent that, prior to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, the securities
affiliates of large banks routinely used their smaller correspondent banks as outlets for the
placement of their securities issues, there may have been some concern to protect less
sophisticated local banks. See 75 Cong. Rec. S9,911 (May 10, 1932) (remarks of Sen.
Bulkley) (country bank correspondents had been "overloaded with a mass of
investments").
66. Three months before the passage of the Act, National City Bank and Chase Na-
tional Bank, two of the largest bank participants in the securities business, announced the
termination of their securities affiliates. Their decisions may have been sparked by the
negative publicity surrounding bank securities affiliates as a result of testimony at the
Pecora investigation into stock market practices. See supra note 52. In addition, follow-
ing the stock market crash, bank securities affiliates were no longer very profitable. See
Perkins, supra note 33, at 522-23.
67. Morgan was one of the small group of private banks that had dominated invest-
ment banking prior to the entry of commercial bank securities affiliates. See J. Auerbach
& S. Hayes, supra note 60, at 13.
68. See Perkins, supra note 33, at 492. The entry of commercial banks into invest-
ment banking through securities affiliates coincided with changing practices in the securi-
ties industry, including improvements in the rapid retail distribution of securities issues.
See J. Auerbach & S. Hayes, supra note 60, at 17-21. The development of huge retail
distribution networks not only enabled the new bank securities affiliates to place securities
more rapidly, but gave them an advantage in competing for underwriting business with
established investment bankers.
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issues made these branches unproductive, banks were looking for ways to
trim their operations as quickly and painlessly as possible. The
mandatory divestment of securities activities required by the Glass-Stea-
gall Act provided banks with an excuse to terminate large numbers of
employees in 1933 without incurring negative publicity.6 9
In the long run, traditional regulation had other benefits for banks.
Regulation excluded numerous potential competitors from entering the
core banking business. Although other financial institutions could com-
pete with banks in discrete activities, such as lending7 ° or trust services,
the line of demarcation between banks and nonbanks under traditional
regulation was the ability to take deposits. 71 The power to take deposits,
particularly given the protection afforded by deposit insurance and inter-
est rate ceilings, not only provided banks with a cheap source of funding,
but also enabled banks to build relationships with potential customers for
other bank products, such as lines of credit, mortgages or credit cards.
In this sense, the classic definition of the bank product market as a
unique cluster of products and services, all of which could be offered only
by banks,7z accurately described the business of banking.73 Thus, the
accomplishment of traditional regulation was not so much to keep banks
69. For example, by the end of 1933, over one thousand employees of Chase Securi-
ties Company, a bank securities affiliate, had been fired. See Perkins, supra note 33, at
523-24. A comparison may be drawn to the recent negative publicity following an-
nouncements by Citicorp and other bank holding companies of plans to terminate em-
ployees in their investment banking operations. See Duffy, Citicorp Cuts Trading Staff in
UK by 85, Am. Banker, Jan. 13, 1988, at 2, col. 1 (Citicorp officials deny any connection
between layoffs and trading losses suffered in October 1987 stock market crash).
70. Nonbank competitors included consumer and commercial finance companies and,
in some lending markets, thrift institutions. In addition, corporations could satisfy their
financing needs through the public and private securities markets. Nevertheless, until the
development of the commercial paper market in the 1960s, corporations tended to resort
to the securities markets mainly for long-term financing, relying on bank loans for more
current financing needs. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
71. For example, section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits any securities organi-
zation from engaging in the business of taking deposits. See 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982); see
also Bank Holding Company Act § 2(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (Supp. V 1987) (defining
bank as an entity that takes demand deposits and makes commercial loans or whose
deposits are FDIC-insured).
72. See United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 664 (1974); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
73. Traditional regulation did not prevent banks from offering a relatively diversified
package of financial services to their customers. For example, despite the Glass-Steagall
Act's restrictions on bank securities dealing, banks were permitted to buy and sell securi-
ties for the accounts of customers. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
see also Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Operation of the National and Federal
Reserve Banking Systems, Report to Accompany S. 1631, S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1933) (under Glass bill, "banks are to be permitted to purchase and sell invest-
ment securities for their customers to the same extent as heretofore"). Likewise, the
Bank Holding Company Act's restrictions on nonbanking activities did not prevent bank
affiliates from offering financial products such as credit cards, investment advice and safe
deposit services. See Regulation Y of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(b), 225.25(b) (1988).
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in the banking business as to keep competitors out. 4
In addition, the regulatory constraints permitted bank managers to op-
erate banks in a risk averse manner."5 Regulation not only guaranteed
banks a healthy rate of return from investment in particular assets, such
as loans and low risk securities, but also removed the necessity to com-
pete by entering new businesses or developing new products. For exam-
ple, Bank A's management did not have to be concerned that Bank B
would decide to offer its corporate customers underwriting services, forc-
ing Bank A to follow suit to retain its own customers. Bank A could
count on the fact that Bank B was precluded by law from this innovation.
Therefore, banks did not have to make substantial and potentially risky
investments in research and development of new products in order to
keep competitive in the banking industry. Virtually the only possible use
for funds was to make more loans, or buy more government securities.
Thus, traditional regulation encouraged asset accumulation rather than
entrepreneurial risk-taking.
This management strategy led to the popular generalizations about
bankers as conservative, unimaginative and risk averse.7 6 Because the
banking business was stable and profitable, the most significant risks to
74. A major force for change in the banking industry has been the effort by nonbanks
to engage in the very activities to which banks have been confined by regulation. See
infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
75. Recent literature has suggested that corporate managers may be more risk averse
than their shareholders because of their personal-and undiversified-investments in
their firms. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 16-24 (1986). This risk aversion should be expected of bank manag-
ers, despite the protection afforded by the deposit insurance system. See supra note 54.
Although deposit insurance and rescues of failed banks may protect most or all bank
creditors from losses, shareholders generally lose all or part of their investments in any
bank liquidation, failed bank merger or restructuring. See, e.g., FDIC Agrees to Assist-
ance Plan for Texas BHC Subsidiary Banks, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 87,067, at 92,923 (Sept. 9, 1987) [hereinafter First City Rescue] (finan-
cial assistance plan to keep failing subsidiary banks open required reduction of sharehold-
ers' interest in the restructured banking organization to less than 3 percent of total
equity). As bank directors generally are required by applicable banking laws to make an
equity investment in their banking organization, these managers can expect losses in the
event of failure. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (requiring national bank directors to own
shares in the bank or its bank holding company with a minimum par value of $1,000).
Moreover, bank managers are certain to lose their jobs once their bank runs into trouble,
regardless of the ultimate regulatory disposition. A liquidation or merger of the bank
automatically removes incumbent management; even if the bank remains open, the regu-
lators can commence a proceeding to remove or impose personal liability on bank man-
agement. For a description of the regulatory disciplinary powers, see infra notes 198-223
and accompanying text. Although some regulatory enforcement powers are of recent
vintage, the authority to remove directors or officers for unsafe and unsound banking
practices was first given to the regulators by the Banking Act of 1933. See Banking Act
of 1933, ch. 89, § 30, 48 Stat. 162, 193, repealed by Financial Institutions Supervisory Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, Title II, §§ 202, 207, 80 Stat. 1028, 1047-50, 1055 (adopting
new removal provisions).
76. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 61, at 3 (banking has had "a pattern of traditional
services, an imposed molecular structure, and a pedestrian operating technology"). In
large part, bankers' conservatism may have been a reaction to the economic crisis of the
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the health of the banking industry were insider fraud and mismanage-
ment.7 7 The low rate of bank failure reflects this. From 1943 through
1974, fewer than ten banks failed per year. No banks failed in 1962.78
Given this record, it is not surprising that bank management generally
saw little need to innovate.79 Moreover, bank shareholders apparently
exerted little pressure on management to take more risks.80 Even if bank
shareholders might have preferred more aggressive risk-taking, their abil-
ity to force their preferences on bank management was blunted by the
fact that, because of the ready availability of deposits, banks rarely had to
resort to the equity markets for funding.8 Traditional regulation did not
impose strict minimum equity capital requirements that might have
forced banks to seek new shareholders.82 Thus, banks could afford to
keep their equity low compared with total bank resources.83
Bank management's reluctance to innovate is suggested by the rela-
1930s, which was still fresh in the memories of bank managers several decades later. See
Leavitt, supra note 29, at 647.
77. As one observer wrote in 1967,
"a bank which fails today on account of bad assets cannot claim that good
assets were not available, or that an unforeseen depression made bad assets out
of a wide range of apparently good ones. The reason is almost certain to be an
error in judgment on the part of the bank's management."
Tussing, supra note 62, at 136.
78. See Huber, Mandatory Disclosure of Information About Banks, 6 Ann. Rev. Bank-
ing L. 53, 58 (1987).
79. Of course, there were occasional attempts to resist bank regulation; repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act was urged as early as 1935. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 698.
Nevertheless, compared with the turmoil of the last decade, the banking industry of the
1940s, 1950s and 1960s was relatively quiescent. See Leavitt, supra note 29, at 646-47
(philosophy of banking from the late 1930s through the 1950s was one of "caution, risk
avoidance, and only limited concern for maintenance of a competitive climate").
80. Because many banks were privately owned and managed, their shareholders
would not be expected to exert any countervailing pressure on management. As late as
1983, only 18 percent of insured commercial banks were owned by publicly held bank
holding companies, while only 5 percent of insured banks not owned by holding compa-
nies were themselves publicly held. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Deposit
Insurance in a Changing Environment C-10, C-11 (1983).
81. Theoretically, equityholders in a highly leveraged institution such as a bank may
prefer more aggressive risk-taking than equityholders in a less leveraged firm, because the
debtholders will bear most of any resulting losses. See McDaniel, Bondholders and Cor-
porate Governance, 41 Bus. Law. 413, 419 (1986). Nevertheless, in order to be effective,
shareholders' preferences must be felt by management. Traditionally, banks have not had
to raise equity on a regular basis, and regulation such as barriers to interstate banking
and restrictions on affiliation with nonbanking firms has protected banks from the disci-
pline of the takeover market. Thus, management could afford to ignore shareholders'
preferences as to risk-taking. For a more complete discussion of the effect of bank regula-
tion on the market for bank equities, see infra notes 324-54 and accompanying text.
82. Prior to 1933, the regulators informally required a capital to total assets ratio of
10 percent or more; after passage of the comprehensive banking legislation, this informal
standard gradually disappeared. See Wall, Affiliated Bank Capital, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Econ. Rev. 12, 13 (Apr. 1985).
83. See Peltzman, Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relationship to
Portfolio Regulation, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 1 (1970). For a discussion of the role of capital
regulation in bank regulatory strategy, see infra notes 173-97 and accompanying text.
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tively limited number of banking institutions that took advantage of legal
means of avoiding restrictive regulation. Although the nonbanking ac-
tivities of bank holding companies were virtually unregulated until pas-
sage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,84 the relative
importance of holding companies actually declined between 1936 and
1956.85 One explanation may be that commercial banking was simply
more profitable than the unregulated activities that could be conducted
through holding companies. For example, a study in the early 1970s of
the performance of nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies engaged
in consumer finance and mortgage banking, two of the most popular
nonbanking activities for bank holding companies, found that in both
cases the bank holding company affiliates tended to be less profitable
than either their independent competitors or their sister banks.
8 6
2. Regulation and Failure Prevention
Traditional bank regulation has served another important function
that is frequently overlooked. The bank regulatory framework includes
an administrative apparatus through which the bank regulators monitor
compliance by individual institutions with regulatory standards.87 Bank
regulatory enforcement traditionally has relied less on deterrence
through the imposition of penalties for violations88 than on detection and
correction of possible violations before they can result in harm to the
bank. This makes sense from the point of view of the bank regulators.
84. See supra note 34.
85. Between 1930 and 1939, only 34 nonbank subsidiaries were formed or acquired by
bank holding companies. Between 1950 and 1959, only 290 nonbank subsidiaries were
formed or acquired by bank holding companies. See One-Bank Holding Companies
Before the 1970 Amendments, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 999, 1004 (1972). One exception was
Transamerica Corporation. See Note, Transamerica-The Bankholding Company Prob-
lem, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 658, 658 (1949). Yet even Transamerica's nonbanking operations
apparently were not very diversified, consisting of substantial investments in insurance
operations and much smaller investments in a metals manufacturer and a fish processing
company. See Halpert, supra note 29, at 498.
86. See Talley, Bank Holding Company Performance In Consumer Finance and Mort-
gage Banking, 52 Mag. Bank Admin. 42, 44 (July 1976). This study covered bank hold-
ing company performance from 1973 to 1974, when banks were already beginning to
push for greater power to diversify; prior to 1973, too few bank holding companies were
engaged in either activity to permit analysis. See id. at 43. Although the consumer fi-
nance industry was experiencing narrowing interest margins in the early 1970s, mortgage
banking generally was extremely profitable. See id. at 42.
87. This monitoring takes place primarily through on-site bank examinations, see
supra text accompanying notes 46-47, and to a lesser extent through mandatory disclo-
sure requirements, which until recently were designed primarily to provide information
to the regulators. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 161, 324, 1817(a) (1982) (year-end consolidated re-
ports of income and quarterly consolidated reports of condition must be submitted by
banks to their primary federal regulator). For a more detailed discussion of bank disclo-
sure requirements, see infra notes 346-54 and accompanying text.
88. To the extent that statutory penalties for violations of banking law have been
provided, they have tended either to be too severe (such as termination of deposit insur-
ance) or to require lengthy judicial or administrative proceedings, thus discouraging their
regular use. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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Violations of bank regulation may lead to bank failure, resulting in tre-
mendous cost to the insurance fund. The bank examination process per-
mits the regulators to uncover problems and violations that can be dealt
with through preventive measures.
In view of this goal of preventing violations, the broad prophylactic
approach of traditional bank regulation simplified the examination pro-
cess. Obviously, prophylactic rules may sweep too broadly; for example,
in any particular case, a bank's participation in an underwriting of corpo-
rate securities may present no risk at all to either the bank or the banking
system. Yet a narrowly tailored rule that prohibits only risky underwrit-
ing would force bank examiners to review every bank participation in
underwriting to see if it presented any unacceptable risks. In contrast, a
sweeping rule that prevents all underwriting avoids the necessity for ex-
aminers to scrutinize individual transactions.
Traditional bank regulation not only simplified the monitoring pro-
cess, but permitted the regulators to channel their efforts and expertise
more efficiently. Any diversified enterprise presents problems of central
monitoring and control. It is almost impossible for a single manager to
comprehend the details of numerous different businesses. This problem
is compounded for the bank examiner, who as an outsider must master
the firm's unfamiliar organizational structure as well as understand the
day-to-day operations of each one of the firm's businesses.89 Confining
banks to particular activities enabled bank examiners to concentrate on
one area, that of loan quality, in which they could develop considerable
expertise.90
Finally, restrictive regulation may have assisted the regulators in con-
taining bank problems once they developed. Restrictions on product and
geographic diversification limited the ability of a bank to affiliate with a
large number of other banks or financial entities, thus avoiding the likeli-
hood of multiple business failures should the bank encounter financial
difficulties. Moreover, in a banking system consisting of numerous small
banks, one bank's failure would have less of an impact on the banking
system than the failure of a huge diversified financial institution. 91 To
89. The job of the examiner is more complex than even that of the outside auditor.
The examiner must assess not only the bank's current financial position, but also any
future risks that may arise out of current activities.
90. In determining bank financial condition, examiners assess banks in five categories:
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. See Putnam, Con-
cepts of Financial Monitoring, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 6, 8 (Nov. 1983).
Given the difficulty of predicting such variables as liquidity and quality of management,
examinations traditionally have focused on assets. See Dince, supra note 47, at 4. Until
recently, bank earnings were derived almost exclusively from the investment of deposits
in loans. Thus, bad loans could wipe out earnings and capital and, if the bank's lending
problems were publicized, lead to deposit runs that could negatively affect liquidity.
Moreover, bad loans generally were viewed as an indication of bad management.
91. This has not always proved to be true. For example, the failure of a tiny Ohio
thrift institution, which raised doubts about the solvency of state-sponsored deposit insur-
ance funds as well as the health of local banking institutions, had significant repercussions
[Vol. 57
BANK REGULATION
the extent that regulation slowed the trend toward financial concentra-
tion,92 it served the very practical purpose of simplifying the task of deal-
ing with the consequences of bank failure. 93
Some critics have disputed the ultimate effectiveness of prophylactic
regulation, since it encourages the regulated industry to find ways to
evade the restrictions. 94 When that occurs, regulatory enforcement be-
comes very complex and expensive, often necessitating legislative redraft-
ing to repair the loopholes. 95 Yet until recently banks themselves had
neither the expertise nor the inclination to breach the regulatory walls.96
Rather, the energies of bank management went into asset growth, a trend
that was encouraged by regulatory policy.97 The regulators' attention
therefore could be directed almost entirely to the tasks of monitoring
asset quality and identifying bad management that was the cause of most
bank failure.98
B. Banking in Transition
Under the regime of traditional regulation, the banking business was
very profitable for many years. This profitability explains the long suc-
cess of traditional regulation, and its recent failure. Traditional regula-
tion remained largely unchallenged as long as the regulated business of
banking was profitable. When that profitability was threatened, the va-
lidity and desirability of traditional regulation began to be questioned.
Why did the traditional banking business suddenly become unprofita-
in the United States and international banking markets. See Kilborn, World Markets
React to Banks Ills, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1985, at D9, col. 5.
92. See supra note 55.
93. The liquidation of Penn Square Bank in 1982 was the first deposit payoff of a bank
with over $100 million in assets in the history of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. See Gilbert, Disclosure and Market Discipline: Issues and Evidence, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 70, 72 (Nov. 1983). When Continental Illinois ran into
trouble in 1984, it was so large that neither a deposit payoff nor a federally assisted
merger was a feasible alternative, requiring a massive government bailout. See Morris &
Weiner, U.S. Rescues Continental Illinois Corp., Am. Banker, May 18, 1984, at 1, col. 2;
see also First City Rescue, supra note 75, at 92,923 (capital assistance plan for bank hold-
ing company with 62 subsidiary banks is second largest financial assistance plan in FDIC
history).
94. See Clark, supra note 16, at 34 (making this argument with respect to mechanical
price and entry restrictions).
95. See supra note 18 (nonbank banks).
96. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text. For example, until the 1970s,
banks did not even attempt to test the limits of the Glass-Steagall Act's brokerage excep-
tion by entering the retail brokerage business. See Note, National Banks and the Broker-
age Business: The Comptroller's New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 Va. L. Rev.
1303, 1311-12 (1983); supra note 73. One explanation may have been that the securities
services that banks did routinely perform for customers, such as custodial services and
portfolio evaluation, were not very profitable. See Securities and Exchange Commission,
Report on Banks Securities Activities, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (Comm. Print 1977).
97. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
98. See J. Sinkey, supra note 42, at 19 (historically, fraud and mismanagement have
been main causes of bank failure).
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ble? Although numerous forces were at play, the most important factors
had little to do with the banking business itself. The very profitability of
the basic banking business of taking deposits and making loans caused
nonbank competitors to look for ways to enter the banks' traditional
markets. This heightened competition from outside the banking industry
led to declining market shares, and, ultimately, declining profitability.99
This competition was felt on both the asset and liability sides of the
bank balance sheet. Beginning in the late 1950s, rising interest rates and
growing investor sophistication began to affect banks' ability to attract
and retain non-interest or low interest-bearing deposits.°" Many deposi-
tors switched their funds from demand deposits to interest-bearing time
deposits, which increased the cost of deposits for banks.1 In addition,
corporate and individual savers began to remove funds from the banking
system entirely. The reasons for this disintermediation included the in-
ability of banks to pay market rates of interest on their deposits because
of regulation,102 the development of liquid financial instruments such as
money market mutual funds that served as deposit substitutes,10 3 the
technological innovations that allowed the rapid movement of money in
and out of bank and nonbank financial instruments,"° and the improved
money management skills of businesses of all sizes. l0 Banks thus had to
99. See Koch, supra note 56, at 27-28.
100. In particular, large national corporations began to seek ways to economize on
their cash balances, which previously had been kept in non-interest-bearing bank ac-
counts. See McKinney, New Sources of Bank Funds: Certificates of Deposit and Debt
Securities, 32 L. & Contemp. Probs. 71, 72 (Winter 1967).
101. Prior to 1960, many banks did not pay any interest on corporate time deposits.
Eventually, the need to attract deposits in order to satisfy the increasing demand for loans
led the largest banks to compete more actively for funds by selling large denomination
negotiable certificates of deposit that paid rates that were competitive with other money
market instruments and thus were attractive to corporate and institutional savers in
search of liquid investments. For a discussion of the development of negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit, see id. at 72-73.
102. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (interest rate ceilings). The interest
rate ceilings became a problem for banks during the 1960s and 1970s as interest rates
rose, causing the rates on unregulated money market instruments such as treasury bills
and commercial paper to exceed the regulated bank rates. See McKinney, supra note
100, at 73-77. Deregulation of interest rates on deposits has removed this impediment to
competing for funds, but also has made deposits much more expensive for banks. See
supra note 19.
103. These financial instruments were developed in response to investors' demand for
investments that were short-term and more liquid than traditional corporate bonds, yet
paid higher rates than bank deposits. Money market mutual funds are investment com-
panies that invest solely in short-term corporate and bank liabilities. See J. Auerbach &
S. Hayes, supra note 60, at 92-93. By the end of 1983, money market funds had grown to
$175 billion. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 52.
104. For a description of the effects of information technology on the financial services
industry, see M. Mayer, The Money Bazaars 71-173 (1984).
105. Even small businesses have become more sophisticated in money management.
Demand deposits and currency have steadily declined as a percentage of the total liquid
assets held by nonfinancial corporations from 63 percent in 1970 to below 40 percent in
1980. Some of these funds have remained in the banking system, but have been invested
in high interest negotiable certificates of deposit. Yet substantial funds have left the
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compete with nonbanks for increasingly expensive funds. 106
As bank liabilities became more expensive and difficult to obtain,
banks faced competition for assets as well. The growth of the commer-
cial paper market in the 1970s,107 coupled with increased competition
from foreign banks both in the Eurodollar market"' and in the United
States,10 9 seriously affected the previously stable relationships of banks
and their corporate borrowers. Corporations, particularly the most
creditworthy, found that they could borrow more cheaply by issuing
short-term debt in the domestic or foreign securities markets than by
borrowing from banks.110 Thus, the traditionally recognized role of
banking system to be invested in commercial paper, nonbank money market mutual
funds and other nonbank financial instruments. See Crooks, Adcock & Driskill, Small
Businesses and the Cash Management Culture, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev.
48, 49 (Jan. 1983).
106. Of course, "core" deposits, consisting of retail demand deposits and low interest
accounts, continue to be a relatively stable and inexpensive source of funds for most
banks. The advantages of these core deposits led some nonbank financial firms such as
Household International to compete directly with banks by setting up so-called "nonbank
banks": deposit-taking institutions that, because they did not make commercial loans,
were not subject to the Bank Holding Company Act's restrictions on ownership of banks
by nonbanking businesses. See supra note 18. Not all such efforts by nonbanks to com-
pete for consumer deposits were successful. See Gross, Financial Companies Follow Spec-
trum of Strategies in Era of Deregulation, Am. Banker, May 26, 1987, at 32, col. 1 (for
some nonbank competitors, attracting retail deposits has proved very expensive).
107. Commercial paper consists of short-term unsecured promissory notes issued by
corporations in the public debt markets to satisfy their current financing needs. Unlike
long-term public debt, issues of commercial paper are not subject to the registration and
prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, see 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1982),
and thus can be placed relatively cheaply and easily. In fact, for high quality issuers,
selling commercial paper is often cheaper than obtaining a bank loan, in view of the
interest rates that banks must charge to cover their costs of funding and administrative
expenses. The commercial paper market has grown from an annual rate of $4 billion in
1960 to $123.7 billion in mid-1983. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 52.
108. Corporate issuers often were able to borrow in the largely unregulated foreign
securities markets more cheaply than in domestic markets. In 1984, Untied States corpo-
rations issued $21 billion of debt securities in the Eurodollar market. See J. Auerbach &
S. Hayes, supra note 60, at 95. Although the Glass-Steagall Act generally did not bar
Untied States banks from competing for this business through their overseas affiliates,
United States banks faced high start-up costs and intense competition. See General Ac-
counting Office, Report to the Chairman of the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and
Finance, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce: International Finance-U.S. Com-
mercial Banks' Securities Activities in London (Sept. 1988).
109. Until 1978, foreign banks operating in the United States were not subject to re-
serve requirements, restrictions on interstate banking and other regulation that increased
operating expenses for United States banks. The International Banking Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)), was designed to achieve competitive equality between domestic banks
and foreign banks operating in the United States. Nevertheless, differences in capital
requirements and other regulation still may give some funding advantages to foreign
banks competing in United States markets. See, e.g., Cacace, Foreign Banks in US Boost
Loan Purchases, Am. Banker, Feb. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (in 1987, business loans grew five
times faster at domestic offices of foreign banks than at United States-owned banks,
largely due to purchases of loans from United States banks).
110. Banks have been able to continue their relationships with some of these borrowers
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commercial banks as the chief suppliers of short-term credit to business
began to disappear.111 Although a market for bank loans did exist, the
new borrowers often were less creditworthy than traditional corporate
customers, because these borrowers were too risky to have access to the
commercial paper market. 12 Even in this market, banks faced fierce
competition from nonbank lenders that had concentrated on "middle
market" and other smaller borrowers.1 13
The result of this competition for both bank liabilities and assets has
been a gradual decline in profitability, and an increase in risk, in the core
banking business. 114 Higher funding costs required banks to charge
higher rates of interest on their loans to make a profit. Yet increased
competition for the most creditworthy borrowers forced banks to choose
between earning very narrow spreads 1 5 and investing in more risky as-
sets.11 6 Moreover, the banking industry's share of the lending market
continued to decline. 1
7
by issuing back-up lines of credit to support their customers' debt issuances in the event
of default. Although these lines of credit have generated substantial fee income for
banks, the unpredictable nature of the bank's commitment to lend creates potentially
serious funding risks. See Johnson & Murphy, Going Off the Balance Sheet, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 23, 26-27 (Sept.-Oct. 1987). Moreover, the most
creditworthy issuers do not have to obtain back-up lines of bank credit to sell their debt.
111. See supra note 33 (describing this view of the proper function of banks).
112. As a result of the development of an active secondary market for junk bonds-
corporate debt rated below "investment grade"-even these borrowers may be able to sell
debt more cheaply than they can borrow from banks. In late 1987, junk bonds were
estimated to provide some $157 billion in credit. See Sudo, Analysts See Loan Growth
Slowing in '88, Am. Banker, Dec. 29, 1987, at 1, col. 2. The advantage of junk bonds
over bank loans is not necessarily lower interest rates. Banks may insist on restrictive
covenants in their loan agreements, especially for less creditworthy borrowers. In con-
trast, most corporate debt today is issued with very few or no restrictive covenants. See
McDaniel, supra note 81, at 425-26. Thus, banks seeking to recapture lost borrowers
may be forced to relax their own requirements for protective debt covenants, thereby
increasing their credit risk.
113. See, e.g., Survey Says Thrifts, Financial Firms Cutting into Consumer Lending Pie,
Am. Banker, Sept. 24, 1987, at 10, col. 2.
114. In 1986, banks of all sizes experienced lower profitability ratios. See Wall, Com-
mercial Bank Profitability: Some Disturbing Trends, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ.
Rev. 24, 24 (Mar.-Apr. 1987); see also Cacace, 19 of Top 25 Banks Post Losses in First
Half, Am. Banker, Sept. 30, 1987, at 2, col. 2 (reporting losses for 35 of nation's 100
largest banks in first half of 1987). Although bank profits generally improved during the
first half of 1988, bank growth, measured by total deposits, was slower than the growth of
the economy as a whole. See Rehm, Banks Losing Market Share, FDIC Chief Says, Am.
Banker, Sept. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
115. In 1986, adjusted net interest margin, or the difference between interest income
and interest expense, fell for banks of all sizes. See Wall, supra note 114, at 25. Two
other measures of bank profitability, return on assets and return on equity, also declined,
particularly for banks with assets under $25 million. See id. at 27.
116. See Johnson & Murphy, supra note 110, at 24. The large amounts of foreign
loans in bank portfolios, many of which account for current loan losses, are in part the
result of banks' efforts to find higher yielding investments for their more expensive
deposits.
117. In 1982, banks accounted for 23.5 percent of all private sector lending; in 1986,
their share was only 16.1 percent. See Clarke, The Limits of Bank Regulation, 6 Ann.
BANK REGULATION
This decline in profitability has put pressure on traditional bank regu-
lation. Traditional regulation had failed to prevent the new nonbank
competitors from offering products and services comparable to or better
than traditional bank products.1 18 By imposing restrictions on the prod-
ucts and services that banks could offer, however, traditional regulation
kept banks from competing with these new entrants on their own
terms. 119
Thus, traditional regulation itself is often blamed for the decline in
bank profitability by restricting the freedom of the banking industry to
innovate. Insofar as the industry was able to escape these restrictions,
regulation forced banks to seek the most expensive and often the riskiest
ways to compete. For example, the inability of banks to offer market
rates of interest on their deposits caused them to develop complex instru-
ments such as "sweep" programs, many of which required banks to share
fees and customers with nonbank financial firms.'20 Likewise, banks in
search of ways to recapture some of their lost lending profits engaged in
"off-balance sheet" activities, such as issuing standby letters of credit to
back up issuances of commercial paper 2 1 and selling interests in pools of
bank assets.122 These activities, although profitable in the short run,
have created new risks for the banking industry. 123
Rev. Banking L. 227, 229 (1987); see also Rehm, Seidman: '87 Was a 'Forgettable Year'
For Banks, Am. Banker, Mar. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (in 1987, bank asset growth was less
than 2 percent, the smallest annual increase since 1948).
118. A frequently cited example is Merrill Lynch's cash management account, which
combined the high return on a brokerage account with the ease of withdrawal of the
typical bank checking account. For a description of the first cash management account,
see M. Mayer, supra note 104, at 34-45.
119. For example, under the Glass-Steagall Act, banks have been permitted to engage
in some aspects of the securities business, such as privately placing corporate securities.
See Federal Reserve Board Staff, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activities 81
(1977) (private placement does not constitute "underwriting or dealing" in securities pro-
hibited by Glass-Steagall). Nevertheless, until recently, banking organizations were pre-
cluded from underwriting public issuances of corporate securities or placing commercial
paper. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807
F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding Federal Reserve Board ruling that commercial
paper placement does not constitute "underwriting or dealing" in securities prohibited by
Glass-Steagall), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987); J.P. Morgan & Co., Chase Manhat-
tan Corp., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Citicorp and Security Pacific Corp., 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 192 (1989) [hereinafter Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pa-
cific] (permitting banks to underwrite and deal in corporate debt securities on a limited
basis through affiliates); infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
120. Under these programs, bank balances were swept into a money market mutual
fund maintained by a brokerage firm. The brokerage firm ordinarily received a fee for
sponsoring the fund. For a description of sweep programs and other deposit innovations,
see Rivoir, supra note 25, at 23.
121. See supra note 110.
122. This securitization of loans enables banks to transform illiquid loans into a diver-
sified investment vehicle. For a description of securitization, see Johnson & Murphy,
supra note 110, at 30-33.
123. Off-balance sheet activities such as standby letters of credit create contingent
claims against the bank that are unpredictable, thus increasing the bank's funding risk,
and that are difficult for the regulators to monitor. See id. at 26.
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Although traditional regulation no longer keeps banks profitable, total
dismantling of the restrictive regulation has not necessarily been the solu-
tion to the profitability crisis. Ceilings on the interest rates payable on
deposits became counterproductive once depositors had a choice of com-
petitive instruments with higher yields. 24 Yet eliminating these ceilings,
although theoretically permitting banks to recapture some of their de-
posit market, created the additional problem of increasing the cost of
bank funds, exposing banks to new funding risks."' 5 It is significant that,
despite rate deregulation, commercial banks have still paid rates on their
deposits that are below rates offered by competitive money market
investments. 126
Moreover, the picture of banks as eager innovators stifled by regula-
tory constraints 127is belied by the bank regulators' own efforts to en-
courage industry innovation. The bank regulators did respond to the
effect of rising interest rates on banks' ability to attract deposits by re-
peatedly raising the ceilings on the rates of interest payable on bank de-
posits.1 28 Moreover, bank diversification into new activities generally has
required prior regulatory approval,129 which, particularly recently, usu-
ally has been granted. 130 Legal challenges to new bank powers have pit-
124. See supra note 19.
125. To the extent that banks relied upon the interest rate ceilings in pricing their
assets, too rapid a rise in rates payable on liabilities could have led to serious gap
problems. See Black & Williams, Regulatory Response to Financial Innovations, 5 Issues
in Bank Reg. 3, 4 (Autumn 1981).
126. See P. Mahoney, A. White, P. O'Brien & M. McLaughlin, Federal Reserve Board
Staff Study: Responses to Deregulation: Retail Deposit Pricing from 1983 Through
1985, at 1 (1987).
127. See, e.g., Kane, Accelerating Inflation, Regulation and Banking Innovation, 4 Is-
sues in Bank Reg. 7 (Summer 1980) (conflict between industry innovation and regulatory
reaction).
128. For example, between 1961 and 1966, the Federal Reserve Board revised Regula-
tion Q four times to respond to increases in rates on treasury bills. See McKinney, supra
note 100, at 73-77.
129. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve Board must deter-
mine whether entry by a bank holding company into a new nonbanking activity is "so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987). Following some approvals of individ-
ual applications, the Board may add a particular activity to Regulation Y's "laundry list"
of permissible activities, thereby permitting other bank holding companies to commence
the activity without formal application. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b) (1988).
130. For example, the regulators repeatedly have approved bank expansion into new
securities activities, including retail discount brokerage, see BankAmerica Corp., 69 Fed.
Res. Bull. 105, aff'd sub. nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984) [hereinafter
BankAmerica]; portfolio investment advice and securities execution, see National West-
minster Bank PLC and NatWest Holdings, Inc., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986), aff'd sub.
nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 697 (1988) [hereinafter NatWest]; acting as
a futures commission merchant, see J.P. Morgan & Co., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 514 (1982);
and underwriting commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage-related se-
curities on a limited basis, see Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co. and Bankers Trust New York
Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), aff'd sub. nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
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ted competitors such as the securities and insurance industries against
the bank regulators.13 1 When reregulation has occurred, it has come
principally from Congress, which has reversed significant regulatory
innovations. 132
Occasionally, the banking industry itself has resisted innovation.
Although banks have been losing customers to nonbank competitors
such as securities firms for over a decade, banks have been surprisingly
slow to attempt to recapture their lost market even when regulation has
not posed a significant barrier to innovation. 133 Most bank management,
trained in the traditional banking business, lacked the expertise necessary
to develop and market sophisticated new financial products. 13  Resist-
ance to and suspicion of the very rapid changes that have occurred in the
financial marketplace slowed bank entry into new activities.1 35 Thus, the
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2830
(1988) [hereinafter Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust]. The regulators recently approved
bank applications to underwrite and deal in various corporate debt instruments on a lim-
ited basis, and indicated their intention to permit banks to underwrite and deal in corpo-
rate equity as well on a limited basis if certain operating conditions are met. See
Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note 119, 75 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 192.
131. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (challenging Board's approval of bank commercial paper
placement activities), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (challenging
Board's approval of bank insurance agency activities), vacated in part and reh'g denied,
558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
132. See, e.g., Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, Title II,
§§ 201-205, 101 Stat. 552, 581-85 (imposing year-long moratorium on regulatory ap-
proval of new securities, insurance or real estate powers for banking organizations);
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 118(a),
601, 96 Stat. 1469, 1479, 1536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V
1987)) (restricting authority for bank holding companies to engage in some insurance
activities previously approved by Federal Reserve Board).
133. See supra note 96 (banks' slow entry into brokerage activities). This reluctance to
innovate may have reflected a disinclination on the part of many banks to incur the cost
of the regulatory application process and subsequent legal challenges by competitors.
For example, Bankers Trust's application to place commercial paper on behalf of custom-
ers resulted in two trips through the federal court system, including one hearing before
the Supreme Court. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984) ("Bankers Trust I") (holding that commercial paper was
a security under the Glass-Steagall Act and remanding for determination whether com-
mercial paper placement constituted prohibited underwriting or dealing); Securities In-
dus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987) ("Bankers Trust II") (holding that commercial
paper placement was not prohibited underwriting or dealing under the Glass-Steagall
Act).
134. Some banks have sought to bridge this gap in expertise by hiring experts away
from their nonbank competitors to set up new divisions. See, eg., Albert, Chemical
Raids Wall Street to Beef Up Unit that Securitizes and Sells Loans, Am. Banker, Feb. 8,
1988, at 1, col. 2. This in turn has created problems in integrating new personnel and
businesses into the traditional banking structure. See infra notes 272-74 and accompany-
ing text.
135. Some observers have spoken of a so-called "bankers' mindset" that resists change
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banking industry actually may have benefited from the slow, piecemeal
deregulation that has come about largely through regulatory approvals of
individual bank applications. 136 In fact, some of the most far-reaching
attacks on bank regulation have been initiated outside of the banking
industry by nonbank competitors. 137
Several conclusions may be drawn about the deregulatory process in
banking. Although the recent effect of traditional regulation has been to
increase bank risk, deregulation, particularly too rapid deregulation, po-
tentially creates its own new threat to bank profitability. Thus, the regu-
lators have had to develop a new strategy to protect the banking industry
during the process of transition. The aim of the new regulation is the
same as that of the old regulation, to assist the banking industry in find-
ing new sources of profit. The regulators' new strategy will be explored
in the next section.
C. The "New" Regulation
Traditional bank regulation was characterized by tight control over
and protection of bank assets, primarily loans.1 38 The new regulatory
strategy is more difficult to characterize. In part, the new approach is
negative, involving the removal of many of the old prophylactic restric-
tions on bank activities. This new approach is apparent in recent regula-
tory decisions permitting banks to exploit gaps in the regulatory
framework. For example, despite the Glass-Steagall Act's general ban on
bank securities activities, the regulators have found ways to permit banks
or their affiliates to offer discount brokerage139 and even to underwrite
certain securities on a limited basis.' 4° This reflects a recognition that
banks must be allowed to find new sources of income in order to
and fears encroachment by outside experts such as investment bankers into bankers'
traditional turf. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 58.
136. For a discussion of the dangers of too rapid deregulation of business and sugges-
tions for facilitating regulatory transition, see generally Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59
Tul. L. Rev. 4 (1984).
137. For example, the "nonbank bank" phenomenon, see supra note 18, was begun by
nonbank firms that were looking for ways to own or retain deposit-taking facilities. See,
e.g., Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 668 F.2d 732 (3d
Cir. 1981) (oil company), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (interstate holding
company).
138. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
139. See Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1988); BankAmerica, supra note
130, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. at 115.
140. See Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note 119, 75
Fed. Res. Bull. at 192 (corporate debt securities); Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra
note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 473 (commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and
mortgage-related securities). The Federal Reserve Board determined that such activities,
if conducted on a limited basis through bank affiliates, did not violate § 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act, which forbids affiliations of banks and any company "engaged principally"
in securities underwriting or dealing. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
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survive. 141
In addition, the new regulatory strategy reflects a different, more ac-
tive approach to the task of limiting bank risk. Since prophylactic rules
that prevent risk-taking are no longer feasible, the new regulation focuses
on the proper management of risk by banking institutions. For example,
the regulators have approved bank entry into new activities only after
imposing very specific conditions on how those new businesses may be
conducted. 142 These conditions not only address specific management
failures, such as conflicts of interest, but also reflect a new concern on the
part of the bank regulators with how banks are being operated by their
managers.
This shift in regulatory strategy is not complete. Banks are still subject
to considerable restrictive regulation. 43 Nevertheless, evidence of
change can be found in two recent developments. First, the bank regula-
tors themselves have been leading the push for further deregulation of
banking in Congress.' 4 Second, the recent internal restructurings at
many banks145 reflect the substantial changes that are occurring in the
operations and management of banking organizations. Although these
changes are in part a response to market pressure for improved bank
earnings, 46 as will be demonstrated, this industry realignment also has
been encouraged by the new regulation. 47
1. Diversification
Perhaps the most dramatic shift in bank regulation over the last dec-
ade has been the extent to which banks have been permitted to diversify
their activities and investments. This relaxation of traditional product
and geographic restrictions has occurred not only at the congressional
level,' 48 but also through the regulatory application process. 49 In recent
141. See, e.g., Shumway, supra note 11, at 248 (regulator sees need for additional
sources of bank income).
142. For specific examples, see infra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
143. To the extent much of this regulation is statutory, congressional action is neces-
sary to remove it.
144. See supra note 4. In fact, the regulators occasionally have been criticized for
being too soft on deregulation. See, e.g., Mayer, Seidman's Brave New World, Am.
Banker, Sept. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (FDIC Chairman criticized for becoming the "point
man of a deregulatory drive").
145. See Matthews & Neustadt, Restructuring Seen as Key to Bank Survival, Am.
Banker, Oct. 27, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (discussing increasing popularity of restructuring).
146. See infra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
148. In fact, the last time Congress addressed the issue, it actually tightened restric-
tions on bank insurance activities. See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 118(a), 601, 96 Stat. 1469, 1479, 1536 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987)) (preventing bank affiliates from providing in-
surance as principal, agent or broker except for credit life and disability insurance). Con-
gress repeatedly has considered loosening the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on bank
securities activities, see supra note 7, but, at the time this Article was prepared, no legisla-
tion had yet been passed.
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years, banks or their affiliates have been permitted by the regulators to
engage in a wide range of new financial activities, such as privately plac-
ing securities for corporate issuers, 150 providing portfolio investment ad-
vice in conjunction with securities brokerage, 15' renting space to a real
estate brokerage firm in exchange for a percentage of revenues152 and
underwriting and dealing in various types of securities. 53 Recently, the
regulators have called for further product deregulation at the congres-
sional level.' 54
Thus, the bank regulators generally have been aggressive proponents
of liberalized powers for banks and their affiliates. At first, this may
seem contrary to the regulators' self-interest. Expanding permissible
bank activities makes the regulators' job harder by complicating the
monitoring process.'55 Nevertheless, the regulators' new policy has a
very practical explanation. The decline in profitability of traditional
banking has forced banks to choose between taking increased risks in the
banking business in order to improve returns and looking for additional
sources of income. As increased bank risk could lead to more bank fail-
ures, the regulators' only alternative is to allow banks to explore new
businesses as potential sources of profitability.
The regulators' recognition that improved safety and soundness in the
149. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. In the case of geographic expansion,
the most significant developments have taken place at the state level, since the Bank
Holding Company Act allows states to authorize entry by out-of-state banks. See Bank
Holding Company Act § 3(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). Nevertheless, acquisitions by
bank holding companies of banks across state lines require approval by the Federal Re-
serve Board, which must determine whether the state statute's authorization of entry by
out-of-state banks complies with the requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act.
See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 169-74 (1985) (upholding Board's determination that a state statute limiting entry to
banks from a particular geographic region is consistent with the Bank Holding Company
Act).
150. See Federal Reserve Board Staff, supra note 119, at 81.
151. See Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700 (1988) (investment ad-
vice/brokerage services for retail customers); NatWest, supra note 130, 72 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 584 (investment advice/brokerage services for institutional customers).
152. See, e.g., Comptroller No Objection Letter No. 87-8, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,037, at 76,644-45 (Nov. 17, 1987).
153. See Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note 119, 75
Fed. Res. Bull. at 192 (corporate debt securities); Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra
note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 473 (commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and
mortgage-related securities). At the time this Article was prepared, the regulators had
agreed to authorize banks to underwrite and deal in equity securities on a limited basis in
a year if certain operational and managerial requirements are met. See Morgan/Chase/
Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note 119, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 209.
154. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Mandate for Change: Restruc-
turing the Banking Industry, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) q
87,103, at 93,017, 93,019 (Oct. 1987) [hereinafter Mandate for Change] (calling for relax-
ation of statutory restrictions'on bank powers, ownership of and affiliation with nonbank
firms); Corrigan, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View, 1986 Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y. Ann. Rep. 3, 26-28 (proposing end of restrictions on affiliations between banks and
financial firms).
155. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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banking industry will come from product diversification represents a
revolution in bank regulatory strategy. As previously described, restrict-
ing banks to particular banking activities not only removed the opportu-
nity for banks to enter into unfamiliar and potentially risky ventures, but
enabled tight regulatory control of day-to-day bank activities."5 6 Diversi-
fication, if handled properly, may permit banks to offset earnings varia-
bility in the banking business,157 but it also removes a great deal of
regulatory authority. The bank regulators no longer can control exactly
what businesses banks will enter,"5 8 nor will all banks necessarily engage
in the same activities. Allowing banks this flexibility to experiment with
new activities is essential to achieve the advantages of diversification.
Nevertheless, the regulators cannot be sure that all bank management
will diversify effectively.
Thus, deregulation of banking activities creates a new risk to the bank-
ing system: the risk that banks will not manage their new investments
and operations profitably.159 Management may misallocate resources
among banking and nonbanking activities, leading to a decline in profit-
ability of the bank as a whole. Management may permit conflicts of in-
terest that threaten the operations of one or more parts of the banking
organization.
Although these risks are inherent in all diversified enterprises, the po-
tential for harm is particularly serious in banking. Poor management or
conflicts of interest that lead to bank failure may impose costs on the
entire banking system."6 Thus, the bank regulators are still faced with
the need to prevent mismanagement of diversified banks. 6' Unlike the
156. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 53 (risk reducing effect of diversification).
158. To the extent that diversification has come about through the regulatory applica-
tion process, the regulators have been able to control the types of new activities that
banks are entering. As the list of permissible activities grows, however, the regulators
have less control over exactly what combination of businesses a bank may choose at any
particular time. Any effort to regulate the permissible mix of investments, or to confine
banks to particular activities that the regulators believe will be profitable for them, would
only interfere with the ability of banks to adjust to market changes, leading to the same
problems that banks experienced under traditional regulation. For example, although
investment banking has appeared very profitable to banks and bank regulators over the
past decade, there are indications that, now that banks are receiving permission to enter
that business, returns are dropping. See Neustadt, Investment Banking Party Ends As
Commercial Banks Get Invite, Am. Banker, Apr. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (study predicts
investment banking profits, lower in 1987, will continue to decline until 1991). There-
fore, allowing individual bank experimentation with different activities is less costly than
legislating a new mix of powers each time that economic conditions change.
159. This risk has been described as "operating risk." See Rhoades, Interstate Banking
and Product Line Expansion: Implications From Available Evidence, 18 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.
1115, 1153 (1985); infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 8 (describing reasons for regulatory goal of minimizing conse-
quences of bank failure).
161. In addition, the absence of substantial self-regulation in the banking industry,
which may in part be due to the industry's limited experience with diversification, in-
creases the need for regulatory intervention. See Miller, A Regulatory Approach to Dereg-
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old prophylactic rules, however, the new regulatory approach has been
symptomatic, consisting of narrowly drawn rules and operating proce-
dures that are designed to minimize opportunities for mismanagement.
In part, the regulators have relied on long-standing statutory rules that
prevent financial abuses within bank holding companies. For example,
section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act limits loans, extensions of credit
and certain other financial transactions between a bank and its nonbank
affiliates. 16 2 Limits on the payment of dividends by a bank to its parent
company also prevent banks from diverting funds to nonbank affili-
ates.1 63 Moreover, banks may not pay excessive fees for services fur-
nished to them by an affiliate. 164 Such regulation is intended to prevent
diversified banking organizations from draining assets from the bank for
the benefit of other entities within the organization.
In addition, in approving applications to commence new activities, the
regulators have imposed conditions and requirements that affect the op-
eration of the new activity in order to minimize opportunities for con-
flicts of interest that may jeopardize the bank and its depositors. The
regulators' strategy has been to separate, both structurally and operation-
ally, the new activity from the traditional banking business.1 65 This
strategy has been referred to as building a "firewall" between banking
and nonbanking activities.1 66 Thus, the regulators have required physi-
cal separation of banking and nonbanking businesses, including separate
incorporation,1 67 separate offices 16 " and separate personnel.1 69 More-
over, the regulators have limited interactions between the separate opera-
ulation, 4 Issues in Bank Reg. 18, 21 (Autumn 1980) (lack of self-regulation in bank trust
departments led to federal conflict of interest regulation).
162. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982). Although section 23A by its terms applies only to
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, its provisions have been extended
to all nonmember insured banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 18280) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). At one
time, bank transactions with affiliates were even more stringently regulated. In the origi-
nal Bank Holding Company Act, banks were prohibited from investing any funds in their
holding companies or any affiliate. See Act of May 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 6, 70
Stat. 133, 137, repealed by Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 9, 80 Stat. 236, 240.
163. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 60(b) (1982) (national banks need regulatory approval to
pay dividends in excess of net profits plus retained earnings for two preceding years).
164. See, e.g., First Southwest Bancorporation, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 301, 302-303 (1972)
(Federal Reserve Board denied merger application by bank holding company that had
charged excessive management fees to subsidiary banks). Section 23B of the Federal Re-
serve Act, added by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86,
101 Stat. 552, requires that a bank's transactions with its affiliates be on terms and condi-
tions substantially the same as those with nonaffiliated companies, and prohibits bank
trust departments from purchasing securities underwritten by an affiliate. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 371c-1 (Supp. V 1987).
165. See, e.g., Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at
492 (insulation of nonbank subsidiary, both structurally and operationally, from bank
makes it less likely that "adverse effects related to the conduct of the nonbanking activity
will affect affiliated banks").
166. See Garsson, Building a "Firewall': Can It Work?, Am. Banker, Dec. 14, 1987, at
1, col. 2.
167. See, e.g., Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at
503 (underwriting to be conducted through separate nonbank affiliate); United City
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tions, particularly extensions of credit by the bank to its nonbank
affiliate 170 and certain joint marketing of bank and nonbank products. 171
Although specific conditions may vary, the strategy of the new regula-
tory approach is clear. Rather than controlling the types of risks that
banks are allowed to take, the bank regulators have encouraged experi-
mentation with new activities in the hope of improving the profitability
of banking. At the same time, the regulators have tried to influence how
banks will manage their newly diversified businesses by imposing rules
intended to minimize the potential for abuses that could adversely affect
profitability. Thus, although bank management has been accorded
greater discretion to choose bank investments, management's autonomy
in operating its businesses actually has been reduced by rules that are
designed to prevent mismanagement on a day-to-day basis. 172
2. Capital
Initially, regulation of bank capital appears to share the objectives and
approach of traditional bank regulation. In the banking industry, capital
traditionally has served an insurance function for depositors by protect-
ing them, and the deposit insurance fund, against a decline in the value of
the bank's assets.' 73 If the value of a bank's assets declines below its
Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 662 (1985) (consumer financial counseling through separate
entity from bank).
168. See, ag., Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at
503. Occasionally the regulators have required the nonbanking business to have a differ-
ent name from that of the bank. See NatWest, supra note 130, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 588.
169. See, eg., Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at
503.
170. See, e.g., Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note
119, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 206-07 (prohibiting lending by bank to its underwriting subsidi-
ary); Citicorp/Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 503
(preventing bank from extending credit (i) to enhance the creditworthiness or marketabil-
ity of any securities underwritten by a securities affiliate, (ii) to customers to purchase any
such securities, or (iii) to issuers for the payment of principal of or interest on any such
securities).
171. See, e.g., Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 656, 660 (1982) (approving bank holding
company acquisition of thrift subject to conditions preventing joint deposit-taking, sweep
arrangements or joint solicitation of customers by the thrift and its affiliated banks). The
regulators subsequently permitted limited tandem operations between banks and affiliated
thrifts, including joint use of automated teller networks. See Letter from William W.
Wiles, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Patrick Mulhern, Senior Vice President and
General Counsel, Citicorp (Aug. 10, 1987) (available upon request from the Freedom of
Information Office, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington
D.C.); see also Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 930, 932 (1987) (permit-
ting limited sharing of customer lists between bank and affiliated broker serving institu-
tional customers). Regulatory approvals also have included rules forbidding the bank
from sharing confidential customer information with nonbank affiliates. See Citicorp/
Morgan/Bankers Trust, supra note 130, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 503 (lending affiliate may
not disclose nonpublic information to securities affiliate). But see Sovran Fin. Corp., 74
Fed. Res. Bull. 504, 505 (1988) (permitting exchange of confidential customer informa-
tion between affiliates with customer's consent).
172. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
173. See Peltzman, supra note 83, at 1. The term "capital" here is used generally to
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capital, then depositors will incur losses, requiring reimbursement from
the deposit insurance fund. Thus, a high capital to asset ratio allows the
bank more readily to absorb loan losses. In addition, high capital makes
the bank examiner's job easier by providing a cushion of protection
against possible future losses on risky loans. Since the amount of a
bank's capital is easier to measure than the riskiness of its loan portfolio,
a large capital component protects against the possibility of examiner
mistakes. 74
Until recently, however, capital levels at most banks were relatively
low. 175 In part, the explanation may have been the failure of the bank
regulators to impose strict capital requirements.176 Until the 1980s, the
regulators tended to evaluate the capital levels at individual banks rela-
tive to their peers, failing to halt the decline in capital ratios for the bank-
ing industry as a whole.177 Moreover, when formal capital to asset ratios
were instituted, 7 1 the regulators' definition of capital included not only
equity, but also loan loss reserves 179 and various forms of debt.'
refer to long-term financial claims on the bank, including equity and long-term debt but
excluding deposits. See generally W. Klein & J. Coffee, Business Organization and Fi-
nance: Legal and Economic Principles 292 (3d ed. 1988) (defining "capital structure").
As will be seen, "capital" for bank regulatory purposes may have a more specific mean-
ing, including only particular types of capital instruments. Moreover, regulation of bank
capital is concerned not only with total levels of capital relative to bank assets (such as
loans and investment securities), but also with the relative levels of equity and debt as
components of total capital (leverage).
174. See Peltzman, supra note 83, at 3.
175. This particularly has been the case for bank equity levels. In 1980, money center
banks' average assets to average equity was 26.9, representing an increase in leverage of
12.3 percent since 1975. Large regional banks (with over $2 billion in assets) were lever-
aged 17.4 times, and medium-sized regional banks (with less than $2 billion in assets)
were leveraged 15.6 times, representing increases in leverage of 5.1 percent and 5.3 per-
cent respectively since 1975. See Walker, Regulating Capital at the Margin, 5 Issues in
Bank Reg. 35, 36 (Autumn 1981).
176. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. The regulators did evaluate capital
levels in ruling on applications by banking organizations to acquire banks or nonbank
affiliates, occasionally denying an application if the acquisition would result in too much
additional leverage. See, e.g., Croesus Partners I, Inc., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 45, 46 (1986).
177. See Wall, supra note 82, at 13.
178. The regulators adopted a two-part definition of capital for banking organizations
(including both banks and bank holding companies): primary capital, consisting princi-
pally of equity (common stock and perpetual preferred stock) and loan loss reserves, and
secondary capital, including limited life preferred stock, subordinated debt issued by
banks and unsecured long-term debt issued by bank holding companies. Banking organi-
zations were required to maintain a minimum primary capital to assets ratio of 5.5 per-
cent and a minimum total capital to assets ratio of 6 percent. See 12 C.F.R. Parts 3, 225,
325 (1988).
179. As a result of this broad definition of capital, additions to loan loss reserves to
provide for bad loans would not result in a decline in capital for regulatory purposes
despite any resulting decline in net worth and shareholders' equity. For example, when
Citicorp added $3 billion to its reserves in May 1987 to cover expected losses on its
international loan portfolio, its primary capital remained unchanged. See Trigaux &
Garsson, Regulators Downplay Possible 'Domino'Effect, Am. Banker, May 21, 1987, at 3,
col. 2.
180. See supra note 178.
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This broad definition of capital may have served the regulators' pur-
pose of providing a cushion to absorb losses in the event of bank failure
before they could be felt by depositors and the insurance fund.18 1 Yet
traditional capital requirements did not cause banks to reduce risk-taking
that could lead to failure and, in fact, may have caused some banks to
increase the riskiness of their assets. Increasing capital imposes addi-
tional costs on banking organizations in the form of higher dividend or
interest charges. In order to fund these increased charges, a bank may be
tempted to invest its new capital in higher yielding, riskier assets. 82 In
addition, the capital requirements indirectly may have led to an increase
in risk in bank holding companies, which issued substantial amounts of
debt and thereby increased their leverage to fund their additional invest-
ments in their subsidiary banks.183 Because the principal source of funds
to service this holding company debt is the subsidiary bank itself, a
highly leveraged bank holding company may be tempted to drain re-
sources from its bank, thereby impairing its operations.
1 84
Moreover, the declining profitability of the commercial banking busi-
ness contributed to the drop in capital, particularly equity, at many
banks. As long a4 banks earned a comfortable spread between the rates
of interest earned on their loans and paid on their deposits, the cost of
servicing capital was not a burden. As the price of deposits increased,
many banks no longer could support high dividend payouts, even when
they invested in more lucrative risky assets.185 Because banks did not
depend on equity for day-to-day funding, they had no incentive volunta-
rily to raise equity capital, particularly when the market for bank equities
was depressed.' 8
6
Recently, capital regulation has assumed new importance, but both the
181. It has been argued that the protection afforded by deposit insurance itself reduced
incentives for banks voluntarily to increase their capital, since at least insured deposits
did not have to rely on capital as protection against losses in the event of failure. See
Peltzman, supra note 83, at 4.
182. With respect to dividends, the banking organization could choose to reduce its
dividend rate. Such a move, however, may have a negative effect on the market for the
bank's equity, hindering its ability to raise future capital. See infra note 324 and accom-
panying text.
183. A survey of New York's six largest bank holding companies at year-end 1986
found that as a group the holding companies had a double leverage ratio of 140 percent.
In other words, the holding companies had invested an amount equal to all of their share-
holders' equity plus an additional 40 percent in their bank and nonbank subsidiaries. See
Forde, The Risk Behind Parent Company Debt, Am. Banker, May 14, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
184. As previously noted, bank dividends are subject to legal limitations that are in-
tended to prevent bank holding companies from taking excessive funds from their subsid-
iary banks. See supra note 163. To the extent that these restrictions are effective,
however, they may leave highly leveraged bank holding companies without sufficient
funds for debt servicing.
185. See Ehlen, A Review of Bank Capital and Its Adequacy, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Econ. Rev. 54, 56 (Nov. 1983) (bank profitability in the 1960s and 1970s too low
to support equity growth).
186. See Matthews, Money Center Stocks Weaken, Analysts Find, Am. Banker, Dec.
15, 1987, at 25, col. 1 (decline in share values of large money center banks).
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form and purpose of the requirements are changing. First, the regulators
are putting greater emphasis on equity as the primary component of the
capital requirement.1 17 Second, in applying capital standards to individ-
ual banks, the regulators are taking into account the composition and
riskiness of the bank's assets.1 88
This new approach to bank capital regulation views the role of capital
as more than simply a cushion of protection for depositors in the event of
failure. Either equity or some form of subordinated debt may provide
such a cushion. But additional debt imposes burdens on banks that can
seriously affect their financial positions as going concerns. Once the in-
terest rate on debt is set, a bank cannot waive or alter its obligation to
pay interest even if the bank suffers a decline in earnings. In contrast, it
is generally assumed that management will be able to waive dividend
payments should the bank encounter financial difficulties. Thus, requir-
ing banks to raise equity, rather than debt, to meet increased capital re-
quirements may lessen the burden of future debt servicing, thereby
eliminating a potential risk to bank solvency.189
Requiring higher levels of equity capital will have the additional prac-
tical effect of forcing banking organizations to raise funds in the public
equity market.190 Ideally, this should have several consequences for
banks. In order to sell new stock, banking organizations must compete
for buyers in the public securities market with other banking organiza-
tions as well as nonbank issuers. This market pressure could force banks
to manage their risk-taking more effectively in order to keep their cost of
capital low."19 In effect, the regulators could enlist the equity market to
assist it in policing bank risk.192
187. The United States bank regulators, in conjunction with central bankers from Eu-
rope and Japan, recently adopted new capital guidelines that require a minimum capital
to assets ratio of 8 percent, of which 4 percent must be primarily common stock and
certain categories of perpetual preferred stock. See Federal Reserve System, Capital;
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4186-4221 (Jan. 27, 1989), corrected
in, 54 Fed. Reg. 12531 (Mar. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Risk-Based Capital Guidelines].
188. The new capital guidelines assign risk weights to bank assets, ranging from zero
percent for essentially riskless assets such as cash and treasury securities to 100 percent
for loans to private borrowers. See id. at 4220.
189. See generally Mendelson, The Threat of Corporate Debt, 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap.
Market L. 149, 155-57 (1984) (negative effects of high leverage on firms). Although, as a
legal matter, dividends may be waived more easily than interest payments, the likelihood
of an adverse market reaction may make such a decision untenable. See infra notes 324-
25 and accompanying text.
190. A study of bank equity to assets ratios in mid-1987 found that 26 major banks had
ratios under the 4 percent minimum. See Rehm & Duffy, 26 Big Banks Face Need to
Raise Equity: Regulators Seek 4% Minimum Level, Am. Banker, Dec. 11, 1987, at 1, col.
4.
191. For example, the depressed share value of many banking organizations over the
past few years may reflect the market's concern about risky lending practices, particularly
in the international sector. See Matthews, supra note 186, at 25, col. 1.
192. At the same time, the regulators may be able to use the equity market's assess-
ment of banks, as reflected in their share prices, to assist them in identifying risky banks.
See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, banking organizations may look for ways to avoid rais-
ing new equity. Regulatory capital requirements are measured on the
basis of the ratio of the bank's capital to total assets. Thus, each addi-
tional dollar of assets, or loans, requires a corresponding increase in capi-
tal. One way for banks to avoid the need for additional capital is to
restrict asset growth. In the past, capital requirements have provided a
reason for the popularity of such bank products as standby letters of
credit issued to back up commercial paper. Standby letters of credit pro-
duce fee income for the bank but, as contingent claims, do not appear on
the bank's balance sheet as assets unless the contingency is realized and
the loan is made. 193 Yet since the bank ordinarily will be called upon to
lend only in the event of a financial emergency, such as a default by the
commercial paper issuer, such a loan may be subject to a significant risk
of nonpayment as soon as it is made by the bank.194 This defeats the aim
of the capital requirements to provide some insurance against future loan
losses.
The new approach to capital regulation seeks to prevent this particular
circumvention of the capital requirements by including in its definition of
assets certain off-balance sheet engagements, such as letters of credit. 195
More generally, by taking into account the riskiness as well as the size of
a bank's assets, the new capital requirements encourage banks to choose
less risky ways to avoid raising new capital. A banking organization that
does not want to resort to the capital markets instead may weight its
portfolio with more low risk assets, such as cash and government securi-
ties, that will not require as much capital as riskier commercial loans.196
Alternatively, the bank may simply shrink its loan portfolio, more care-
fully choosing its borrowers and experimenting with alternative sources
of income by diversifying into new businesses. 19 7 To the extent that the
new approach to capital regulation may discourage uncontrolled asset
growth, particularly loan growth, it represents a profound shift in regula-
tory attitude toward portfolio management.
3. Fiduciary Responsibility of Bank Management
Although traditional bank regulation consisted largely of formal rules,
regulatory enforcement of those rules was surprisingly informal. The
193. See Johnson & Murphy, supra note 110, at 25.
194. In addition, because the bank's obligation to lend is unpredictable, the bank in-
curs the risk that it will be unable to fund the loan. See id. at 26.
195. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, supra note 187, at 4203-05.
196. See id.; supra note 188.
197. See Duffy, UK's Japanese Banks Focus on Profitability, Am. Banker, Nov. 17,
1987, at 2, col. 2 (strict U.K. capital requirements force banks to concentrate more on
profitability and less on asset growth). At a time when lending has become less profitable
for banks than in the past, this portfolio restructuring may make sense. In a changed
financial environment, however, leaner banks may be unable to compete as effectively in
national and international lending markets against large foreign lenders. See Shaw, Capi-
tal Adequacy Standards May Increase Risk, Am. Banker, Feb. 10, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
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regulators had powerful sanctions at their disposal to punish violations,
including termination of a bank's deposit insurance19 or revocation of its
charter,1 99 but rarely exercised such so-called "death penalty" powers." °
Instead, the regulators resorted to less formal means of bringing pressure
on bank management, including "jawboning" and voluntary agreements
with management, that had the advantage of not requiring formal judi-
cial or administrative proceedings.0 1
In part, the success of these informal techniques was due to the influ-
ence of the regulators over the banking industry. The necessity for regu-
latory approval of the most basic corporate decisions, such as branch
openings, 20 2 acquisitions of banks203 and entry into new businesses, 20 4
gave the regulators a potent means of bringing pressure to bear on recal-
citrant bank management.20 5 Moreover, the threat of severe sanctions,
although rarely used, made bank management more willing to acquiesce
in the regulators' informal requests for compliance.20 6
Recently, however, as the substance of bank regulation has shifted
away from rigid prohibitions toward more flexible rules of conduct such
as conflict of interest rules, regulatory enforcement actually has become
more formal. In 1966, the regulators requested and received new formal
disciplinary powers from Congress, 207 including the authority to issue
cease-and-desist orders to compel banks to undertake or to end particular
conduct.20 8 In addition, the regulators obtained broad powers to remove
bank officers or directors who engaged in insider abuse involving per-
sonal dishonesty.20 9 In 1978, again at the regulators' request, Congress
198. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1982).
199. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982) (providing for forfeiture of national bank char-
ter for knowing violations of banking laws).
200. See House Comm. on Government Operations, Federal Response to Criminal
Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Financial Institutions, H.R. Rep. No.
1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1984) [hereinafter House Report on Insider Abuse].
201. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982) (termination of national bank charter requires
judicial determination that banking law violations have occurred).
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982) (national banks need approval of the Comptroller of
the Currency to establish new branches).
203. See Bank Holding Company Act § 3(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982) (Federal Re-
serve Board approval required to form bank holding company or for bank holding com-
pany to acquire new bank subsidiaries).
204. See Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987)
(Federal Reserve Board approval required for bank holding company to engage in new
nonbanking activities).
205. For example, the regulators could impose conditions on bank management in
connection with their approval of an application. See supra note 12.
206. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
207. These were contained in the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
208. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1982). Such orders are legally enforceable and can be
instituted only after an administrative hearing and opportunity for judicial review. For a
discussion of cease-and-desist orders, see Deal, Bank Regulatory Enforcement-Some
New Dimensions, 40 Bus. Law. 1319, 1320-28 (1985).
209. As originally formulated, removal required proof that the director or officer had
violated a law or regulation, engaged in unsafe or unsound practices or breached his or
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gave the agencies additional disciplinary powers, 1' including authority
to issue cease-and-desist orders against individual officers, directors and
insiders of banks,z11 civil money penalties against banks and bank man-
agement for certain legal violations 12 and expanded powers to remove
bank management for "willful or continuing disregard" for the safety or
soundness of the bank. 1 3 Recently, the regulators once again have asked
for even broader powers.214
Despite the availability of these regulatory powers, formal enforce-
ment proceedings have been relatively infrequent.21 5 The regulators' re-
luctance to commence formal proceedings, as well as their recent
requests for still additional disciplinary powers, suggest that the existing
remedies still may be too severe or may require too high a standard of
proof.
216
In addition, however, the regulators' push for new and more flexible
enforcement powers may reflect a change in the way that disciplinary
powers will be used to control bank risk. Originally, the enforcement
powers were designed primarily to prevent actual cases of fraud and in-
sider abuse within banks. For example, in the past, bank management
could be removed only for knowing violations of the banking laws involv-
ing personal dishonesty.217 Because fraud and insider abuse accounted
her fiduciary duties; that the conduct in question threatened substantial financial loss to
the bank or seriously prejudiced the interests of depositors; and that the conduct involved
personal dishonesty. See House Report on Insider Abuse, supra note 200, at 143 n.383.
210. These were contained in the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
211. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982); Cobb, The New Clout in Federal Bank Regula-
tory Agencies, 96 Banking L.J. 512, 517-19 (1979).
212. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
213. Id. § 1818(e)(1).
214. At the time this Article was prepared, legislation was pending that would sub-
stantially increase both the enforcement powers and penalties. See Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, S. 413, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
215. From 1971 through 1976, the three federal bank regulatory agencies initiated only
108 cease-and-desist orders and 49 removal actions. See House Report on Insider Abuse,
supra note 200, at 143. In 1983, the Federal Reserve Board, which supervised 5,371 bank
holding companies, collected only one civil money penalty from a bank holding company.
See Wall, Insulating Banks from Nonbank Affiliates, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ.
Rev. 18, 27 n.15 (Sept. 1984).
216. In Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986), the
Comptroller issued a cease-and-desist order requiring the bank directors to reimburse the
bank for losses resulting from the directors' approval of loans in excess of the bank's legal
lending limits. The court held that the Comptroller had no power under its cease-and-
desist authority to impose personal liability on bank directors. See id. at 1245. Although
a provision of the National Bank Act does permit an action for damages to be brought
against bank directors for knowing violations of the lending limits and other banking
laws, such an action requires a full judicial hearing, not simply an administrative pro-
ceeding. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982). Pending legislation would broaden the regulators'
authority to fashion more flexible remedies. See supra note 214.
217. See supra note 209; Cobb, supra note 211, at 519-20.
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for most of the serious financial problems at banks,218 the enforcement
powers were designed to help prevent bank failure. Yet because fraud is
hard to discover even through on-site regulatory examinations, often the
bank had failed before the regulators could bring an action for removal of
management.219
Recent expansions of the regulators' disciplinary authority, such as the
broadening of the removal power to include "willful or continuing disre-
gard" for the safety or soundness of the bank,22° not only make enforce-
ment actions easier to bring, but also reflect the regulators' increasing
concern with the skill and quality as well as the honesty of bank manage-
ment. The broader enforcement powers permit the regulators to police
breaches of fiduciary duty that may not involve actual dishonesty on the
part of management.221 Such breaches of fiduciary duty may include
negligence, failure to supervise officers or employees and other misman-
agement that results in losses for the bank.222
This new use of the enforcement powers to police the fiduciary obliga-
tions of bank management is consistent with the regulators' recent efforts
to monitor more carefully the day-to-day performance of bank directors
and officers. As strict regulatory controls are dismantled, managing risk
largely becomes the task of individual banks. The enforcement powers
can serve the twofold purpose of enabling the regulators to pressure bank
management to improve its performance and permitting the regulators to
punish or remove bad managers when problems go uncorrected.223
II. A CORPORATE FINANCE ANALOGY
The previous Part described some of the recent changes in the strategy
of bank regulation. This Part proposes a way to categorize the new regu-
latory approach and to contrast it with past regulatory strategies. This
effort to categorize the recent changes in bank regulation in a compre-
hensive fashion has two aims. First, identification of the common themes
218. See supra note 98.
219. See House Report on Insider Abuse, supra note 200, at 157.
220. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Brickner v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 747 F.2d 1198, 1203 (8th Cir.
1984) (upholding removal power for breaches of fiduciary duty). Although the FDIC
had criticized the bank's extensions of credit to a customer in violation of its legal lending
limits, the directors accepted an officer's assurances that the improper lending would
cease and took no further steps to correct the problem. The court upheld the FDIC's
authority to remove the directors for breach of fiduciary duty although the directors had
not acted intentionally to endanger the safety of their bank.
222. For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of bank directors under common law, as
well as statutory sources of liability, see Grunewald & Golden, Bank Director Liability
Post-FIRA: How to Avoid It, 98 Banking L.J. 412 (1981).
223. To the extent that increased personal liability for mismanagement makes direc-
tors insurers of bank safety and soundness, the regulators' new policy may be subject to
some criticism. See Hawke, The Limited Role of Directors in Assuring the Soundness of
Banks, 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 285 (1987); see also infra notes 283-85 and accompanying
text.
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in the "new" bank regulation illustrates the extent of the shift that has
occurred in both the philosophy and the techniques of bank regulation.
This change in regulatory strategy is more significant than any individual
statutory or administrative change, because it suggests the direction that
regulation will continue to take in the future.
Second, identification of the shift in regulatory strategy permits some
tentative assessment of how well the new approach is already working
and can be expected to work in the future. Certain problems that have
emerged in administering the new regulation may be symptomatic of
deeper difficulties inherent in the regulators' new approach to managing
bank risk. Identifying this approach may assist in grappling with these
problems. This Part sets forth a framework for analysis of the new regu-
latory approach. The next Part describes its limitations.
The shift in bank regulatory strategy may be best understood by refer-
ence to basic concepts of corporate finance. Traditional bank regulation,
with its rigid controls on permissible bank activities and investments,
may be understood as viewing bank safety from the perspective of the
corporate debtholder. Because the bank regulators acted as surrogates
for depositors, the relationship between a bank and its regulators was
essentially that of a corporation and its debtholders. The influence of
these powerful debtholders naturally affected the management style and
business of the banking industry.
Recent regulatory innovations suggest that the bank regulators are be-
ginning to view bank safety from a different perspective. This new ap-
proach is evident not only in the more liberal attitude toward risk-taking,
but also in the new emphasis on the quality of management at banks.
The new regulatory strategy may be understood as viewing bank safety
from the perspective of the equityholder, who is concerned with the prof-
itable and efficient operation of the enterprise as a going concern. Of
course, the bank regulators still must be concerned with the need to pro-
tect depositors in the event of failure. To achieve this goal, the new regu-
latory approach focuses on encouraging better risk management within
the institution to maintain its profitability as a going concern rather than
on risk prevention and protection of bank assets.
A. Shareholders Versus Debtholders
Basic corporate finance theory assumes a conflict of interest between
debtholders and equityholders in a typical corporation. This conflict at
times may be overemphasized. Both shareholders and debtholders are
engaged in the same economic activity of investment and are motivated
by the same goal of profit.224 Moreover, the existence of hybrid securities
such as convertible debt has made the distinction between equity and
debt less clear in the modern corporation.225 Nevertheless, the classic
224. See B. Manning, A Concise Textbook on Legal Capital 8 (2d ed. 1981).
225. See McDaniel, supra note 81, at 417.
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dichotomy between shareholders and debtholders is still useful in identi-
fying two divergent approaches toward risk management.
In the classic model, the conflict between shareholders and
debtholders is most acute with respect to three basic management deci-
sions: risk-taking, asset management and leverage. Typically, the
debtholder is less willing to permit the corporation to incur additional
risk than the equityholder. Unlike the debtholder, who is entitled to a
rate of return that is unaffected by the profitability of the enterprise, the
equityholder stands to gain if risky ventures succeed, either through in-
creased dividends or capital appreciation. In contrast, the debtholder
prefers ventures that produce enough income to pay the interest on and
principal of the debt, but that do not involve a significant risk of loss that
could interfere with repayment.226 Moreover, equityholders can afford
to be less averse to risk-taking at individual institutions given their ability
to diversify their investments to reduce overall portfolio risk.22 7
In addition, debtholders and equityholders tend to differ as to the
proper management strategy concerning the use of the corporation's as-
sets. In the event of bankruptcy, the debtholder has a prior claim to the
assets of the corporation. Therefore, the debtholder prefers the corpora-
tion to maintain sufficient assets to be able to cover the debt in the event
of failure.228 This-emphasis on a strong balance sheet is of less concern
to the equityholder, who is more interested in the immediate distribution
of assets in the form of dividends. 229
Finally, equityholders and debtholders may have different attitudes to-
ward leverage. Typically, the debtholder welcomes a substantial invest-
ment in the corporation by equityholders.23 °  In contrast, the
equityholder prefers new operating capital to come from debtholders,
226. See Guttentag & Herring, Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder, 39 J. Fin.
1359, 1369 (1984) (describing this conflict of interest).
227. See supra note 53. Many debtholders also can diversify their investments. For
bank depositors, who are banks' most significant debtholders, diversification often is less
feasible, particularly for those depositors with small deposits or transaction accounts that
are maintained less as an investment than as a convenience or a necessity. Theoretically,
the deposit insurance fund itself is relatively diversified, since it is "invested" in all in-
sured banks. Nevertheless, given the potential cost to the banking system of some bank
failures, the insurance fund can be viewed as overinvested in particular banks whose fail-
ure either poses systemic risks or would bankrupt the insurance fund. As of the end of
1983, the total deposits of thirteen insured commercial banks exceeded the size of the
insurance fund. See Working Group of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, Rec-
ommendations for Change in the Federal Deposit Insurance System 20 (1985).
228. See B. Manning, supra note 224, at 6-7. Of course, debtholders also are interested
in the corporation's income flow as the source of repayment of their debt during the life
of the corporation. See id. at 14. In contrast, the bank regulators' principal concern is
that the bank will have sufficient assets to protect depositors during periods of financial
duress, avoiding the need for assistance from the insurance fund. Thus, the classic model
of the typical debtholder as primarily interested in maintaining a cushion of assets as
protection in the event of bankruptcy, although not entirely representative of the average
creditor, is useful to understanding the perspective of the bank regulators.
229. See id. at 15.
230. See id. at 11-12.
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which funds can be invested to make profits that will benefit the equi-
tyholders, while any losses will be borne mainly by the debtholders.231
At a certain point, however, the effects of leverage may produce a change
in these preferences. For example, debt servicing imposes a fixed cost on
the enterprise that, unlike shareholders' dividends, cannot be waived in
the event of declining corporate earnings. Thus, too heavy a debt burden
will limit the ability of shareholders either to remove funds from the en-
terprise in the form of dividends or to draw on internally generated funds
for expansion.232 On the other hand, the cost of servicing some forms of
debt may be so much less than the profits that can be generated from
those funds that even existing debtholders will prefer the sale of addi-
tional debt as a method of raising funds. This may have been true of
deposits when they were subject to interest rate ceilings.233
In addition, too much leverage may shift the balance of power within
the corporation. Although highly leveraged firms typically are thought
to be more inclined to take risks than less leveraged firms,2 34 this assumes
that shareholders' preferences determine management's choices. As the
investment and risk exposure of debtholders grow, debtholders may in-
sist on a greater voice in day-to-day management.235 Although the abil-
ity of a bank's principal debtholders, its depositors, to exert this influence
may be limited,236 the bank regulators as representatives of those deposi-
tors have sufficient power to demand greater control of management
decisionmaking.
B. Bank Regulation from the Debtholder's Perspective
The previous description of the preferences of the typical debtholder
closely fits the strategy of traditional bank regulation. Debtholders are
concerned about earnings variability, because they obtain no advantage
from windfall profits but are adversely affected by unexpected losses.23 7
Therefore, they prefer a strong balance sheet and steady if unspectacular
earnings. These preferences are reflected in the approach of traditional
bank regulation. The bank regulators sought to preserve bank safety,
and thus protect depositors, a bank's largest group of debtholders, by
limiting banks to businesses that had proved to be predictable sources of
231. See id. at 12.
232. Too much leverage also may prevent a banking organization from receiving the
necessary regulatory approval for further expansion by acquisition. See supra note 176.
233. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 81.
235. See Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale L.J. 1197, 1212 (1984). This
voice may take the form of representation on the board of directors by a major corporate
lender or more stringent restrictive covenants in the loan documentation.
236. Since depositors as a group lack both organization and shared goals with respect
to their investments, they will have difficulty negotiating for and monitoring compliance
with detailed debt covenants. See Garten, supra note 10, at 245-46.
237. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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income.238 New forms of risk-taking by individual banks were discour-
aged because they presented only downside risk to the regulatory system.
If the risk paid off, any resulting profits would not be shared by deposi-
tors, the insurance fund239 or the regulators. On the other hand, any
resulting losses could lead to bank failure, requiring a payoff of deposi-
tors out of the insurance fund or a regulatory bailout."4°
Thus, traditional bank regulation consisted of a series of restrictive
covenants similar in form and content to a classic bond contract. These
covenants restricted bank investments241 and activities, 42 as well as
banks' ability to pay dividends 4 3 and interest to future investors.244 In
fact, these regulatory covenants were far more onerous than the typical
covenants contained in privately negotiated debt instruments, which,
particularly recently, tend not to impose controls on investment deci-
sions."z4 The failure of debtholders to demand more restrictive cove-
nants from issuers may be explained by numerous factors, including the
inability of debtholders effectively to bargain for and enforce detailed
covenants,246 the liquidity of most debt instruments247 and the pressure
on corporate issuers of debt to free themselves from restrictions that
hamper their ability to compete.
These constraints on private bargaining, however, did not affect the
bank regulators in their dealings with the banking industry. Unlike ordi-
nary debtholders, the bank regulators could require essentially identical
restrictive covenants from all banks, removing competitive inequalities
among different institutions.248 Moreover, regulatory monitoring of
238. See supra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
239. Insurance premiums are based on a bank's total deposits, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(b)(I)-(8) (1982), and do not vary with the amount of risk or profits at individual
banks.
240. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (restrictions on national
bank's investments in securities).
242. See supra note 6.
243. See supra note 163.
244. See supra note 19 (interest rate ceilings).
245. Apart from negative pledge clauses, debt instruments today contain few cove-
nants at all. See McDaniel, supra note 81, at 424-25.
246. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 226, at 1369.
247. This liquidity, which has resulted from the development of active secondary trad-
ing markets for all kinds of corporate debt as well as the shortening of the average matu-
rities of debt instruments, enables investors to protect themselves by liquidating or selling
their investments rather than attempting to control risk-taking by contract.
248. The dual banking system may permit some competition among state and federal
bank regulators for bank charters (and chartering fees). See Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1977). Theoretically,
this competition should lead to a relaxation in regulatory restrictions similar to the phe-
nomenon observable with respect to private debt covenants. Nevertheless, although
many state banking laws do grant broader powers to state-chartered banks than are avail-
able to national banks, the effect of this competition has been blunted by the fact that
almost all banking organizations are subject to some federal regulation, such as the Bank
Holding Company Act regulating the holding companies and nonbank affiliates of both
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bank compliance with restrictive covenants was superior to private moni-
toring.249 Thus, traditional bank regulation imposed the types of
controls that an individual debtholder might choose to require given ade-
quate bargaining and monitoring power.
In addition, the effects of traditional regulation on the business of
banking accorded with the preferences of the typical debtholder. Tradi-
tional regulation encouraged asset growth, both by ensuring a steady
source of inexpensive funds for lending and by channelling bank invest-
ments into loans rather than into nonbanking ventures. Loan growth,
coupled with limits on the interest payable on deposits, provided banks
with a comfortable stream of income to service their debt and a large
cushion of assets in the event of losses. Thus, bank creditors were
protected despite extraordinarily high leverage at most banking
institutions.250
C. Bank Regulation from the Equityholder's Perspective
The breakdown of traditional regulation has involved more than sim-
ply the dismantling of regulatory "debt covenants." The new focus of
bank regulation reflects a shift from the traditional emphasis on risk con-
trol to a new concern with risk management at banking institutions.2"'
This approach to regulating banks approximates more closely the classic
model of the equityholder than that of the debtholder. Although the
primary aim of protecting bank safety has not changed, the new regula-
tion reflects a different view of how this goal should be achieved.
Many signs of this new equityholder's perspective can be found in re-
cent regulatory innovations. The relaxation of regulatory restrictions on
permissible bank activities and investments reflects a more positive atti-
tude toward bank risk-taking. Some bank product diversification was
necessary to offset declining earnings in the banking industry. 52 Never-
theless, there has been no effort, as there was in 1933, to force banks into
a particular investment strategy that the regulators consider to be safe.
Instead, there is a recognition that diversification itself may be the best
way to limit risk. 53
In addition, the new emphasis on improving bank earnings reflects a
different regulatory approach to the problem of bank failure. The grow-
ing expense of paying off depositors in or otherwise disposing of failed
state-chartered and national banks. See Rehm, State Banks Wary of Using New Powers,
Am. Banker, Apr. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
249. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text. Of course, even regulatory cove-
nants have not been completely effective in preventing all prospective changes in risk.
Nevertheless, as discussed previously, until recently bank management had little incen-
tive to attempt to violate these restrictions. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying
text.
250. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
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banks254 has made bank failure a more serious threat than ever.255 The
cost of handling failed banks has led the regulators to look more carefully
at how banks are operated as going concerns rather than relying primar-
ily on a cushion of protection for depositors in the event of bankruptcy.
Put another way, although the regulators will not directly share in in-
creased bank profitability, strong earnings make failure less likely.
Further evidence of the new regulatory perspective is the regulators'
increased attention to the quality of management. New regulatory initia-
tives have sought to improve corporate governance, both through de-
tailed rules that dictate how specific operations should be conducted to
avoid mismanagement and conflicts of interest256 and through policies
intended to expand the traditional fiduciary duty of bank manage-
ment.2 57 Ironically, this new regulation may be even more intrusive than
the old static controls, since it involves intimate details of corporate deci-
sionmaking, such as where to locate new activities within the banking
organization 258 and even when to fire incompetent or dishonest manag-
ers.2 59 Thus, the new regulation seeks to put the regulators into the posi-
tions of supermanagers who can impose direct discipline on the business
decisions of bank management. Like equityholders, the regulators can
punish excessive risk-taking while rewarding properly managed
institutions.26 °
Perhaps the best evidence of the new equityholder's perspective is the
recent attempt by the regulators to expose bank management to the disci-
pline of the equity market. Efforts to increase the equity levels at banks
and bank holding companies are intended in part to reduce excessive lev-
erage in bank capital structures.261 Forcing banks to raise new equity,
however, serves the additional purpose of making banks more sensitive to
the risk preferences of the securities market.262 Moreover, the regulators
may be able to rely on the market's assessment of individual banks as
reflected in their share prices as a gauge of bank problems and take steps
to ensure a reduction in risk-taking, much as corporate managers are
expected to do.2 63
254. For the regulators' alternatives for handling failed banks, see supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 227.
256. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 213.
260. A good example of this new regulatory power is the Change in Bank Control Act
of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), which makes management skill and
experience a prerequisite to acquiring control of a bank. Under the Act, the regulators
can stop an acquisition if the "competence, experience, or integrity of any acquiring per-
son or of any of the proposed management personnel indicates that it would not be in the
interest of the depositors of the bank, or in the interest of the public to permit such person
to control the bank." Id. § 1817(j)(7)(D).
261. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
263. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
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III. REGULATORY GROWING PAINS
The recent shift in perspective in bank regulatory strategy from that of
a debtholder to that of an equityholder suggests that the bank regulators
will play a more active role in managing risk at banking institutions than
they did under the old regulatory scheme. Nevertheless, this more dy-
namic regulatory approach may create new problems for the regulators.
First, it is far more difficult to create and administer standards that at-
tempt to affect how a business is governed than simply to impose prohibi-
tions on particular activities. Second, these new standards are likely to
intrude on the prerogatives of bank management to an even greater de-
gree than the old regulation.
A. The Problem of Administration
Detailed regulation that attempts to influence the day-to-day operation
of a business is often impossible to administer effectively. The sheer com-
plexity of the regulation may lead to misunderstandings and uninten-
tional violations by the regulated industry, requiring clarification
through additional rulemaking. For example, early regulatory approvals
of bank entry into the securities business were coupled with detailed
specifications as to how to achieve the complete physical separation of
banking and securities operations in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
Banks offering discount brokerage services to their customers were re-
quired to use different employees, to establish separate telephone lines
and even to maintain separate office entrances for their brokerage and
banking businesses."' Yet these rules not only proved virtually impossi-
ble to enforce, 65 but also were ineffective in preventing tying arrange-
ments,2 66 sharing of confidential information and other abuses from
taking place. The regulators therefore have been forced to rewrite or
even to abandon many of the detailed operating conditions they origi-
nally imposed on applicants seeking to enter new businesses.267
264. See, e.g., Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency Concerning an Application by
American National Bank ofAustin, Texas, to Establish an Operating Subsidiary to Provide
Investment Advice, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,732
(Sept. 2, 1983) (permitting investment advice and retail discount brokerage to be offered
by two separate bank subsidiaries, subject to requirements of separate employees, office
space and telephones).
265. For example, in practice, separation of the brokerage and advisory businesses
meant only that clients of a bank's investment advisory subsidiary had to walk across the
bank's lobby to have trades executed by its affiliated discount broker. See Gross, Banks
Dispense Investment Advice Through Gap in Glass-Steagall Wall, Am. Banker, Aug. 14,
1985, at 1, col. 3.
266. Section 106(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982), pro-
hibits banking organizations from extending credit or providing other services condi-
tioned upon the customer's obtaining an additional service from the banking organization
(except when both services consist of bank lending, discount, deposit or trust services), or
agreeing not to obtain services from a competitor.
267. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Unsafe and Unsound Banking
Practices, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,379 (Dec. 14, 1987) (eliminating requirement for separate en-
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In addition, many new operating requirements proved unsuccessful be-
cause they defeated the very purposes for which banks sought to enter
new businesses. In approving new securities activities for banking orga-
nizations, the regulators originally restricted the sharing of customer lists
between banking and securities operations and other efforts to cross-mar-
ket traditional banking services and new financial products.26 In theory,
these restrictions may protect bank customers from unfair pressure to
buy additional financial products from their bank. In practice, however,
most banks must rely primarily on their established customer base as a
market for their new products. This cross-marketing may be the only
way that banks can gain entry into new businesses and may assist banks
in attracting and retaining banking customers.269 Further, consumer
preference for joint marketing of financial products has been a driving
force for product deregulation.270 Thus, restrictions on joint marketing
actually may stifle the very innovation that product deregulation was
designed to encourage.2 71
The more active role that the regulators are seeking to play in manag-
ing bank risk has been further complicated by the banks' own efforts to
adapt to the greater opportunities and risks afforded by deregulation of
banking. Diversification has required banks to develop both new exper-
tise and new management strategies. Initially, banks relied upon hiring
outside experts from their nonbank competitors to gain instant expertise
in new businesses. 272 Nevertheless, integration of the new specialists
with established bank personnel often has proved difficult.273 Many
trances for offices of bank and its securities affiliate), corrected in 53 Fed. Reg. 597 (Jan. 8,
1988).
268. See United City Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 662, 662 (1985) (separate marketing
required for discount brokerage and consumer financial counseling offered by bank affili-
ate); cf Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971) (bank engaging in securi-
ties activities creates danger of conflict between the promotional interest of investment
bankers and the obligation of commercial bankers to render disinterested investment
advice).
269. For example, some of the new businesses that banks have chosen to enter, such as
retail discount brokerage, have not proved to be very profitable. To the extent that banks
have continued to enter these businesses, they may be primarily attracted by the opportu-
nity to generate additiQnal deposit customers and by other retail cross-selling opportuni-
ties. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 54.
270. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 26, at 28.
271. Although the Federal Reserve Board originally restricted the sharing of customer
lists between banks and their nonbank affiliates, such as affiliated brokers, see NatWest,
supra note 130, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. at 585, the Board subsequently reversed its position,
noting that in many cases banks and their affiliates may be operating in the same markets
and soliciting the same customers even without sharing customer lists. See Manufactur-
ers Hanover Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 930, 932-33 (1987). Thus, any abuses resulting
from joint marketing are already a possibility whenever a banking organization engages
in nonbank activities. In this situation, sharing customer lists may simply be a matter of
convenience.
272. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 134, at 1, col. 2.
273. This particularly has been a problem for the new investment banking personnel,
who often have been better paid than traditional lending officers. See Dickey, It's A Bird,
It's A Plane... It's A Bank?, 5 Bank Expansion Rep. 1, 10 (Oct. 6, 1986).
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banks have gone through successive internal reorganizations as they have
attempted to merge their new activities more effectively with their tradi-
tional banking business.274
This sort of adjustment is to be expected as the banking industry
adapts to a new market environment. Yet deregulation is creating simi-
lar dislocations for the bank regulators. Bank examiners now must mon-
itor risk by looking not only at loan portfolios, but also at numerous new
sophisticated financial products.275 The regulators not only must under-
stand the new risks, but also must arrive at a means of predicting their
potential effect on future earnings. Inevitably, an expertise gap may de-
velop between the industry and the regulators.276
A gap may exist in organization as well. Theorists have noted that all
business organizations go through successive phases of maturation that
are precipitated by crises in management as the organization grows.277
For example, a young entrepreneurial organization ultimately will face a
crisis of leadership as management responsibilities grow, leading the or-
ganization to institute a more formalized supervisory structure. 278 Too
much centralization in turn leads to efforts to restore local autonomy.279
As banks have begun to diversify, they have gone through a similar
revolution in organizational structure. Many banks are abandoning their
traditional compartmentalized structures, reorganizing their operations
by product and market.28
The ability of the industry to adapt its structure to new business devel-
opments is not shared by the regulatory system. The bank regulatory
system has remained highly centralized and focused on individual corpo-
rate units. One bank regulator still is responsible for evaluating all risks
274. See, eg., Horowitz, Chase Breaks Up Its Investment Bank And Sends the Staff to
Other Units, Am. Banker, Dec. 29, 1987, at 1, col. 3 (integration of investment banking
with lending business); Fraust, Chemical Restructures to Merge Investment Banking,
Lending, Am. Banker, Feb. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (same).
275. These products may include standby letters of credit, futures contracts, forward
rate agreements, swaps and securitized assets. See Johnson & Murphy, supra note 110, at
25-33.
276. This problem is exacerbated by the high turnover rate among examiners. A re-
cent survey of bank examiners in the Dallas region found that the majority had less than
three years' experience. See Federal Financial Structure for Examining Financial Institu-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981)
[hereinafter Hearings on Bank Examination Procedures] (statement of Daniel F. Stanton,
Deputy Director, General Government Division, General Accounting Office).
277. For an elegant statement of this theory, see Greiner, Evolution and Revolution as
Organizations Grow, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1972, at 37. Greiner's five phases of
maturation have been applied to banking organizations. See Dickey, supra note 273, at 9-
10.
278. See Greiner, supra note 277, at 41-42.
279. See id. at 42-43.
280. See, e.g., Horowitz, Morgan Revamps Corporate Lending Group, Am. Banker,
Sept. 26, 1988, at 3, col. 2 (reorganization of corporate lending into industry-specific
groups); see also supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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within the bank entity, from loan portfolios to securities activities. 28 I
This responsibility creates problems for the individual examiner as well
as the regulatory system in keeping banks accountable. Banks are be-
coming too big and diverse to permit the traditional monitoring by peri-
odic on-site regulatory examinations.28 2
Thus, the recent shift in regulatory strategy has created a dilemma for
the bank regulators. To the extent that the new regulatory approach
views bank safety from the perspective of an equityholder, such regula-
tion aims to protect the banking system less through contractual limita-
tions on bank risk-taking than through more careful risk assessment and
management. Yet, in the absence of static constraints, it is unclear how
the regulators can effectively monitor the new risks at banking
institutions.
B. The Problem of Risk Control
In the average corporation, risk monitoring is primarily the responsi-
bility of management and shareholders. Thus, the bank regulators may
be more successful in managing risk at banks if they find ways to en-
courage bank management voluntarily to improve its performance. The
regulators already have the authority to bring disciplinary actions against
individual bank directors and officers to hold them personally responsible
for losses caused by their mismanagement.2"3 Yet personal liability alone
will not necessarily persuade bank managers to play a greater role in
actively controlling bank risk-taking. Greater liability (and higher insur-
ance rates for director and officer liability policies) 2 4 instead may simply
discourage qualified managers from accepting positions with banking
281. The division of regulatory responsibility is largely based on the nature of the
bank's charter. The Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for monitoring all na-
tional banks and their subsidiaries, while state-chartered banks are monitored by the state
chartering authority and in some cases by the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Recently, there have been proposals for more functional
regulation, under which, for example, all securities activities of banks would be regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
282. The increasing difficulty of comprehensive on-site monitoring of banks has led the
regulators to rely more heavily on statistical data reported by the banks themselves to
monitor bank safety. See Dince, supra note 47, at 5-6. Yet since the usefulness of this
data depends on the accuracy and completeness of the banks' own reporting, regulatory
oversight is dependent on the honesty and skill of bank management. See infra notes 283-
85 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 207-23 and accompanying text (describing regulatory enforce-
ment powers). Certain statements by the regulators confirm their intention of forcing
bank directors to share the regulators' task of actively monitoring the soundness of their
banks, particularly when the regulators cannot do so. See, e.g., Clarke, Directors'Respon-
sibilities Echo Those of Regulators, Am. Banker, Sept. 21, 1987, at 10, col. 1, at 12, col. 4
(board of directors is an "independent source of safety and soundness for the institution
and, in turn, the overall banking system").
284. See Searle, Directors' Liability and the Relationship Between Bankers and Regula-
tors, 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 291, 294 (1987) (limited availability of bank director and
officer liability insurance).
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organizations.285
Moreover, penalizing bank directors may not even serve a compensa-
tory purpose. If mismanagement causes a bank to fail, the resulting costs
may be so large that directors' liability can never adequately compensate
for the damages. For example, a director's approval of insider loans
leads to losses and failure of the bank, requiring a payoff of depositors
out of the insurance fund. To compensate for these losses, the director
would have to reimburse the deposit insurance fund as well as pay all
administrative costs attendant to the bank closing and liquidation. Even
then, the failure may have had spillover effects on the community, caus-
ing depositors to withdraw their funds from other local banks, leading to
their failure. Individual liability can never adequately compensate for
these losses that may result from bank failure.
The regulators face similar problems in relying on bank shareholders
to bear primary responsibility for monitoring bank risk-taking. Share-
holders may have reason to prefer higher levels of risk at individual
banks than the regulators are willing to tolerate. Moreover, the regula-
tors have only limited means of bringing direct pressure to bear on share-
holders to conform to the regulators' standard of vigilance.286
Thus, the new regulatory approach leaves open the question of who
should bear primary responsibility for setting limits to risk-taking at
banks: the bank's regulators, its management or its shareholders. This
emerging strain in the fabric of the new regulatory strategy can best be
illustrated by examining three examples of the new regulation. Although
these examples are intended to demonstrate some problems with the new
regulatory approach, this Article does not necessarily advocate a return
to old-style bank regulation. Nevertheless, these problems raise signifi-
cant questions as to how effective the new regulatory approach will be in
achieving its goal of preserving the soundness of the banking system.
1. Bank Regulation and Portfolio Theory
From the perspective of the equityholder, diversification is an effective
way of reducing overall risk in an investment portfolio. If bank safety is
seen from this point of view, similar advantages may be expected from
diversification of activities within banks. A banking organization would
treat its separate subsidiaries and businesses as investments in a portfolio
of securities, and seek to maintain a properly diversified portfolio.28 7
Proper portfolio management should permit banks to improve their over-
all return by entering more risky businesses without increasing the riski-
ness of their portfolio as a whole.288
285. See Hawke, supra note 223, at 287.
286. See infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
287. The bank would choose investments whose returns are negatively correlated, per-
mitting cyclical profits in one business to offset declines in another. See supra note 53.
288. See Jessup, Portfolio Strategies for Bank Holding Companies, 152 Bankers Mag.
78, 78 (Spring 1969) (advocating this portfolio approach to bank diversification); see also
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Recent changes in bank regulation have encouraged this portfolio ap-
proach to bank diversification. Empirical studies of bank holding com-
pany diversification have treated new bank activities as individual
securities in the holding company's portfolio and have examined the ef-
fect of each new investment on the overall risk position of the portfo-
lio.289 To the extent that these studies have supported arguments that a
portfolio of banking and certain nonbanking activities is either less risky
or no more risky than a portfolio consisting solely of banking activi-
ties,29° this evidence has served as a basis for a policy of relaxation of
product restrictions.291 Under this model, the inherent riskiness of any
particular investment, banking or nonbanking, would be balanced by the
presence of other investments.292
This view of bank entry into new ventures as an investment in a diver-
sified securities portfolio further is reflected in regulatory requirements
that new nonbanking activities be placed in separate affiliates from the
bank.293 This separation encourages banking organizations to treat their
different businesses as individual investments in a diversified portfolio. 294
Compartmentalization of activities has long been considered a solution to
the problem of conflicts of interest within diversified banking organiza-
tions 295 and has been thought sufficient to shield banks from liability for
Note, The Demise of the BankiNonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating the
Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 650, 658-61 (1985) (benefits of
diversification).
289. See, e.g., Meinster & Johnson, Bank Holding Company Diversification and the
Risk of Capital Impairment, 10 Bell J. Econ. 683, 685 (1979); Eisemann, Diversification
and the Congeneric Bank Holding Company, 7 J. Bank Research 68, 69 (Spring 1976).
290. Most studies appear to support the hypothesis that nonbank investments either
decrease bank holding company risk slightly or have little impact at all. See Wall, Non-
bank Activities and Risk, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 19, 28-32 (Oct. 1986)
(reviewing prior studies). Because of existing legal restrictions, however, these studies
were not based on actual experience of banking organizations in activities such as securi-
ties underwriting or insurance. See Rhoades, supra note 159, at 1149. In fact, some
studies of bank holding companies' actual experience with nonbank affiliates suggest that
the operations could actually increase risk in some ways. See, e.g., Talley, supra note 86,
at 44 (bank holding company subsidiaries tend to be more highly leveraged than in-
dependent companies).
291. See, eg., House Comm. on Government Operations, Modernization of the Finan-
cial Services Industry: A Plan for Capital Mobility Within the Framework of Safe and
Sound Banking, H.R. Rep. No. 324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1987) (relying on portfolio
theory to recommend additional bank diversification).
292. See Note, supra note 288, at 661 ("because diversification can reduce 'unique
risk,' a broadly diversified bank holding company is likely to be more secure than an
undiversified one").
293. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. Most proposals for relaxation of
product restrictions have suggested that such firewalls be built to separate banking from
nonbanking activities. See, e.g., Mandate for Change, supra note 154, at 93,019.
294. Theoretically, diversification may be achieved without placing each separate ac-
tivity in a different corporate entity. Nevertheless, policies encouraging compartmental-
ization of activities are designed to minimize the potential for conflicts of interest and
mismanagement of operations that could defeat the risk-reducing benefits of diversifica-
tion. See infra note 299.
295. See supra note 162 (discussing Federal Reserve Act § 23A).
[Vol. 57
BANK REGULATION
the debts of nonbank affiliates.29 6 Recently, rules that attempt to insulate
banks from nonbank affiliates have been proposed as adequate substitutes
for traditional restrictions on diversification.297
Thus, application of portfolio theory to banks leads to a view of a di-
versified banking organization as akin to a mutual fund or other interme-
diary that makes essentially passive investments in various separate
businesses in order to earn a return.298 Ideally, the separate businesses
should be operated independently, as is encouraged by regulation that
has required separate officers, separate physical facilities and occasionally
even separate names for bank and nonbank affiliates and that has tightly
regulated interaffiliate transactions. 299 Theoretically, a bank organized in
this fashion may be able effectively to reduce risk, but it is doubtful that
diversified banking organizations have much in common with a passive
investor holding a diversified portfolio of securities. This gap between
theory and reality not only casts doubt on the usefulness of portfolio
theory in evaluating the costs and benefits of bank diversification, but
raises questions as to the ability of the new regulatory approach to ensure
the soundness of a diversified banking organization.
The average diversified banking organization differs from the typical
equity investor in a number of ways. First, the diversified equity investor
is not actively involved in the management of the enterprises in which he
or she invests.a° In contrast, evidence suggests that, rather than viewing
296. The Bank Holding Company Act divided banking organizations into a heavily
regulated and protected bank component and a less regulated nonbank component. See
Eisenbeis, How Should Bank Holding Companies Be Regulated?, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Econ. Rev. 42, 43 (Jan. 1983). It was assumed that, in the event of the bank-
ruptcy of a nonbank affiliate, a court would be unlikely to hold the separately incorpo-
rated and regulated bank liable for its affiliate's debts. See Note, supra note 288, at 661-
62.
297. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text. Many bank regulators have en-
dorsed the notion that regulatory firewalls will permit diversification by banks without
increasing the likelihood of bank failure. See, e.g., Garsson, supra note 166, at 1, col. 2.
298. See Eisenbeis, supra note 296, at 43.
299. See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text. Interaffiliate financial transac-
tions, including the shuffling of resources among different operations, will not necessarily
increase risk in a diversified organization. In fact, the ability to allocate cash flows to the
highest yielding operations has been viewed as one of the benefits of the conglomerate
form of organization. See 0. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies 147-48 (1975). Nev-
ertheless, regulatory restrictions on interaffiliate financial transactions reflect a view that,
in banking organizations, the actual allocation of resources among banking and nonbank-
ing operations often will be inefficient. Once bank management chooses to diversify, it
may have strong incentives to use bank funds to support its new activities even if such an
allocation of resources will impair the financial condition of the bank. See infra notes
307-10 and accompanying text. Such a diversion of funds could actually defeat the risk-
reducing effects of diversification. The new regulatory approach prefers banking organi-
zations to treat their separate operations as almost autonomous, on the model of a mutual
fund, in order to achieve the maximum benefits of diversification. Yet this management
model (and the resulting positive effects of diversification) may be impossible to achieve.
300. If the investor did have a management role in one or more of the companies, his
disproportionate stake in the enterprise would interfere with his efforts to diversify. See
Coffee, supra note 75, at 17-19.
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their subsidiaries as passive investments, bank holding companies ac-
tively manage their separate bank and nonbank affiliates as integrated
operations. °1 Most financial services are not isolated "lines of com-
merce" but are actually interdependent activities. 3 2 For example, banks
do not necessarily view securities underwriting and lending as completely
separate businesses, such as auto repair and shoe sales, that serve differ-
ent markets and can be conducted independently. °3 To the extent that
bank diversification has been successful, banks have developed products
that complement their existing businesses and can be marketed in tan-
dem. 3" In fact, when banks have operated their new activities com-
pletely separately from their traditional banking business, either because
of regulation or management choice, their ventures have tended to un-
301. Studies of bank holding company operating policies indicate that parent compa-
nies tend to exercise extensive managerial control over their subsidiaries, particularly
nonbank subsidiaries. For example, the majority of members of the boards of directors of
nonbank subsidiaries tend to be officials of the holding company or its lead bank; the
holding company tends to have final say over the selection of key officers of the subsidiar-
ies; and the holding company tends to exercise general supervision over such matters as
structure, funds management and budgets of its subsidiaries. For a discussion of these
studies, see Rose, Bank Holding Companies as Operational Single Entities, in The Bank
Holding Company Movement to 1978: A Compendium 69, 85 (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 1978). Although these studies were conducted before 1978,
more recent research confirms this highly centralized management strategy. See
Eisenbeis, supra note 296, at 43.
302. See Hayes, supra note 2, at 56. Hayes cites investment banking as an example.
Securities underwriting, trading and advising are not separate businesses but interrelated
activities. Leadership in underwriting can be advertised as evidence of corporate finance
skill and used to attract business such as advising clients on mergers and acquisitions,
which often involve issuances of securities. Leadership in underwriting in turn may de-
pend on the ability to place securities rapidly, requiring a presence in the secondary trad-
ing market. See id. at 56-57.
303. This is demonstrated by recent bank reorganizations that are designed to integrate
investment and commercial banking operations and personnel. See supra note 274 and
accompanying text.
304. For example, as the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions on securities activities have
been relaxed, banks have moved quickly into such areas as underwriting commercial pa-
per and municipal revenue bonds. Although underwriting municipal revenue bonds is
not as profitable as corporate underwriting, banks already underwrite general obligation
bonds, and thus have a network of personnel and customers in place; moreover, banks
can offer a full line of municipal bonds to the public, thereby improving their relation-
ships with securities buyers. See Forde, Banks Make Steady Progress In Municipal Bond
Underwriting, Am. Banker, Apr. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 3. Likewise, although commercial
paper underwriting recently has proved unprofitable for many securities firms, see
Horowitz, There's Life After Glass-Steagall For Wall Street, Report Says, Am. Banker,
Dec. 2, 1987, at 3, col. 2 (discussing Salomon Brothers' termination of its municipal bond
and commercial paper underwriting business), banks can use commercial paper opera-
tions to reestablish themselves with major corporations as domestic short-term lenders.
In contrast, banks may have more difficulty competing for equity underwriting business,
which is less complementary to their present operations. Existing bank customers gain
no real advantage in terms of expertise or access to a broad distribution network by using
banks to place their equity, and they may be concerned about possibile conflicts of inter-
est. See Stone, Business and Bank Reactions to New Securities Powers, Fed. Reserve Bank
of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 41, 45-47 (May 1984).
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derperform their independent competitors." 5 Thus, successful diversi-
fied banking organizations are more likely to manage their banking and
nonbanking activities as a single operation than to treat them as separate
investments.3 °6
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that banking organizations are
not likely to treat their diversified activities as separate investments is the
frequency with which regulatory firewalls between separate affiliates have
been breached. Despite legal restrictions, banks repeatedly have pro-
vided financial support for ailing nonbank affiliates, even when such
funding has impaired the financial condition of the bank.30 7 Moreover,
in some cases, the bank regulators actually have encouraged banks to bail
out weak affiliates.30 8 The fact that these breaches of the firewall con-
tinue to occur, occasionally even with the acquiescence of the regulators,
demonstrates the interdependence of banks and their affiliates. This in-
terdependence involves more than the joint marketing of products or
even the sharing of basic services such as data processing. It also results
from a strong public perception of banking organizations as single oper-
ating entities. For example, confidence in the bank itself can be shaken
by losses at an affiliate.309 Because the failure of an affiliate may threaten
the solvency of the entire banking organization, the bank always has a
strong motive to come to the rescue of an ailing affiliate.310
305. Traditionally, merger and acquisition advisory activities have not been profitable
for banks, in part because of their lack of experience in securities underwriting and deal-
ing. See Horowitz, Banks Garner Few Domestic Merger Deals, Am. Banker, Apr. 7, 1988,
at 1, col. 2.
306. The fact that banks are willing to pay substantial premiums to acquire nonbank
subsidiaries suggests that banks do expect considerable synergy to result from the combi-
nation of activities. See Rose, supra note 301, at 70.
307. For example, the failure of Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga in 1976 has
been attributed to bad loans purchased by the bank from its nonbank affiliate in violation
of section 23A. See J. Sinkey, supra note 42, at 199-202.
308. The extensive involvement by many major banks in the 1970s with real estate
investment trusts (REITs) as lenders and advisers caused those banks to lend to their
REITs when the REITs were in danger of defaulting on their commercial paper. This
lending was encouraged by the bank regulators, who feared the possible spillover effect of
a REIT failure on its sponsoring bank. For background on the banks' involvement in the
REIT crisis, see id. at 237-55.
309. See Rhoades, supra note 159, at 1142 (adverse publicity surrounding default by
bank holding company on its commercial paper resulted in a run on its subsidiary bank).
310. A recent dramatic illustration of how flimsy the firewall can be was the loan made
by Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago to its options trad-
ing subsidiary, First Options of Chicago, in violation of the bank's lending limits. The
bank's motive was to keep its subsidiary, the largest clearing firm for professional options
traders, in compliance with regulatory and exchange capital requirements following the
October 1987 stock market plunge. See Ringer, First Options' Luster Was Tarnished in
Hard Week at Futures Exchange, Am. Banker, Oct. 28, 1987, at 1, col. 2. The incident is
noteworthy not only as additional evidence of the readiness of banking organizations to
breach firewalls, but also as an illustration of the problems with regulation designed to
prevent joint operation of affiliates. First, the options subsidiary legally could have been
(and ultimately was) funded directly by the bank's parent, Continental Illinois Corpora-
tion, which itself relies for funding on the bank. Thus, despite the firewall, banking orga-
nizations can and will find ways to channel funds to a failing operation. Second, given
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Another difference between the portfolio investor and the diversified
banking organization is the investor's approach to the acquisition and
disposition of investments. The portfolio investor constantly reevaluates
the risk-return relationship of all investments, disposing of those that no
longer fit the portfolio. Acquisition or disposal of product lines or whole
subsidiaries is not so simple for the banking organization. 31' Although
acquisitions of new businesses have been frequent, particularly recently,
banking organizations have been reluctant to dispose of operations, in
part due to such factors as regulatory concerns, 312 employee pressure31 3
and the costs of divestment.314 Thus, banking organizations have grown
largely through accretion, reluctant to terminate businesses that no
longer fit their portfolios.315
Even if banking organizations theoretically can reduce risk by diversi-
fication, portfolio theory does not take into account what has been called
operating risk: the risk that the diversified businesses may be poorly
managed.316 If management of a diversified banking organization fails to
provide efficient operating policies for or adequate supervision of individ-
ual operations, any risk-reducing effect of diversification may be lost.
The bank regulators do attempt to evaluate management's skill and per-
formance before they will approve acquisitions of new banks and non-
banks. 317  Nevertheless, this screening has not always predicted the
management problems that tend to arise in newly diversified enterprises.
Studies of diversified banking organizations have suggested that the
bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies tend to be more aggres-
sively managed than independent banks, having higher leverage and
holding greater proportions of high yielding, high risk assets.3" 8 This
the size and importance of First Options, this decision to fund was not necessarily adverse
to the interests of the bank holding company, the bank or the banking system.
311. See Rhoades, supra note 159, at 1151.
312. The bank regulators may be reluctant to permit banks to cut back banking opera-
tions, particularly if no alternative source of services exists for the community.
313. See supra note 69 (negative publicity following announcements of employee lay-
offs at banks).
314. Since banks have been largely insulated against hostile takeovers, the "bust-up"
takeover is virtually unknown in banking. Cf Coffee, supra note 75, at 3 (such takeovers
now common in industrial conglomerates).
315. See Jessup, supra note 288, at 81 (bank holding companies have not been flexible
portfolio managers).
316. See Rhoades, supra note 159, at 1153.
317. See, e.g., Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(D) (1982)
(regulators may take into account competence, experience and integrity of proposed bank
management); Bank Holding Company Act § 3(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982) (in ap-
proving application for acquisition of a bank, the Federal Reserve Board shall take into
consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the bank
holding companies and banks concerned); Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V 1987) (in determining whether a particular nonbanking ac-
tivity is a proper incident to banking, the Board shall consider whether its performance
by a bank holding company affiliate will produce benefits that outweigh possible adverse
effects, including conflicts of interest and unsound banking practices).
318. See, e.g., Mayne, A Comparative Study of Bank Holding Company Affiliates and
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preference for greater risk may simply reflect the advantages of diversifi-
cation.319 Yet further studies have indicated that the new nonbanking
businesses of bank holding companies are not necessarily being operated
profitably. A study of returns on equity for bank holding company affili-
ates between 1976 and 1984 found that the median return for nonbank
subsidiaries tended to be far below the return for bank subsidiaries, par-
ticularly for smaller banks.320 Other studies have found that the non-
bank affiliates of bank holding companies have underperformed their
independent competitors.321 This evidence suggests that bank holding
company management of nonbank subsidiaries has not been very success-
ful, making the increased risk in the bank even more troubling.
Finally, regulation designed to force banks to manage their different
enterprises like portfolio investments may have some unintended conse-
quences. As some bank economists have pointed out, compartmental-
ized regulation that divides banking organizations into a heavily
regulated bank component and a less regulated nonbank component has
led banks to shift activities out of the bank into nonbank affiliates. This
in turn actually increases operational interdependencies by making the
bank more reliant on its affiliates for necessary services.322 Forcing
banks to place functionally related activities in separate entities leads to
the same dilemma: either new ties will be developed among different af-
filiates as they find ways to coordinate the sharing of customers, informa-
tion and services, or duplication will increase operational expenses for
each individual entity. Thus, the goal of independent operation of bank-
ing and nonbanking activities may be self-defeating.3 23
If banking organizations are unlikely to treat their diversified activities
as investments in a diversified portfolio, the portfolio approach to risk
management is of limited usefulness. Because banking organizations
cannot or will not diversify as effectively as portfolio investors, any risk-
reducing effects of diversification may not be a sufficient substitute for
regulation of bank risk-taking. Moreover, diversification itself may cre-
Independent Banks, 1969-1972, 32 J. Fin. 147, 151 (1977); Mingo, Managerial Motives,
Market Structures and the Performance of Holding Company Banks, 14 Econ. Inquiry
411, 420 (1976). These studies focused on bank holding companies that owned multiple
bank subsidiaries.
319. See Chase & Mingo, The Regulation of Bank Holding Companies, 30 J. Fin. 281
(1975) (citing advantages of bank holding company organization).
320. See Wall, supra note 290, at 26.
321. See Talley, supra note 86, at 42.
322. See Eisenbeis, supra note 296, at 44-45.
323. Ironically, separately operated affiliates also complicate regulatory monitoring of
diversified banking entities. Because of the difficulty of examining large diversified bank-
ing organizations, the regulators increasingly have looked at the policies, procedures and
controls at the holding company level as an indication of the quality of the entire opera-
tion. See Hearings on Bank Examination Procedures, supra note 276, at 83 (statement of
Charles E. Lord, First Deputy Comptroller of the Currency). Truly autonomous man-
agement of holding company subsidiaries instead would necessitate separate examination
of each affiliate.
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ate new problems of risk control and management both for banking orga-
nizations and for the regulatory system.
2. Bank Regulation and Market Discipline
Several reasons may account for increased attention to bank capital
levels as other regulatory restraints are dismantled. Bank capital always
has been viewed as providing a cushion of protection against bank fail-
ure. The recent emphasis on equity as a more significant component of
the capital requirement discourages the use of debt as a means of raising
capital in order to protect banking organizations from the added cost of
servicing large quantities of debt. If a bank runs into trouble, it can skip
its regular dividends. In contrast, interest payments impose a regular
fixed charge on the bank.
As a practical matter, however, a banking organization may be unwill-
ing to skip dividends, particularly if it expects to raise new capital in the
public equity markets. Any cut in the dividend rate may be read as very
negative news by the market, leading to lower share prices and higher
capital costs.324 Thus, equity does not necessarily provide banking orga-
nizations with greater flexibility than debt. In the long run, particularly
if bank equity prices are depressed, raising new equity may prove costly
for many banks, actually increasing their risk levels. 325
Alternatively, the new emphasis on capital may be designed to force
some restructuring of bank balance sheets. Banks faced with high capital
requirements are likely to shrink their assets in order to avoid the need to
raise new capital. Ideally, this may lead to leaner, more efficiently oper-
ated banking organizations. 326 Nevertheless, asset size alone says very
little about profitability. Some banks may be more profitable in the tradi-
tional lending business than in ventures that produce fee income but do
not result in asset growth.327 Again, increased capital requirements do
not necessarily result in a reduction in bank risk.32 s
324. Moreover, if there is any chance that this negative news also will affect depositors,
causing them to withdraw their funds from the bank, the regulators will be reluctant to
require dividend cuts.
325. Issuing equity can be very expensive for a bank. Citicorp paid Merrill Lynch $29
million to place $1 billion in new bank equity in late 1987. Moreover, Citicorp paid out
over $300 million in dividends on its common stock in 1987. Thus, in three years, Cit-
icorp will have returned to shareholders almost the entire $1 billion in new capital. See
Ohman, High Cost of Capital May Mean Lost Income for Bank Shareholders, Am.
Banker, Mar. 4, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
326. See Shaw, supra note 197, at 4, col. 1.
327. See id. at 4, col. 3 (shrinkage of U.S. banks could lead to competitive disadvantage
in world markets).
328. The need to raise additional equity has prompted some banking organizations to
sell off profitable operations. Manufacturers Hanover Corporation sold its profitable con-
sumer finance subsidiary to raise capital following losses in 1987. Although, in the short
run, the sale may improve the banking organization's capital position, in the long run, it
means the loss of a major source of earnings as well as a valuable national retail distribu-
tion network. See Horowitz, Hanover Puts Consumer Unit Up for Sale, Am. Banker,
Mar. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
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Increased capital requirements have another, more significant conse-
quence for bank regulation. Any substantial increase in equity capital
requirements will force most banking organizations to raise new capital
in the public securities market. This in turn will subject banking organi-
zations to the scrutiny and discipline of the equity market. Ideally,
shareholders will favor better managed banks, while poorly managed
banks will have trouble raising capital. Moreover, large numbers of new
shareholders should help to alter the balance of power in highly lever-
aged banking institutions. The more shareholders that are exposed to
risk, the more discipline they may be expected to exert on bank
management.
Recent changes suggest that banking organizations are becoming more
sensitive to market pressure. Improvements in bank disclosure329 and
analysis33 indicate that banks are beginning to respond to market prefer-
ences. For example, announcements of write-ofis of bad loans331 and ma-
jor internal restructurings332 may have been designed in part to improve
the banks' image in the market, particularly among analysts.333 Further,
evidence suggests that the market for bank stocks has been a relatively
accurate reflector of bank financial condition.
334
329. These improvements have come about in part as a result of regulatory pressure,
see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 350.3(b) (1988) (FDIC requires bank Call Reports to be made avail-
able to the public upon request); Financial Accounting Standards Board, Proposed State-
ment of Financial Accounting Standards: Disclosures About Financial Instruments
(Exposure Draft Nov. 30, 1987) (proposing to require disclosure in financial statements
of market values of all financial instruments), and in part as a result of voluntary efforts
to satisfy financial analysts, see Wooden & Paluszek, Disclosure Needs of Financial Ana-
lysts: Large Bank Holding Companies, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 77, 79
(Nov. 1983) (describing recent improvements in disclosure).
330. Over the past decade, banking organizations have received greater attention from
financial analysts as well as rating agencies. See Stillinger, Sensitivity, Art, and the Shift-
ing Ground of Bank Monitoring, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Econ. Rev. 42 (Nov.
1983); see also Hicks, Downgraded Ratings Keep Banks Out of Credit Markets, Am.
Banker, Feb. 23, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
331. Bank of Boston's announcement in late 1987 that it would write off $200 million
of its Latin American loans was viewed as a positive step by the market, ending uncer-
tainty as to the extent of the bank's international debt problems. See Berg, Bank of Bos-
ton in Big Write-Off of Latin Loans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1987, at Al, col. 1; see also
Fraust, Citicorp's Debt Move Lifts Stock, Am. Banker, May 21, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (decision
to add $3 billion to loan loss reserve ended rumors about international debt problems,
leading to stock price rise). Such a move by one bank may force competitors to follow
suit to satisfy the fears of the market, even if those competitors are less able to absorb the
resulting losses. Thus, the first bank to disclose may thereby obtain a competitive advan-
tage. See Forde, Regionals Follow Bank of Boston in Increasing Loan-Loss Reserves, Am.
Banker, Dec. 17, 1987, at 2, col. 1; see also Duffy, Citicorp Move Triggers Drop in British
Bank Stocks, Am. Banker, May 21, 1987, at 2, col. 1 (Citicorp's addition to loan loss
reserves casts doubt on financial position of other banks with substantial Latin American
exposure).
332. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
333. See Matthews & Neustadt, supra note 145, at 1, col. 4 (bank analysts advocated
recent industry restructurings).
334. See Matthews, supra note 186, at 25, col. 1 (decline in share prices of money
center banks reflects concern over international debt).
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Greater reliance on the stock market to discipline bank risk-taking is
consistent with the new regulatory strategy, which views bank safety
from the point of view of the equityholder. In addition, it provides a
solution to the regulators' dilemma of how to police risk at diversified
banking institutions. The market could assist the bank regulators in two
ways. First, shareholders could bring pressure to bear on bad bank man-
agement which, in order to improve its share price and lower its cost of
capital, would improve its performance.335 Second, if the market could
be counted on to react to changes in bank risk, the regulators could use
the market as an indicator of potential problems at banks, thereby target-
ing their resources.336
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the discipline of the equity market
is either attainable or even desirable as a regulatory strategy. Infrequent
trips to the equity market may not be enough to expose banking organi-
zations to market discipline. Even with increased capital requirements,
banks will continue to generate most of their operating funds from depos-
its, or, in the case of bank holding companies, the sale of commercial
paper, and will raise capital only to the levels required by the regula-
tors.3 3 7 Moreover, banks still may find ways to avoid having to raise new
equity in the public securities market, particularly when the market
prices of bank stocks are depressed.338
More fundamentally, even if the discipline of the equity market could
be felt, the risk preferences of bank equityholders may not accord with
those of the regulators. Portfolio theory suggests that the ability of equi-
tyholders to diversify their investments among different bank and non-
bank stocks will enable them to tolerate more risk in any individual
investment than an undiversified investor. In contrast, the goal of bank
regulation, to prevent losses to the banking system as a result of bank
failure, makes the regulatory system overinvested in particular banks
335. The regulators have considered attempting to encourage similar discipline by the
deposit markets by reducing or altering deposit insurance coverage. See, e.g., Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, supra note 80, at I1-11. Such a change, however, could
have the unintended effect of increasing depositors' already strong incentives to partici-
pate in sudden and devastating bank runs, which would have no real disciplinary effect on
bank management. For a discussion of these and other problems with attempting to force
depositors to discipline banks, see Garten, supra note 8, at 129-63. To date, no major
changes in deposit insurance coverage have been made.
336. Recent regulatory efforts to develop early warning systems for predicting financial
problems at banks have incorporated bank stock price data. See Bovenzi, Marino & Mc-
Fadden, Commercial Bank Failure Prediction Models, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Econ. Rev. 14, 15-16 (Nov. 1983).
337. If these sources of funds are sensitive to equity levels, banking organizations may
still find that they must voluntarily increase their equity in order to obtain funding. Yet
evidence suggests that other indicators of bank financial performance such as dividends,
earnings and loan loss rates may be more significant to bank investors than leverage. See
Gilbert, supra note 93, at 73.
338. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. In some cases, banks may be able to
meet the capital requirements by issuing stock to management or insiders or to employee
stock option plans.
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whose failure poses systemic risks.3 3 9 As undiversified investors, the reg-
ulators cannot afford the degree of risk-taking by a banking organization
that may be preferred by the bank's diversified shareholders.
Another problem with shareholder discipline is that, unlike the regula-
tors, shareholders need not make a long-term investment in their bank.
A shareholder may tolerate excessively risky behavior at a bank as long
as its risky ventures are profitable, because he or she can sell the stock as
soon as problems begin to arise. In contrast, the regulators' long-term
commitment to the bank requires the regulators to take a longer view of
bank risk. A bank that today is earning a return of 12 percent on a
portfolio consisting solely of ten-year loans will make a profit so long as
interest rates on its liabilities remain at 11 percent. Yet in evaluating this
bank, the regulators must consider what will happen if interest rates rise
above 11 percent in eight or nine years. In contrast, the average share-
holder today does not expect to be holding the stock even five years from
now.
3 4 0
The volatility of the equity market also creates the danger of possible
overreactions to information. Bank disclosures often prompt dramatic
price swings that seem out of proportion to either the seriousness or the
timeliness of the news. For example, rumors of continuing international
debt problems at some money center banks lead to declines in the stock
prices of all large multinational banking organizations. One bank an-
nounces a substantial addition to its loan loss reserves; its share price
soars, although the write-off of the loans will result in large losses and
represents only a portion of the bank's total international loans. The
stock prices of other banks decline further, as the market waits to see if
these banks will make similar announcements.
Although this scenario is hypothetical, concern about international
debt has led to similar sudden stock price movements based on rumors,
predictions and actual announcements. 341 The sensitivity of the market
for bank stocks may be due in part to the elusive quality of much of bank
disclosure. Credit quality, liquidity and other determinants of bank fi-
nancial condition are very hard to quantify. 342 Because the equity mar-
339. See supra note 227.
340. Some observers have suggested that bank subordinated debt may be a more effec-
tive source of discipline on bank risk-taking than equity, because such debtholders tend to
have a longer commitment to the bank and are more risk averse than equityholders. See,
e.g., Gilbert, supra note 93, at 73; Horvitz, A Free Market Approach to Saving Troubled
Banks, Am. Banker, Dec. 10, 1987, at 4, col. 1. Nevertheless, a recent study found risk
premiums on bank subordinated debt to be unrelated to traditional accounting measures
of bank performance and only weakly related to private-sector bond ratings, casting
doubt on the effectiveness of these debtholders' discipline. See Avery, Belton &
Goldberg, Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk- New Evidence from the Capital
Markets, 20 J. Money, Credit, and Banking 597, 608-09 (1988).
341. See supra note 33 1; see also Matthews, supra note 186, at 25, col. 1 (blaming share
price erosion of money center banks on concern over future international debt problems).
342. See Stillinger, supra note 330, at 43 (bank analysis must allow considerable lati-
tude for the exercise of individual judgment). A recent accounting proposal to require
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ket often overreacts to news about banks, a policy that forces banks to be
more sensitive to the equity market may create a new risk to the banking
system. For example, sudden negative publicity following announcement
of large loan losses may prevent a banking organization from raising cap-
ital in the public equity market. Yet the bank's inability to raise capital
may cause it to violate the minimum capital requirements. At this point,
any regulatory action to force the bank to increase capital will only lead
to further negative publicity, compounding the bank's problems in rais-
ing new equity.343
These unintended consequences of shareholder discipline raise a ques-
tion as to the regulators' motive in attempting to facilitate greater market
discipline of banking institutions. It is unclear whether the regulators
actually trust the equity market to exert effective control over risk-taking
at banks, or whether their real aim is to force the preferences of the regu-
lators as to risk-taking on both banks and their shareholders. The differ-
ence between these goals can be illustrated by the new bank capital
requirements. Although forcing banks to increase equity theoretically
exposes bank management to the discipline of the securities market, the
adequacy of capital is tied to the types and riskiness of assets in the
bank's portfolio. 3" If a bank limits its future investments to United
States treasury securities, no additional capital will be required, allowing
the bank to avoid the expense and uncertainty of an equity offering.345
Although a portfolio of government securities may not be attractive to
shareholders in search of high returns, bank management and existing
shareholders may be persuaded to reduce the riskiness of the bank's port-
folio rather than to incur the expense of raising additional capital.
The regulators' often ambivalent attitude toward disclosure also has
reflected a desire to use disclosure as a weapon to enforce regulatory
standards rather than simply to inform the market. For example, the
regulators repeatedly have suggested the need for special disclosure of
regulatory enforcement actions 346 brought against banks.347 In many
banks to disclose information about credit risk and market values of their financial instru-
ments has been criticized by observers on the ground that the banks themselves cannot
determine the risk-adjusted cost or market value of many of their own products. See
Weiner & Forde, Plan to Force Banks to Disclose Risk is Criticized, Am. Banker, Dec. 2,
1987, at 2, col. 1; supra note 329.
343. A similar problem could arise if a bank were forced to cut its stock dividend as a
result of losses. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
344. For a description of the risk-based capital requirements, see supra notes 187-97
and accompanying text.
345. United States treasury securities are accorded a weight of zero in determining
total assets for application of the capital to assets ratio. See Risk-Based Capital Guide-
lines, supra note 187, at 4214.
346. See supra notes 207-23 and accompanying text (describing regulatory enforce-
ment powers).
347. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 350.4(b) (1988) (FDIC mayrequire disclosure of enforce-
ment actions in annual disclosure statements to be made available to shareholders, cus-
tomers and the public "where the FDIC deems it in the public interest"). For banks and
bank holding companies subject to the periodic disclosure requirements of the securities
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cases, this disclosure may provide no real new information to the market,
except to indicate the regulators' concern. If the regulators bring an ac-
tion to force a bank to increase capital, the equity market is already
aware of and presumably has taken into account the low level of capital
at the offending institution.
Under these circumstances, disclosure of the enforcement action may
have several possible effects. Initially, the shock value of the special dis-
closure may focus the market's attention on the bank in question. This
may lead to a negative reaction on the part of bank shareholders. If the
bank subsequently takes steps to raise its capital, however, the market
may be reassured. 48
In addition, the disclosure may have an effect on other banks with low
levels of capital. Announcement of the enforcement action against one
bank may affect the market's perception of all similarly situated banks,
since shareholders will anticipate similar enforcement actions against
other institutions. In order to prevent a negative market reaction, other
banks may voluntarily take steps to increase capital. Thus, the ultimate
effect of the disclosure is to persuade bank management to take steps to
comply with regulatory preferences in order to avoid the necessity for
such disclosure.349
Nevertheless, experience demonstrates that regulatory attempts to
force bank management and shareholders to become risk averse can have
unintended effects. The market for bank equities does not always react in
ways that the regulators might expect. For example, the regulators tradi-
tionally have resisted disclosing their own internal examination data and
ratings of banks for fear of a negative market reaction. 50 Yet the occa-
sional accidental release of this information has not had a significant ef-
fect on the market for bank stocks. 1 Presumably, equityholders were
laws, any final orders or written agreements with the regulators already must be dis-
closed. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Youmans, 543 F. Supp. 1292, 1301
(E.D. Tenn. 1982) (securities law requirement to disclose material adverse changes in-
cluded written agreement between Comptroller of the Currency and bank), rev'd on other
grounds, 729 F.2d 413 (6th Cir.), cerl denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
348. For example, in 1984, the Comptroller announced that two large banks, Bank of
America and First Chicago, had entered voluntary agreements to increase their capital
and correct other deficiencies; according to the Comptroller, this disclosure was designed
to reassure the market that the banks' problems had been identified and were being cor-
rected. See Garsson & Trigaux, Comptroller Steps Up Pressure on Big Bank Capital Ade-
quacy, Am. Banker, Nov. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 1.
349. This was the only possible motive for some regulatory disclosure policies, such as
the FDIC's publication of the identities of certain depositors who placed funds through
money brokers in banks that subsequently failed. See Brokered Deposits in Weak Institu-
tions Strain Insurance Fund According to FDIC, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) 86,189 (Mar. 11, 1985).
350. Although the regulators have the authority to publish their examination reports if
the bank fails to comply with their recommendations, see 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1982 & Supp.
V 1987) (national banks); id. § 1828(f) (insured state-chartered banks), this seldom oc-
curs. Without regulatory permission, a bank may not disclose its own examination data.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.6025 (1988).
351. See, e.g., Murphy, Disclosure of The Problem Bank Lists: A Test of The Impact,
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already aware of the difficulties experienced by the banks in question, or
discounted the disclosure, making their own risk assessments. Thus, the
actual market effect of special selective disclosure may not be sufficient to
have any real deterrent effect on bank management and shareholders.352
Therefore, neither capital requirements nor selective disclosure neces-
sarily will cause shareholders to accept the preferences of the regulators
as to bank risk-taking. Although increasing shareholder discipline may
have the beneficial effect of putting pressure on overly cautious bank
management to improve its performance, the regulators' strategy may
backfire if banks are pressured by the market to achieve rapid earnings
growth in order to appeal to shareholders. A regulatory policy that
forces bank exposure to the market may cause banks to take too many
new risks too quickly.
Ironically, one way to pressure shareholders to become more averse to
risk would be to combine increased capital requirements with a return to
the historical assessability of bank shares.353 This assessability gave
shareholders an additional financial stake in their banks, causing them to
be more risk averse. As a practical solution to the problem of risk con-
trol in diversified banks, however, assessability of bank shares has obvi-
ous drawbacks. It is likely that equityholders would react by simply
avoiding bank stocks altogether. 4 Without some incentives for bank
shareholders to become more risk averse, however, reliance on the equity
market to set limits to bank risk-taking may be misplaced.
10 J. Bank Research 88, 89 (Summer 1979) (study of stock price movements following
publication of regulators' internal problem bank lists found no significant market reaction
to disclosure of the lists).
352. The regulators' occasional attempts to use disclosure to have a positive effect on
the market also have failed. For example, one week before the federal financial assistance
plan for Continental Illinois was announced, the Comptroller's office issued a press re-
lease intended to reassure the market, stating that it was unaware of any significant
changes in the bank's operations that would serve as the basis for rumors as to the bank's
impending failure. See Continental Hearings, supra note 24, at 273. This announcement
did not stem the deposit run on the bank by large depositors.
353. Until the 1930s, shareholders of national and most state banks were subject to
double liability up to the par value of their shares to satisfy creditors in the event of
bankruptcy. See United States v. Knox, 102 U.S. 422, 425 (1880). Because of problems
of collection and the small amount of equity relative to total deposits, this double liability
afforded only limited protection to depositors. See Note, Branch, Chain, and Group
Banking, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 659, 669 n.77 (1935). Following creation of the federal de-
posit insurance system, provisions for double liability gradually were repealed. See
Vincens, On The Demise of Double Liability of Bank Shareholders, 75 Banking L.J. 213,
214-15 (1958).
354. Since many banks today are wholly owned by bank holding companies, an assess-
ability requirement would have to apply to holding company shareholders. Cf. Anderson
v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 355 (1944) (applying statutory assessment on insolvent bank
shares to holding company shareholders). In fact, the regulators' policy of requiring
bank holding companies to provide financial support for their subsidiary banks in the
event of financial problems may already serve as a form of assessment on bank shares for
bank holding companies and their shareholders. The results of this policy, however, have
not been entirely satisfactory. See infra notes 355-67 and accompanying text.
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3. Bank Regulation and Problem Banks
The contradictions inherent in the new regulatory approach are per-
haps best illustrated by the problem of bank failure. From the viewpoint
of a diversified equityholder, losses resulting from the failure of any one
investment may be adequately offset by profits made on other invest-
ments. Thus, "looting" profitable investments to bail out unprofitable
investments may be counterproductive, potentially weakening the
healthy enterprises.
Although the new regulatory strategy does attempt to maintain a fire-
wall between a diversified banking organization's investments in order to
prevent such looting,355 this policy presents theoretical and practical
problems in the case of the impending failure of a bank. Although the
regulators recognize that banking organizations today are diversified en-
tities, ultimately, the regulators are concerned about protecting the tradi-
tional deposit-taking component of the diversified company, not its
nonbanking operations. Thus, the regulators' attitude toward diversifica-
tion as somewhat ambivalent. The regulators welcome diversification so
long as it strengthens the banking organization as a whole, thereby pro-
tecting its banking operations. Once banking operations are threatened,
however, the regulators' priority is the future of the bank, not the health
of the entire organization.
The contradiction inherent in this regulatory approach is suggested by
the regulators' attitude toward interaffiliate transactions in a diversified
bank holding company. Rules governing such transactions prevent the
use of bank funds to assist nonbank affiliates, 6 but are not concerned
with the possible abuse of nonbank affiliates for the benefit of the bank.
A recent regulatory proposal for bank product deregulation suggested as
a benefit of diversification that nonbank affiliates could be sold to raise
capital for the bank during times of adversity.357 Moreover, the Federal
Reserve Board recently reaffirmed its position that bank holding compa-
nies are expected to serve as a source of "financial and managerial
strength" to their subsidiary banks358 by ordering a bank holding com-
pany with thirty-two subsidiary banks to inject $1.2 million in new capi-
tal into one failing bank subsidiary. When the bank holding company
355. See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text. As previously noted, in some
cases, shifting funds from profitable to unprofitable operations may be in the long term
interest of a diversified organization if such allocation of funds improves overall perform-
ance. See supra note 299. Nevertheless, transferring funds between operations leads to
distortions if the sole justification is to prop up inefficient and ailing operations.
356. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Reserve Act
§ 23A).
357. See Mandate for Change, supra note 154, at 93,019. Section 5(e) of the Bank
Holding Company Act permits the Federal Reserve Board to require a bank holding
company to terminate nonbanking activities or divest nonbank subsidiaries if they consti-
tute a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness or stability of a subsidiary bank. See
12 U.S.C. § 1844(e) (1982).
358. Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1988).
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refused, pointing to agreements with its own creditors that prevented ad-
ditional investment in its subsidiaries, the Board brought a disciplinary
action against the bank holding company charging it with unsafe and
unsound practices.359
The regulators' policy of requiring bank holding companies to serve as
a source of financial and managerial strength to their subsidiary banks
presents a philosophical conflict with the regulators' other policy of en-
couraging compartmentalized portfolio management of diversified bank-
ing organizations. The latter policy contemplates management of
subsidiaries as independent profit-making operations; the former requires
management of the diversified operation with the goal of ensuring a flow
of funds to the bank. Moreover, proper management of a diversified
portfolio may mean that unprofitable operations are sold or shut down.
Yet if the unprofitable operation is a bank, the regulators may require the
banking organization to divert resources from more productive busi-
nesses to keep the ailing bank solvent. 3 °
These two regulatory policies involve more than simply a conflict in
management philosophy. In practice, banking organizations are far
more integrated than the portfolio approach to bank diversification sug-
gests. Thus, banking organizations are likely to channel funds to rescue
a troubled affiliate as a result of both operational interdependencies and
public perception of a banking organization as a single entity. 61
Nevertheless, by encouraging a different managerial approach, the new
regulatory strategy actually may lessen the ability and willingness of
banking organizations to stand behind their subsidiary banks. Geo-
graphic and product diversification creates more demands on and oppor-
tunities for use of financial resources, particularly as new activities may
involve extensive start-up costs. A banking organization's resources no
longer will be devoted exclusively to its banking operations.
In addition, recent bank regulatory initiatives have encouraged both
the shrinking of traditional bank assets36 2 and the movement of activities
359. See Mandate for Change, supra note 154, at 93,026 (Hawkeye Bancorporation).
The Board ultimately withdrew its complaint, but issued a policy statement confirming
that a bank holding company "should stand ready to use available resources to provide
adequate capital funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adver-
sity." See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement on the
Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength to Their Subsidi-
ary Banks, 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 43,055A (Apr. 24, 1987).
360. In one recent case, the bank regulators attempted to force a bank holding com-
pany to contribute $400 million derived from the sale of its nonbank subsidiaries to in-
crease capital at its failing bank subsidiaries. See Klinkerman, US Balks as MCorp Seeks
to Shield Assets, Am. Banker, Oct. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
361. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text. This suggests that ordinarily a
banking organization will have strong incentives to bail out its subsidiary banks as well as
other important affiliates.
362. See supra notes 326-28 and accompanying text (effect of more stringent capital
regulation).
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out of banks into separate nonbank affiliates.363 These developments
render any single bank subsidiary a relatively less important part of the
entire banking organization than in the past. Management may find it
increasingly hard to justify directing a disproportionate amount of the
organization's total resources to any individual bank subsidiary, particu-
larly if the banking operations are not a significant source of profits for
the entity as a whole.
Therefore, diversification and more efficient portfolio management,
both of which are encouraged by the new approach to bank regulation,
may mean that less, not more, resources will be devoted to strengthening
banking operations. Two additional developments may exacerbate this
trend. First, because diversification permits -greater risk-taking in indi-
vidual investments, banks in diversified banking organizations may be
operated in a riskier manner, a phenomenon that already has been
noted.3 4 Thus, the banking operations of today's diversified banking or-
ganization may be inherently riskier than they used to be, creating a
greater possibility of financial difficulty and failure. Second, efforts to
increase capital in banking organizations introduce into the banking sys-
tem an enlarged group of equityholders who are interested in the profit-
ability of the entire banking organization. Equityholders will resist use
of the banking organization's earnings to prop up a single troubled bank
subsidiary.365
The conflict in regulatory strategy may be most pronounced when a
bank subsidiary fails. It is generally assumed that a bank's failure will
have spillover effects on affiliated banks in the form of bank runs, and
even on nonbank affiliates, which tend to have business and other ties to
the bank. Moreover, the loss of a bank subsidiary could deprive the
banking organization of a major source of income. Yet the new regula-
tory strategy aims to minimize these organizational interdependencies. 66
Ideally, for a diversified bank holding company with strong firewalls be-
tween affiliates, the failure of one bank subsidiary may not even threaten
the rest of the organization. On the other hand, extensive funding of a
failing bank subsidiary by its holding company or its other bank or non-
bank affiliates could impair the financial stability of the entire enterprise.
In this case, the bank holding company may be better off liquidating the
bank rather than draining resources from healthy operations. In view of
363. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text (effect of compartmentalized
regulation).
364. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
365. Holding company debtholders also have reason to resist the use of holding com-
pany assets to protect bank debtholders. See Klinkerman, supra note 360, at 14, col. 4
(large bank holding company debtholders likely to sue bank holding company manage-
ment if corporate assets are transferred to failing bank subsidiaries).
366. If the bank and nonbank affiliates do not share services, customers or even names,
both operational interdependencies and public perception of the affiliation may be re-
duced, minimizing spillover effects. Moreover, a strongly capitalized bank holding com-
pany is less dependent on bank stock dividends for its own funding. See supra notes 183-
84 and accompanying text (risks of double leveraging).
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management's fiduciary duty to its shareholders, this may be the only
feasible alternative.3
67
Thus, banking organizations actually may be more willing to accept
bank failure than the regulators. For the regulators, a decision to liqui-
date a bank is not so simple: they must consider the cost to the insurance
fund and the effect on depositors and other banks, which lead the regula-
tors to avoid bank closings. Yet a regulatory policy of forcing banking
organizations to support their failing bank subsidiaries not only goes
against the logic of the regulators' new strategy, but can lead to financial
strain on the entire operation. In that case, maintenance of this policy
ultimately may require the regulators to deal with the consequences of
failure of an entire banking organization, not just a single subsidiary
bank.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE NEW BANK REGULATION
The new approach to bank regulation that has been described in this
Article leaves two unanswered questions. First, it is unclear who will
bear primary responsibility for managing risk in deregulated banking in-
stitutions, the bank regulators, bank management or bank shareholders.
Second, it is unclear how the bank regulators can ever control risk-taking
in the large diversified banking organizations of the future.
These problems will not be solved by returning to traditional strategies
of regulation. Initially, neither Congress nor the bank regulators are
likely to restore the formal system of controls that once characterized
bank regulation. In view of the momentum for further deregulation of
banking, the regulators simply will not be able to halt bank diversifica-
tion and growth. Moreover, developments in the markets in which banks
operate have made traditional regulatory techniques anachronistic.
Thus, all observers of bank regulation today are to some degree deregu-
lators. They differ only as to the desirability and efficacy of the new regu-
latory techniques, such as firewalls and capital requirements, in
controlling bank risk in a deregulated banking environment.
The growing pains that the bank regulatory system currently is exper-
iencing suggest a need not to return to traditional regulation, but to re-
think the approach of the new regulatory strategy. Traditional
regulatory techniques that mandated a particular investment policy for
the banking industry deprived banks of the flexibility needed to adapt
their business to an altered financial market. Yet recent regulatory initia-
tives that attempt to impose specific operating requirements on a deregu-
lated banking industry ultimately may create similar problems. For
example, the model diversified banking organization consisting of in-
dependent, separately operated banking and nonbanking components
367. Cf. Eisemann & Budd, Bank Holding Company Capital Planning Approaches, 4
Issues in Bank Reg. 27, 28 (Summer 1980) (concluding that parent organization is un-
likely to come to the rescue of an ailing subsidiary).
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may not in fact prove to be either the most profitable or the safest way
for all banks to enter new businesses.3 68 More important, regulation that
mandates this particular structure hampers the ability of banks to make
alterations within their organizations in response to internal crises or fu-
ture changes in the banking business.
The most significant lesson to be learned from the failure of traditional
regulation may be that future regulation must permit banks sufficient
flexibility to develop different operating policies in response to continuing
market changes. This suggests that attempts to legislate a new structure
for a deregulated banking industry may be unsuccessful. Rather, regula-
tory reform requires some rethinking of the role that bank regulation
itself should be playing in the governance of modern banking organiza-
tions. If direct regulatory controls over the structure and business of
banks are unworkable, then more effective regulatory strategies for man-
aging bank risk must be developed.
This Part suggests two possible visions for the bank regulation of the
future. One alternative would be to complete the process of deregulation
of the banking industry, leaving responsibility for determining the orga-
nizational structure, business and risk posture of individual banks to
their managers and owners. In this deregulated banking environment,
regulation would continue to serve only two functions. First, regulatory
efforts could be devoted to facilitating market discipline through im-
proved public disclosure and accounting requirements.369 Second, the
regulators presumably would continue to play some role in handling
bank failure when it occurred.370
An inevitable consequence of this minimal regulatory approach is that
it is likely to result in more frequent bank failures. Such a result may be
tolerated or even welcomed by the securities market. Bank shareholders
are likely to be less risk averse than bank regulators. Moreover, as banks
are forced to adjust to a deregulated banking environment, failure ini-
tially may serve to eliminate poorly managed or weak banks.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the bank regulatory system can tol-
erate the dislocations caused by more frequent bank failures, particularly
the resulting drain on the resources of the deposit insurance system. If
individual bank failures create additional risks for solvent institutions,
for example, by leading to deposit runs at healthy banks, any substantial
increase in the number of bank failures may pose a threat to the safety
and soundness of the banking system, defeating the goal of the new regu-
368. See supra notes 287-323 and accompanying text.
369. This style of bank regulation would be similar to regulation of the securities
markets.
370. How extensive this role should be has been debated elsewhere by this author and
others. See supra note 10. The regulators might continue to develop strategies for failure
prevention, such as arranging federal assistance to or mergers of troubled banks, or might
simply act to control the consequences of bank failure by administering the deposit insur-
ance fund.
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latory approach.371 Even if individual failures do not have serious spil-
lover effects on solvent banks, too many bank failures are likely to
threaten the solvency of the insurance fund. 372 The only solution then
may be to reinstitute some form of protective regulation in order to
shield banks from risk-taking that may cause their failure.373 Thus, un-
less deposit insurance itself is eliminated or curtailed, which is very un-
likely,37 4 some form of regulatory control over bank risk-taking is
inevitable.
Therefore, the regulators will continue to play a significant role in de-
termining how risk is managed at modem banking organizations, partic-
ularly during any transitional period following the dismantling of
traditional regulatory controls. As previously noted, however, the regu-
lators' attempts to manage bank risk in deregulated banking organiza-
tions create problems of regulatory monitoring and control of diverse
and complex institutions.375 Obviously, the regulators cannot expect to
engage in day-to-day administration of banking operations. Attempts to
serve as the "shadow management" of the banking industry376 will be
unsuccessful.
Although the regulators cannot hope to direct the day-to-day affairs of
a bank, they can become a more powerful constituency within the bank-
ing organization. Like bank shareholders, the regulators can bring pres-
sure to bear on bank management to control its risk-taking. Moreover,
the same techniques that are used by shareholders to influence manage-
ment policy are also available to the regulators. Shareholders rely on two
powerful weapons to make management more responsive to their prefer-
ences: their decision to supply or withhold capital from particular orga-
nizations, depending on their assessment of management, and their
371. See supra note 8 (describing goals of bank regulation).
372. Recent financial difficulties experienced by the thrift insurance fund have raised
questions as to the ability of the federal deposit insurance fund to absorb losses from
massive bank failures. See McTague, FDIC Chief to Answer League Critics: Seidman Will
Face Group's Convention To Rebut Claims that Fund is Shaky, Am. Banker, Oct. 31,
1988, at 1, col. 3 (FDIC Chief denies that fund is near bankruptcy).
373. In the past, concern over the adequacy of the insurance fund has led to increased
regulatory oversight and control of banks. For example, regulatory intervention to keep
failing banks open through federally assisted mergers or direct assistance, although criti-
cized as undermining market discipline of bank management, has been justified as the
only way to prevent exhaustion of the deposit insurance fund as a result of large or nu-
merous bank failures. See Isaac, supra note 11, at 203. Other solutions to the deposit
insurance crisis likewise would give the regulators new and extensive authority over the
affairs of banks. Any form of risk-based premium structure for deposit insurance would
require new regulatory powers to investigate and compel disclosure of information relat-
ing to bank management. Moreover, in setting individual risk ratings, the regulators
would be sending a powerful signal to the market that could affect banks' ability to obtain
funding or even their solvency. See id. at 207-08; Garten, supra note 10, at 247 n.26.
374. Even proponents of deregulation support retention of deposit insurance. See
supra note 11.
375. See supra notes 264-86 and accompanying text.
376. See Clarke, supra note 283, at 10, col. 2.
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power to remove or replace management for poor performance. 377 The
bank regulators have devoted considerable effort to enhancing sharehold-
ers' ability to exercise these powers by improving bank disclosure and
forcing banks to resort more frequently to the capital markets to raise
new equity.378 Yet these shareholders' techniques for disciplining corpo-
rate management also may be the regulators' most effective weapons in
controlling bank risk-taking.
Effective employment of these tools, however, will require some im-
provement in bank regulatory technique. The ability to exert effective
pressure on bank management requires careful monitoring of manage-
ment performance. The bank regulators repeatedly have attempted to
improve shareholder monitoring of bank risk-taking.379 Regulatory
monitoring must be at least as good as that of private analysts and the
securities market if the regulators are to exert any influence over bank
policy. In view of the increasing cost and diminishing usefulness of tradi-
tional on-site examinations of diversified banking institutions, the regula-
tors may have to rely increasingly on private sector analysis to assist
them in gathering and assessing comparative information about banking
organizations.38 °
In addition, the regulators must improve existing incentives for bank
management to respond to regulatory preferences with respect to risk-
taking. Unlike shareholders, the regulators do not supply funds directly
to individual banking organizations, but certain forms of regulatory
"capital" traditionally have been significant to bank management. Be-
cause bank acquisitions and many other corporate decisions have re-
quired explicit regulatory approval, banks seeking to expand their
operations have had reason to cultivate the good will of the regulators.
Moreover, the regulators' broad discretion to decide applications for ex-
pansion has enabled the regulators to engage in some creative condition-
ing in applying regulation to individual banks.381 For example, the
regulators' authority to take into account a bank's financial and manage-
rial resources in ruling on an application has permitted the regulators to
condition approval on the applicant's undertaking to raise its capital or
otherwise to improve its performance. 382
Thus, the regulators already have the ability to reward or penalize
377. Shareholders may exert this power through election of the board of directors or,
more frequently, through takeovers, which enable shareholders who are dissatisfied with
management performance to register their disapproval by tendering their shares to a rival
bidder. In addition, shareholders may penalize bad management by suing their directors
for money damages for breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation. See W. Klein &
J. Coffee, supra note 173, at 178-79.
378. See supra notes 326-36 and accompanying text (capital requirements).
379. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
380. The regulators intend to make greater use of outside auditors to assist them in
gathering information. See, e.g., Rehm, FDIC to Urge Outside Audits for Banks It In-
sures, Am. Banker, Jan. 6, 1988, at 3, col. 2.
381. See supra note 12 (describing this conditioning power).
382. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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management performance through flexible application of their supervi-
sory authority. Ironically, as deregulation proceeds, this authority may
be diminished. If remaining regulatory controls on bank investments are
removed, banks no longer will have to apply formally to the regulators
before engaging in new activities.
The check on bank management traditionally provided by the ap-
proval process provides a strong justification for retaining the require-
ment for prior regulatory approval at least of major corporate decisions
such as acquisitions of new affiliates and changes in control. In reviewing
applications, the regulators should concentrate on management quality
and performance record, using their authority to deny or conditionally to
approve an application as a means of disciplining bank management.38 3
Although management quality is difficult to evaluate, the regulators can
look at such objective factors as past earnings record, stock price per-
formance and the existence of effective internal control mechanisms.
These are the same factors that shareholders look to in predicting a com-
pany's future performance.384
Use of the application process to discipline management may be criti-
cized as a crude and arbitrary means of exerting influence on manage-
ment policy. Banks may easily avoid the discipline simply by deciding
not to expand their operations. Nevertheless, although most banks may
resort to the application process infrequently, they must take into ac-
count the possibility that they may require regulatory approval of an ap-
plication at some future time. Thus, it is in the interest of management
to be responsive to the regulators' preferences in order to bank some reg-
383. Banking statutes already require the regulators to evaluate management quality in
deciding applications for major acquisitions. See supra note 317.
384. The existing approval process is complicated by the fact that a banking organiza-
tion's decision to expand banking or nonbanking operations may require approval by a
different regulatory supervisor-applying different statutory standards-depending on
which specific corporate entity within the banking organization is to be used for expan-
sion. For example, new nonbanking activities may require the approval of the Federal
Reserve Board if they are to be conducted by a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding
company; if they are to be conducted by the bank, they may be regulated by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration or a state banking supervisor, depending on the charter or insured status of the
bank and its membership in the Federal Reserve System. See supra note 248. The danger
of conflicting or inconsistent supervisory standards may provide a reason for requiring
banking organizations to expand their activities through nonbank subsidiaries of a bank
holding company to ensure that a single supervisory authority (in this case, the Federal
Reserve Board) will be able to control the application process. Such a requirement, how-
ever, will not entirely solve the problems created by the existence of competing supervi-
sory authorities, each of which would still have authority to approve corporate decisions
other than expansion into new nonbanking activities. This suggests the need for closer
coordination among the different bank regulators in developing consistent supervisory
standards for banks. More generally, the existing division of authority among bank regu-
lators based on corporate form-state bank, national bank, bank holding company-will
only hamper regulatory efforts to improve supervision of the restructured and diversified
banking organizations of the future. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
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ulatory good will for the future.38
Moreover, the effectiveness of this discipline depends entirely on the
ability or willingness of the regulators rigorously to exert their authority
in deciding applications. Countervailing factors, such as the need to ar-
range a merger of a troubled bank or fear of possible negative publicity
for the bank following denial of its application,386 may cause the regula-
tors to be unduly lenient in evaluating management quality in individual
cases. 387 These individual considerations may impede the development
of clear and predictable standards for granting or denying applications.
Nevertheless, some flexibility in administering standards is desirable in
the creative conditioning process, since it permits the regulators to nego-
tiate with individual applicants and tailor solutions designed to address
their specific problems. For example, the regulators might be willing to
tolerate below-average performance by a bank that has exhibited its com-
mitment to improve by replacing management and developing new oper-
ating procedures. At a minimum, bank management will be aware that,
to be successful in the application process, it cannot simply ignore past
problems, but must take some affirmative steps to improve its
performance.388
In addition to their ability to withhold or supply regulatory capital,
385. The discipline exerted by the capital markets on corporate management also may
be indirect. Many corporations rely on internally generated funds for most of their fi-
nancing needs and resort directly to the capital markets infrequently. Nevertheless, man-
agement still cannot afford to ignore the securities market's reaction to its performance.
If the market value of the corporation's stock drops too far, the company may become the
target of a takeover by an outsider that believes that it can improve the firm's market
value by better management. Similarly, bank management that deliberately avoids the
regulatory approval process will be hampered in its ability to expand the bank's opera-
tions and adjust to new competitive forces. This in turn may lead to negative shareholder
reaction and a possible takeover.
386. The regulators can avoid actually denying an application by requiring applicants
to meet with them informally to discuss the application before it is formally filed; if the
applicant cannot or will not meet the regulators' conditions and does not want to risk a
denial, it will not file an application.
387. For example, the regulators' record in enforcing the Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1982), which requires the regulators in acting on an
application for expansion to take into account the applicant's record in helping to meet
the credit needs of the local community, has been criticized by some observers as overly
cautious and ineffective. One explanation may have been a lack of consensus as to what
banks should be doing to serve local credit needs. But see Bank of Boston Corp., 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 35, 37 (1989) (describing typical elements of effective CRA programs). In
contrast, the regulators have had long experience in assessing and setting minimum stan-
dards for bank financial strength and management performance.
388. In its recent approval of corporate securities underwriting powers for bank affili-
ates, the Federal Reserve Board has required each applicant to develop operational and
management procedures, such as computer, audit and accounting systems and internal
risk management controls, which must be examined and approved by the Board before
the new underwriting activities may be commenced. See Morgan/Chase/Bankers Trust/
Citicorp/Security Pacific, supra note 119, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 206. Requiring bank
management to develop its own internal control procedures in this case may be a better
way to manage any new risks that may arise out of underwriting activities than for the
regulators to impose detailed new structural and operating requirements. The regulators
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the regulators, like shareholders, have the power to penalize management
directly for poor performance. The regulators can remove or impose di-
rect penalties on bank managers for actual fraud or negligence in operat-
ing a banking institution.389 Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the
regulatory enforcement powers have not been used frequently or effec-
tively enough to have had much of a deterrent effect on bank risk-tak-
ing.' 9° Too often, enforcement actions have been brought only after the
bank has failed, too late to have any influence on bank management
policy.
Simply increasing the number of enforcement actions that are brought
against bank management, however, may not necessarily improve man-
agement performance. The limited effectiveness of current enforcement
powers actually may be due in part to the very breadth of existing disci-
plinary authority. The enforcement powers permit the regulators to pun-
ish broadly defined conduct, such as "continuing disregard for the safety
or soundness of the bank," '391 the scope of which is determined by the
regulators themselves.392 Moreover, unlike the approval process for reg-
ulatory applications that encourages negotiation between the bank and
the regulators, the enforcement process is adversarial, resulting in the
imposition of potentially serious penalties on management such as re-
moval from office or personal liability.39 3 In light of the severity and
unpredictability of the enforcement powers, too frequent exercise of the
powers may simply discourage candidates from becoming bank directors
or officers rather than encouraging greater care in managing banks.3 94
generally could require banks to demonstrate effective internal operating policies and an
adequate performance record as a condition to approval of any application.
389. See supra notes 198-223 and accompanying text.
390. See House Report on Insider Abuse, supra note 200, at 152.
391. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1) (1982) (removal authority). Cease-and-desist orders
may be imposed following a showing of unsafe or unsound practices in the conduct of the
affairs of the banking institution. See id. § 1818(b). Any violation of such an order is
punishable by civil money penalties. See id. § 1818(i)(2)(i) (Supp. V 1987).
392. See Brickner v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 747 F.2d 1198, 1202 (8th Cir. 1984)
(FDIC has discretion to define breach of fiduciary duty for purposes of the removal
statute).
393. The regulators' apparent preference for flexible solutions may account for the in-
frequent use of the formal enforcement powers as opposed to jawboning and other infor-
mal techniques of persuasion. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. Yet these
informal techniques have been criticized as ineffective in correcting management
problems before they lead to bank failure. See, e.g., House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, Combating Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation's Financial Institutions:
Current Federal Efforts Are Inadequate, H.R. Rep. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988) (finding efforts by regulators to detect and prevent fraud, abuse and misconduct to
have been inadequate).
394. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text. A recent study of the regulatory
enforcement procedures criticized the bank regulators for failing to make public informa-
tion concerning decisions in administrative adjudications. This secrecy limits the ability
of counsel to advise potential targets of enforcement actions. See Malloy, Balancing Pub-
lic Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal
Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 Temple L. Rev. 723, 791-93 (1988).
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In addition, the different risk preferences of the regulators and bank
shareholders may subject bank management to conflicting duties. For
example, the regulators may deem a decision by management of a diver-
sified banking organization not to support an ailing bank subsidiary to be
an unsafe or unsound practice warranting an enforcement action against
management.395 Yet a decision to support the subsidiary could be harm-
ful to the banking organization as a whole, prompting complaints and
possibly even a derivative action against the directors by its shareholders.
Moreover, any penalty imposed by the regulators on the banking organi-
zation, such as removal of its directors, could lead to disruption of its
operations and negative market reaction, resulting in injury to its share-
holders. Thus, aggressive use of the disciplinary powers could result in
significant interference with the operations of the bank.
These problems with the regulatory enforcement powers suggest the
need for changes in their interpretation and use if they are to be effective
in disciplining bank management. Initially, the regulators must develop
clearer standards for exercise of their powers, for example, by clarifying
what conduct by bank management will be considered to amount to a
breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to justify removal. Clearer standards
not only will assist potential targets of enforcement actions, but also may
solve the problems that the regulators are facing in attempting to use
their enforcement powers to improve the quality of management at bank-
ing organizations rather than simply to punish past legal violations or
dishonesty.396 In the latter case, the problem conduct is easily identifi-
able: for example, the bank official embezzled funds from the bank or
made improper insider loans. Such conduct is usually both illegal under
existing banking laws and a clear breach of the official's duty of loyalty to
the bank under common law fiduciary duty principles. Thus, the basis of
an enforcement action is easy to articulate and prove.
It is much harder to base an enforcement action on mismanagement
that may not violate any specific statute or common law rule but that still
poses a threat to the safety of the bank. For example, management's
risky and imprudent lending practices by themselves may not violate any
specific banking law or even constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the
bank's shareholders.397 Yet this conduct may be the very sort of mis-
management that the bank regulators wish to discourage before it results
in losses for the bank. In order to bring pressure to bear on bank man-
agement, however, the regulators must be able to articulate what lending
practices are so imprudent as to fall below the regulatory standard of
care in managing banks. For example, the regulators may apply certain
minimum requirements as to proper loan documentation, levels of loan
395. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text (Hawkeye Bancorporation).
396. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
397. In fact, shareholders may have no reason to complain about these excessively
risky practices if they have not yet resulted in financial problems for the bank. See supra
notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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concentrations in particular industries or geographic regions and loan
approval procedures.
This suggests the need for the bank regulators to develop their own
standards of fiduciary duty for bank management that can be used as a
basis for the enforcement powers and that will provide bank management
with better guidance as to what duties it owes to the regulators. In addi-
tion, clearer standards will permit management to decide how best to
balance its duties to the regulators against the demands of other constitu-
encies, particularly its shareholders. Inevitably, the requirements of the
regulators as to risk management may occasionally conflict with the pref-
erences of shareholders who may prefer more aggressive risk-taking.
Nevertheless, these conflicts need not present insurmountable problems
for bank management. In practice, bank management already must bal-
ance the conflicting interests of multiple constituencies, including share-
holders and debtholders, depositors, who because of the special nature of
their investment may have completely different interests from the bank's
other creditors, customers and the community. The regulators are sim-
ply an additional powerful constituency whose demands must be taken
seriously by bank management.398
This broadening of regulatory standards for exercise of disciplinary au-
thority must be accompanied by more narrowly tailored remedies. If the
enforcement powers are to be used to improve management performance,
the penalties must be designed to protect rather than to cause further
injury to the banking organization. For example, if a bank employee
embezzles funds from the bank, the most appropriate remedy may not be
to remove or penalize the bank's directors. If it was impossible for the
directors either to discover or prevent this employee's actions, penalizing
or removing the directors will do little to encourage better management
performance. Moreover, removing the directors may leave the bank
without effective leadership in a time of crisis. On the other hand, if the
directors had failed to set up any internal control mechanisms designed
to prevent employee fraud, then an enforcement action against the direc-
tors may force them to take steps to minimize opportunities for future
embezzlement. Thus, by fashioning more narrowly tailored penalties,
the regulators can minimize the negative effects of regulatory enforce-
ment actions on banks and their shareholders.
These suggestions for regulatory reform are by no means exhaustive,
but are designed simply to illustrate a possible new strategy for bank
regulation in managing a deregulated banking industry. Clearly, future
bank regulation must rely less on direct rules of conduct and more on
flexible risk management, which may vary with individual bank and eco-
nomic conditions. Thus, rather than attempting to develop new substan-
tive rules to control risk in diversified banks, the regulators should focus
398. The modem view of corporate law treats the corporation as consisting of multiple
participants in a series of bargains. See, e.g., Klein, The Modern Business Organization:
Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 Yale L.J. 1521, 1527 (1982).
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on improving techniques of monitoring individual bank risk and exerting
pressure on bank management. This may be the most valuable lesson of
the new equityholder's perspective on bank regulation.
CONCLUSION
Deregulation has required the bank regulators to develop new strate-
gies of regulation that are designed to control risk in modern banking
organizations. The shift in regulatory strategy that has accompanied
bank deregulation may be characterized as a fundamental change in ap-
proach toward bank risk-taking from that of a typical bank debtholder to
that of an equityholder. The new equityholder's perspective on bank risk
recognizes the need to enhance bank profitability through diversification,
but leaves open the question of how to ensure that banks will manage
their new risks effectively. This dilemma may impede the future progress
and success of bank deregulation.

